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Abstract 
Large infrastructures like electricity supply networks are widely presumed to be 
crucial for the functioning of societies as they create conditions for essential economic 
activities. There has always been a continuing concern and complexity around risks 
in the field of energy security and particularly power grids within energy supply chain. 
Drawing on this complexity and a need for useful tools, this research contributes to 
developing and utilising proper decision-making tools (i.e. methods and models) to 
deal with the risk identification and mitigation in the UK energy supply chain as a 
compound networked system.  
This thesis is comprised of four study phases (Figure I.A.). It is aimed at 
developing decision-making tools for risk identification, risk interdependency 
analysis, risk prioritisation, and long-term risk mitigation strategy recommendations. 
The application of the tools has focused on the UK power supply chain. The five new 
tools which are introduced and applied in this thesis are: (1) Proposed Expert Selection 
Model (ESM) and its application under hesitant fuzzy environment (i.e. HESM), (2) 
Proposed Neutrosophic Revised Decision-Making Trial and Evaluation Laboratory 
(NR-DEMATEL) method, (3) Proposed hybrid Spanning Trees Enumeration and 
Best-Worst Method (STE-BWM), (4) Proposed Neutrosophic Enhanced BWM (NE-
BWM), and (5) Proposed stratified model of game of chance involving risk. 
In this thesis, the applied decision analysis tools not only are theoretically 
improved but also implemented in the UK power supply chain risk management to 
validate their effectiveness. The utilised tools can provide helpful models and methods 
to illuminate and solve managerial problems by enhancing decision making and policy 
setting.  
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Figure I.A Phases of the research 
Phases I and II: 
In Phase I, a framework is proposed containing 12 risk dimensions, and 5 
classification perspectives. The 12 risk dimensions include Climate Change (CC), 
Natural Disasters (ND), Environmental and Health Safety (EHS), Technical 
Reliability (TR), Operational Safety (OS), Disease Outbreak (DO), Political 
Instability (PI), Industrial Action (IA), Sabotage and Terrorism (ST), Resource 
Availability (RA), Market Failure (MF), and Affordability (AF). The five 
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classification perspectives are context-based, position-based, temporal, origin-based, 
and hybrid classification. Then, in Phase II, the NR-DEMATEL has been applied in 
order to analyse the 12 identified risk dimensions based on the causal 
interrelationships and interdependencies among them, which has been missing in the 
current electricity risk management practices. Additionally, a novel Hesitant Expert 
Selection Model (HESM) to systematically assist researchers with the expert selection 
process is also proposed. The proposed HESM along with scenario analysis would 
provide a basis for the expert selection and weight assignment process. Findings have 
suggested the six most significant risk dimensions are ND, CC, IA, AF, PI and ST. 
Phase III: 
Besides the interrelationships between risks, it is important to know the ranking of 
identified risks which motivated the development and application of the BWM, by 
highlighting some weaknesses in the original BWM and contributing to the theoretical 
development. The NE-BWM and STE-BWM are introduced to enhance the efficiency 
of the original BWM in dealing with uncertainty in experts’ subjective judgements. 
The application results have highlighted that CC and ND are two most critical risk 
dimensions.  
Phase IV: 
A novel generic stratified decision-making model is introduced. It is based on Concept 
of Stratification (CST), game theory and Shared Socio-economic Pathway (SSP) to 
deal with long-term risk mitigation planning for the most critical identified risks (i.e. 
CC, and ND). The model is applied in the region of Highland and Argyll in Scotland 
based on the primary data obtained from experts to prioritise flooding risk mitigation 
strategies which were recommended by the Scottish Environment Protection Agency 
(SEPA). The model takes into account both UK socio-economic situations and 
flooding risk impacts for the long-term decision making (5 to 20-year time frame). 
The findings indicate that the most important strategies which can provide long-term 
benefit in mitigating flooding risk impact in the area of Highland and Argyll in 
Scotland are flood forecasting, awareness raising, emergency plans/response, 
planning policies, maintenance, and self help, respectively. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
Energy security is generally associated with various concepts and realms of studies 
such as political science, economics and engineering but its fundamental characteristic 
is indubitably risk management. Efficiently assessing risks of an energy supply chain 
cannot be achieved without thoroughly identifying risks via reliable methods. 
Knowing that the disruption concern is quite substantial in electric power network 
particularly with growing global demand for electricity. Risk identification by 
considering all levels of the power supply chain from upstream to downstream prior 
to risk mitigation phase is a highly important task. Hence, risks have to be identified 
first. In this study, this goal can be achieved by introducing an all-inclusive risk 
identification framework and then using proper quantitative methods to assess risks. 
An overview on the energy security literature led this study to comprehend a need of 
a framework for identifying risks in energy supply chain and then their analysis based 
on their interrelationships. The reason is that, risks usually act in close interconnection 
to each other and barely act independently; that means there would be causal relations 
among them that occurrence of one risk would cause the other one. Thus, it is surmised 
that analysing these interrelationships can provide insightful understanding about the 
links and relations between risks that can guide to find out what risks are key factors 
in leading to other risks. This helps also with the risk mitigation strategy suggestion 
to focus more on these vital risks especially via a proactive perspective which looks 
more into future status of the system. In subsequent studies, identified risks are 
prioritised by proposed quantitative tools and risk mitigation analysis for the most 
critical ones are discussed. In this chapter, an overview of the research including some 
definitions, aims and objectives, as well as the structure of thesis are explained. 
1.1 Background 
1.1.1 Energy tri-lemma 
The notion of energy tri-lemma balances between the demands for low emissions, 
affordable and secure energy supply (Figure 1.1) (Winzer, 2012). It requires that a 
sustainable energy system should be able to balance between three factors of 
emissions, cost and security. Design of an energy system which balances all the three 
elements is a challenging task. It is believed that the security aspect of a sustainable 
energy system is not isolated from cost and environmental issues. In other words, there 
would be an interrelationship between energy security and emissions. For instance, 
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emissions can be stabilised by handling energy risks such as environmental health 
safety risk, via effective risk mitigation process. The same thing can happen for the 
cost side by mitigating the risks of market failures as an example. Thus, security is a 
crucial factor of a sustainable system with mutual relations with emissions and cost 
(Figure 1.1).  
 
 
Figure 1.1 Sustainable energy system tri-lemma (Winzer, 2012)  
 
Thus, under the spectrum of energy security, risk analysis in energy systems 
exploring the whole energy supply chain from upstream to downstream would be of 
paramount importance. This risk assessment cannot be reached successfully without 
thoroughly addressing and identifying risks ideally based on a compelling framework.  
1.1.2 Energy supply chain 
Supply chain vulnerability is a critical issue because a single disruption can lead to 
the collapse of the entire supply chain (Habermann et al., 2015; Kern et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, it is crucial for supply chain managers to know where networks are most 
vulnerable to allocate necessary resources (Chopra and Sodhi, 2004). Globalisation 
and outsourcing have raised the severity and frequency of supply chain disruptions 
(Zhao and Freeman, 2019). Potential severe repercussions resulting from supply chain 
risk uncertainty have led to growing interest in supply chain risk research (Hult et al., 
2010; Kumar and Park, 2019; Yildiz et al., 2016). Basole and Bellamy (2014) 
indicated that supply chain risk identification and mitigation is a complicated task due 
to supply chains’ progressively global, complex and intertwined nature. Klinke and 
Renn (1999) suggested that to deal with risks rationally one should be able to 
characterise them as well as to recognise the tools for designing proper responses. It 
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has been realised that an integrated risk management approach in supply chains is 
necessary which takes into account multiple characteristics of supply chain risks 
noting that supply chain management has a multidisciplinary nature (Heckmann et al., 
2015; Sanders et al., 2013).  
Energy supply chain can be separated technically into three levels. In the 
upstream of the energy supply chain, the generation or supply of energy sources is 
considered. It can be either primary such as oil, gas and solid fuels or secondary such 
as electricity. Midstream or network, manages distribution and transmission of the 
energy sources. Downstream or demand side of the energy supply chain is where 
energy is delivered to consumers that can be in transport, domestic, service or 
industrial sectors. In Figure 1.2 adapted from Hammond and Waldron (2008) a 
simplified illustration of the UK energy supply chain is depicted to show various 
elements of this socio-technical energy system.   
 
 
Figure 1.2 Simplified UK energy supply chain (adapted from Hammond and Waldron, 
2008) 
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1.1.3 Risks, accidents, and incidents 
To get an idea about what it is meant by risk, it should be referred to the Perrow’s 
(1999) work where he introduced the Normal Accident Theory (NAT). He divided 
each system like an energy system into four levels:  
1) Part: It is defined as the smallest and easily identifiable element of a system; an 
example of this can be a valve.  
2) Unit: It is defined as a collection of parts which are functionally linked to each 
other; a steam generator can be an example for a Unit.  
3) Subsystem: It constitutes a number of units. The secondary cooling system can be 
an example which includes condensate polishers and associate motors, pumps, and 
piping.  
4) System: like a whole nuclear plant as an example.  
Beyond these four levels, the environment is positioned. The disruptions to the third 
and fourth levels are named as accidents, while disruptions to the first and second 
levels are called incidents. In this study, all the potential incidents and accidents in an 
energy system are named risks. For complex systems such as nuclear plants which lie 
within the energy supply chain, accidents can cause disruption to the whole supply 
chain.  
In the supply chain literature, risks or disruptions are unplanned and unforeseen 
events which disrupt the normal flow of goods within a supply chain. Subsequently, 
they impose operational and financial risks on stakeholders within the supply chain 
and can have both short-term and long-term effects. Supply chain risks can be grouped 
into two levels: operational risks and disruption risks. Operational risks are linked to 
the daily management of supply chains whereas on the other hand, disruption risks are 
basically associated with natural or man-made catastrophes like floods, terrorism and 
so on (Blackhurst et al., 2011; Craighead et al., 2007; Hendricks and Singhal, 2003; 
Kleindorfer and Saad, 2009; Kouvelis et al., 2009; Sodhi et al., 2012; Stauffer, 2003). 
Bhattacharya et al. (2013) defined excursion event as an unpredictable event with large 
negative impact on the performance of at least one component of a system for a 
comparatively long timescale.   
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1.2 Aims and Objectives 
Large infrastructures like electricity supply networks are widely presumed to be 
crucial for the functioning of societies as they create conditions for essential economic 
activities. Electric power outages have been recognised as a national security issue by 
many governments like the US and more than 20 other countries including the UK 
(Brunner and Suter, 2008; Silvast, 2017). Aware of the importance of disruptions, the 
UK Government has been publishing National Risk Registers (UK Cabinet Office, 
2017) that outline significant risks ranging from coastal flooding to widespread 
electricity failure, pandemic influenza, and attacks on infrastructures. The 2017 
edition of this governmental publication has highlighted that widespread electricity 
supply failure has been classified with a severity of high impact and with a moderate 
likelihood of occurrence in the next five years, which confirms its importance. As 
declared by UK government report (UK Cabinet Office, 2017), the high impact 
severity of electricity supply failure in the UK, coupled with moderate likelihood of 
its occurrence between 2017-2022 exist. Thus, it is an interesting topic which is worth 
exploring within a broader context of energy supply chain. Furthermore, there is a 
need for a framework that clearly deals with the identification and classification of 
risks surrounding energy supply chain risks. Drawing on the complexity within the 
energy supply chain and a need for useful tools, this research contributes to the risk 
management body of knowledge (i.e. risk identification and mitigation) in energy 
supply chains as a compound networked system by proposing proper decision-making 
tools. Hence, this study’s research aim is to develop decision-making tools (i.e. 
methods and models) based on various theories and methods. Theories such as game 
theory, graph theory, uncertainty theories, Concept of Stratification (CST), Shared 
Socio-economic Pathway (SSP) and methods such as Multiple Criteria Decision 
Making (MCDM) methods including Decision-Making Trial and Evaluation 
Laboratory (DEMATEL) and Best-Worst Method (BWM) which are used in order to 
show their applications for dealing with risks in the UK power supply chain. This 
research intends to have significant theoretical contribution to the MCDM and 
decision analysis realms by developing quantitative tools as well as providing 
valuable information for policy and decision makers in the UK power supply chain. 
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1.2.1 Research questions 
This thesis aimes to answer the following Research Questions (RQs): 
RQ 1. What are the critical risks in the UK power supply chain?  
RQ 2. What are the causal relationships among the critical risks? 
RQ 3. How are these risks ranked and prioritised? 
RQ 4. How can policy makers deal with mitigating the most critical risks in the longer 
timeframe by taking into account socio-economic situations? 
RQ 5. What are the most appropriate risk mitigation strategies in response to the most 
critical risks?  
1.2.2 Research objectives 
The Research Objectives (ROs) are listed as follows: 
1. To provide a comprehensive framework for risk identification focusing on the UK 
energy supply chain. A risk identification framework will be proposed by scrutinising 
energy supply chain risks in the energy security literature. It is tried to incorporate all 
three aspects of a sustainable energy system (security, cost and emissions) in the 
power supply chain (Figure 1.1) (Chapter 5). 
2. To analyse causal interrelationships between identified risks by proposing 
Neutrosophic Revised Decision-Making Trial and Evaluation Laboratory (NR-
DEMATEL). Knowing that risks usually act in close interconnection to each other 
and barely act independently that means there would be causal relations among them 
that occurrence of one risk cause the other one. Hence, it is absolutely vital to take 
advantage of a method to analyse this type of interrelationships as well as dealing 
effectively with subjective judgements of experts in the UK energy supply chain 
(Chapter 5). 
3. To develop and apply two extensions of the Best-Worst Method (BWM) to 
prioritise the most significant energy risks obtained from the interrelationship 
analysis. The two extensions of the BWM are Neutrosophic Enhanced BWM (NE-
BWM) and hybrid Spanning Trees Enumeration and BWM (STE-BWM) (Chapter 6). 
4. To introduce a novel stratified decision-making model in order to deal with long-
term risk mitigation planning for the most critical identified risks (Chapter 7).  
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1.3 Thesis Structure and Summary 
In this part, I will explain briefly the thesis structure and summary of each chapter in 
order to make the comprehension of the studies easier for the reader. The thesis is 
structured in eight chapters and the research is carried out in four phases (Phases I to 
IV as shown in Figure I.A).  
Chapter 1: “Introduction”: In this chapter, the background of energy supply 
chain, definition of risks, aims and objectives including research objectives, and 
research questions are provided.  
Chapter 2: “Literature Review”: This chapter consists of a number of 
subsections including the literature discussion of decision analysis methods in energy 
and risk (Section 2.2), energy security (Section 2.3), twelve identified energy supply 
chain risks (Section 2.4), various classifications of energy supply chain risks (Section 
2.5). The knowledge gap is also discussed at the end of this chapter (Section 2.6). 
Chapter 3: “Theories and Preliminaries”: This chapter explains all necessary 
theories, concepts or logics which are used in this thesis and helps readers understand 
the methodology and analysis parts in the later chapters. MCDM and weighting 
methods are described in Section 3.2, and Section 3.3, respectively. Uncertainty 
theories including fuzzy logic (Fuzzy Set (FS), Hesitant Fuzzy Set (HFS), and 
Intuitionistic Fuzzy Set (IFS)), grey systems, and neutrosophic logic (Neutrosophic 
Set Theory (NST)), are explained in Section 3.4 and Appendix A. In addition, graph 
theory, Concept of Stratification (CST), and game theory are described in Section 3.5 
and Appendix B, Section 3.6, and Section 3.7, respectively.   
Chapter 4: “Proposed Decision-Making Tools”: In this chapter all the novel 
applied tools including methods and models in the thesis are presented. The five new 
methods which are introduced and applied are as follows: 
1) Proposed Expert Selection Model (ESM) (Section 4.2). The ESM provides a 
basis for the expert selection process in the similar decision-making problems where 
subject expert selection is necessary. In fact, it offers a reliable model that helps 
decision makers decide who can be an expert based on their credentials and experience 
as well as assigning each expert a relative importance weight. Chapter 5 illustrates an 
application of the proposed ESM as Hesitant Expert Selection Model (HESM).  
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2) Proposed NR-DEMATEL method (Section 4.3). The Battelle Memorial 
Institute launched a DEMATEL method project between 1972 and 1976 through its 
Geneva Research Centre in order to deal with complex issues. The original 
DEMATEL was utilised to solve fragmented and antagonistic issues of world 
societies. In this section, the revised-DEMATEL (Lee et al., 2013) is developed and 
enhanced under NST in order to capture uncertainty of Decision Makers’ (DMs) 
subjective judgements. The method then is applied to understand the interrelationships 
between energy supply chain risks as presented in Chapter 5.  
3) Proposed hybrid STE-BWM (Section 4.4). In the original BWM, DMs are 
required to offer with certainty the best and worst criteria. However, in real-world 
decision-making settings it would be simplistic to regard that DMs are able to choose 
one criterion as either the best or the worst with full confidence. In other words, there 
might be a set of best and a set of worst criteria instead of just one single best or worst 
criterion. The original BWM does not suggest any solution in this case and expect a 
DM to offer only one criterion. The STE-BWM deals with this issue and its 
applicability is verified and discussed within the energy supply chain risk 
prioritisation in Chapter 6. 
4) Proposed NE-BWM (Section 4.5). In the original BWM, the degree of a 
DM’s confidence on the best-to-others preferences and others-to-worst preferences 
has been overlooked by giving equal importance to them. This issue generated the 
motivation to improve the BWM by introducing the NE-BWM. The application of the 
proposed NE-BWM is presented in the energy supply chain risk prioritisation in 
Chapter 6. 
5) Proposed stratified decision-making model (Section 4.6). A novel model is 
proposed based on the integration of CST (Section 3.6) and game theory (game of 
chance involving risk) (Section 3.7) for long-term decision-making planning. The 
novelty lies within the fact that in some games like games of chance (i.e. one-player 
game against nature), the dynamic change of various states of a system in a long-term 
decision-making time frame is overlooked. In the games of chance, the current state 
of the system has been considered unchanged during the decision-making timescale. 
This feature of fixed state of the game, makes the obtained decision useful in a longer 
time frame if only the current state at the time of arriving a decision persists which 
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barely occurs. The reason for this shortcoming might be due to lack of a proper theory 
to formulate dynamic change of states throughout a longer decision-making period. 
This encouraged the development of the proposed stratified decision-making model. 
The application of the model is verified in risk mitigation strategy selection in Chapter 
7. 
The other five applied tools which are already introduced in previous studies in 
the literature are explained in Appendices C, D, and H as follows:  
1) Maximum Mean De-Entropy (MMDE) algorithm (Appendix D), 
2) BWM (Appendix E), 
3) Gray code algorithm for generating all spanning trees (Appendix C), 
4) Enumerating All Spanning Trees (EAST) (Appendix H), 
5) Geometric Mean of All Spanning Trees (GMAST) (Appendix H).  
Chapter 5: “Risk Analysis by NR-DEMATEL”: Energy supply chain risk 
identification (phase 𝐼) and causal interrelationship analysis of the 12 risk dimensions 
(phase 𝐼𝐼) are both presented in this chapter. This study proposes a comprehensive 
framework for risk identification focusing on the UK power supply chain. It is based 
on scrutinising energy supply chain risks in the energy security literature via 
consolidating information from various fields such as engineering, social sciences and 
natural sciences. The framework helps identify the most significant risks to the UK 
power supply chain. The 12 risk dimensions are identified and then by incorporating 
their interdependencies and causal influences, the most significant risks can be dealt 
with. The NR-DEMATEL is tailored and used in this chapter which makes it possible 
to analyse interrelationships between risks as well as dealing effectively with 
subjective judgements of experts. 
Chapter 6: “Prioritisation of Risks”: Prioritisation of the six risk dimensions 
obtained from phase 𝐼𝐼 is explored in Chapter 6 (phase 𝐼𝐼𝐼). The applications of STE-
BWM and NE-BWM are shown in evaluating identified energy supply chain risk 
dimensions from NR-DEMATEL. Additionally, in two case studies from the literature 
the applicability of the proposed NE-BWM are also verified. 
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Chapter 7: “Risk Mitigation Analysis”:  In Chapter 7 (i.e. phase 𝐼𝑉) the flooding 
risk mitigation strategies are evaluated in the Highland and Argyll in Scotland. The 
aim is to deal with the most significant climate change risk to UK infrastructure (i.e. 
flooding) for the long-term policy making (between 5 to 20 years) with reference to 
the UK socio-economic status. 
Chapter 8: “Conclusions”: Conclusions obtained from all analyses (Chapter 5, 
Chapter 6, and Chapter 7) are provided in this chapter. Moreover, research 
contributions, implications, limitations of the studies as well as suggestions for future 
research directions are discussed.  
At the end, Glossary of Terms, Appendices A to I, and References are provided. 
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Chapter 2 Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction  
Understanding energy supply chain risks from supply, network, and demand sides 
necessitates a review of the related literature from transdisciplinary fields such as 
energy security and supply chain mangement. This would then help systematically 
identify risks within a comprehensive framework which is one of the aims of this 
thesis. Futrthermore, it is of paramount importance to recognise what similar decision-
making methods are already in place in order to highlight the research gaps.  
In this chapter the related literature is reviewed. First, in Section 2.2, 
applications of decision analysis methods such as MCDM in energy planning and risk 
management literature are reviewed. In Section 2.3, the related research on energy 
security literature is explored. In Section 2.4, energy supply chain risks containing 12 
subsections that each one is discussing one of the identified energy risk dimensions 
via a systematic literature review. Five identified energy supply chain risk 
classification perspectives are described by providing literature support in Section 2.5. 
Finally, knowledge gap is discussed in Section 2.6.    
2.2 Decision Analysis Methods in Energy Planning and Risk 
Management  
In this section, literature on application of decision analysis methods mainly MCDM 
and game theory in energy planning and risk management is summarised. Energy 
planning is comprised of broad application areas, such as renewable energy planning, 
energy resource allocation, transportation energy systems, and electric utility 
planning. MCDM is one of the common methodologies in decision analysis. There 
are a number of studies that reviewed the literature on energy and MCDM which are 
briefly explained from the oldest to the most recent ones in the following paragraphs. 
Huang et al. (1995) reviewed the literature on decision analysis in energy 
modelling and identified that energy planning and policy analysis was the most 
popular application field. They also realised that decision-making under uncertainty 
was the most common practised methodology. In another review of more than 90 
articles on application of MCDM techniques to sustainable energy planning in seven 
application areas by Pohekar and Ramachandran (2004), it was identified that 
Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP), Preference Ranking Organisation Method for 
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Enrichment Evaluations (PROMETHEE), and Elimination and Choice Expressing 
Reality (ELECTRE) were the most favoured methods. Loken (2007) reviewed energy 
planning literature. It is indicated that energy planning is a suitable field for the Multi 
Criteria Decision Analysis (MCDA) applications. His findings revealed that more 
research is required on local energy systems with multiple energy carriers (i.e. 
electricity, hydrogen, and natural gas). Wang et al. (2009) reviewed MCDA methods 
corresponding to each decision-making stage for sustainable energy and recognised 
that AHP is the most favoured method. They also summarised evaluation criteria for 
energy supply systems from technical, economic, environmental, and social 
perspectives. The results revealed that investment cost followed by carbon-dioxide 
emission are the most critical criteria. Suganthi et al. (2015) reviewed applications of 
fuzzy-based models in Renewable Energy (RE) systems and found out that site 
assessment for installing PV/wind farms was among popular application areas. Elena 
Arce et al. (2015) reviewed the energy systems literature which applied Grey 
Relational Analysis (GRA). They realised that technical criterion and energy systems’ 
efficiency have been the most-utilised criterion and sub-criterion, respectively. 
Strantzali and Aravossis (2016) provided a review on decision-making methods 
applied in RE literature. Ioannou et al. (2017) provided a review of risk-based 
quantitative and semi-quantitative methods for sustainable energy system planning. 
Kumar et al. (2017) reviewed the applied MCDM methods in RE applications. 
Leimeister and Kolios (2018) reviewed the literature of risk and reliability analysis 
methods in the offshore wind industry. Kaya et al. (2018) reviewed the literature on 
both RE and non-RE energy alternatives spanning from 1986 to 2017.  
Apart from literature review papers, in  other research, Ali et al. (2019) 
evaluated renewable energy technologies (i.e. solar, wind, biomass, biogas, solar-
wind battery hybrid) in southern region of Bangladesh considering economic, 
technical, environmental, and socio-political criteria by Evaluation based on Distance 
from Average Solution (EDAS) method. Lin et al. (2018) identified risk elements of 
the New Energy Power System (NEPS) in China and analysed their internal influence 
relations based on D numbers and DEMATEL. Wu et al. (2018) evaluated RE power 
sources in China applying a fuzzy AHP method and a cumulative prospect theory. 
Okoro and Kolios (2018) developed and applied a multiple criteria risk assessment 
framework in a complex oil and gas support structure. Okoro et al. (2017) introduced 
a new multiple criteria risk assessment framework based on Technique for Order 
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Preference by Similarity to Ideal Solution (TOPSIS) and showed its applicability in 
an offshore wave energy converter case study. Kolios et al. (2016) utilised TOPSIS 
and weighted sum methods in order to rank risks in tidal energy developments. 
Bolsover (2015) employed Bayesian Network (BN) in order to monitor risks in real-
time which would lead to a more efficient decision making in an offshore drilling rig. 
Chou and Ongkowijoyo (2014) proposed a risk-based approach to compare alternative 
RE schemes. They applied a hybrid graphical matrix approach with Monte Carlo 
simulation. Maxim (2014) prioritised 13 power generation technologies considering 
10 criteria using a weighted sum multi-attribute utility approach. Bhattacharya et al. 
(2013) proposed stochastic dynamic decision-making tools in order to design a 
resilient shock absorber for disrupted supply chain networks. Aplak and Sogut  (2013) 
used game theory to evaluate decision-making process of the industry and the 
environment as two players by the scope of energy management. The strategies were 
analysed using MCDM methods to calculate performance efficiency values. Ren et al. 
(2009) studied the causal interrelationships between risk elements in offshore 
installation operations using a Fuzzy Bayesian Network (FBN). Afgan and Carvalho  
(2002) assessed new and renewable energy power plants using multi-criteria 
evaluation considering analysis of parameters based on the information deficiency 
method. Matos (1999) showed the application of Fuzzy Filtering Method (FFM) in a 
planning problem in the field of power distribution systems.   
After reviewing the applied decision analysis methods in the literature, in the 
next section, the literature on the the energy security and its relation to energy risk is 
discussed. The reason is that energy risk and energy security are closely connected, 
so it is beneficial to understand energy risks which is the application context of the 
current thesis from the lens of energy security.     
2.3 Energy Security 
The energy security literature is characterised by continuing concerns about risks. 
Although there is no universally accepted definition of energy security, there appears 
to be a consensus on security’s connection to risks (Chalvatzis and Ioannidis, 2017a; 
Chalvatzis and Rubel, 2015; Rutherford et al., 2007; Wright, 2005). 
Sustainable production and use of energy at affordable prices have been 
considered as a country’s objective for energy security which focuses on three pillars: 
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efficiency, diversification of supplies, and price volatility (The World Bank Group, 
2005). In another definition, four A’s of energy security have been realised as: (1) 
Availability (geological elements); (2) Accessibility (geopolitical elements); (3) 
Affordability (economic elements); and (4) Acceptability (environmental and societal 
elements). There is a complex interplay between these categories and they are by no 
means isolated (Asia Pacific Energy Research Centre, 2007; Kruyt et al., 2009). Based 
on the International Energy Agency (IEA) the security definition of energy supply is 
when it is adequate, affordable and reliable. Energy security is context-dependent such 
as a country’s level of economic development, risk perceptions, energy system’s 
robustness and prevailing geopolitical issues (Ang et al., 2015). It is indicated that 
there are three distinct perspectives on energy security as sovereignty (intentional 
actions by malevolent agents), robustness (predictable natural and technical factors) 
and resilience (diverse and partially unpredictable factors) perspectives. These 
perspectives have their roots in political science, natural science, and engineering and 
economics/complex systems analysis, respectively (Cherp and Jewell, 2014, 2011). 
Energy security has been linked to securing of access to oil supplies considering 
impending fossil fuel depletion. On the other hand, with a rise in natural gas use, the 
security concept has widened to cover other fuels and primary energy supply 
(Chalvatzis and Ioannidis, 2017a) such as gas or even electricity (Chalvatzis and 
Rubel, 2015) and is not limited to oil anymore.  
Disruptions can happen at any position within the supply chain thus, energy 
conversion and transport are regarded in connection to energy security. The political 
instability of producer and transit countries is another subject of discussion in the 
energy sector that takes geopolitical elements into consideration (Kruyt et al., 2009). 
As a result, the energy security concept has widened and developed over time.  
The IEA developed an exhaustive perspective on energy security to analyse all 
dimensions of energy system that goes beyond oil. The IEA Model of Short-term 
Energy Security (MOSES) has focused on short-term energy security dealing with 
vulnerabilities which can cause physical disruptions of few days or weeks (Jewell, 
2011). Chevalier (2006) indicated dimensions of time, space, and social for Security 
of Supply (SOS). Chester (2010) presented a couple of aspects related to energy 
security such as energy security as risk management concept.  
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Energy security in comparison with SOS is considered as a broader concept which 
covers all elements of an energy supply chain including supply, network and demand 
sectors from upstream to downstream. Hence, SOS should be regarded as a 
subcategory of energy security. 
2.4 Energy Supply Chain Risks  
In previous studies, Bode and Macdonald (2017) applied the organisational 
information-processing viewpoint to empirically study the decision-making process 
leading to rapid responses in supply chain disruptions. The outcome contributed to a 
deeper realisation of the decision stages role in mitigating supply chain perturbations. 
It was also confirmed that information processing speed and positive cooperation 
between stages influence supply chain performance. Bode and Wagner (2015) 
explored the frequency of supply chain disruptions by focusing on an upstream supply 
chain. Hammond and Waldron (2008) identified and ranked major risks concerning 
the UK electricity sector by taking into account various stakeholder groups and 
quantifying risks by multiplication of the likelihood of each risk and its consequences. 
Silvast (2017) studied the electricity infrastructures and interruptions from the social 
science perspective and tried to answer how people and organisations react to these 
interruptions. Moreover, he explained how interruptions to the electricity 
infrastructures can be anticipated and how risks can be managed. Klinke and Renn 
(1999) suggested a set of eight criteria to evaluate risks in general terms, not 
exclusively in an energy context. The authors discussed various methodologies to 
analyse risks, identified six different risk types and for each type developed special 
risk management strategies. Hunt et al. (2013) proposed a decision support framework 
tool based on MCDA for complex prediction of decision-making processes in the UK 
energy sources. Bhattacharya et al. (2013) defined an “excursion event” as “an 
unpredictable event that effectively shuts down or has a relatively large negative 
impact on the performance of at least one member of a system for a relatively long 
amount of time.” They classified excursion events in supply chain networks into two 
main groups: natural and forced disruptions. Natural disruptions such as natural 
calamities, infectious diseases, psychological panic among customers, market 
fluctuations, and economic recession. Forced disruptions included terrorism, 
organisational issues, contamination of raw materials, accidents due to negligence, 
and delivery failure. Staid and Guikema (2015) provided an overview of the risks 
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encountered by an offshore wind farm in US where they put emphasis on this point 
that an integrated framework for risks is needed in this area of wind farm electricity 
generation. They considered their work as a preliminary starting point for such a 
framework within offshore windfarms.  
As discussed in the research aims and objectives, this thesis intends to provide 
a comprehensive perspective towards macro-level energy risks including all energy 
sources through the entire UK energy supply chain. That is why it requires taking a 
thorough approach and avoiding a limited vision. For example, this overarching 
approach not only focuses on risks which are related to specific energy supply risk but 
also is aimed at including all risks from supply, demand, and network positions. More 
details about the protocol of the systematic literature review leading to the following 
energy supply chain risks is provided in Section 5.2 where the energy supply chain 
risk identification framework is described.  
2.4.1 Climate change 
Climate Change (CC) is a long-term alteration in the climate mainly driven by 
manmade Green-House Gas (GHG) emissions. These elements are expected to impact 
energy systems at all levels. Changes in power generation are resulted from changes 
in precipitation. A long-term alteration in the climate can change weather patterns and 
threaten renewable energy supply or capability for cooling thermal power stations. 
The transformation and transportation of electricity could be affected due to extreme 
weather events occurrence. Mideksa and Kallbekken (2010) stated that there is a 
surprisingly scant number of research on the effects of climate change on the energy 
sector. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) indicated that energy is 
“an example of an industrial sector particularly sensitive to climate change” 
(Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2007). Based on a scientific 
assessment, IPCC declared with very high confidence that humans are having a 
critical influence on the global warming. The policy response is likely to be the most 
significant challenge to climate change (Hammond and Waldron, 2008). Considine 
(2000) indicated that changes in weather have influence on electricity and natural gas 
demand. Wilbanks et al. (2008) in a review of US energy system indicated that for a 
1◦C rise in temperature, energy consumption would change within the range of 5%. 
Linnerud et al. (2011) explored the effect of climate change on electricity generation 
through thermal cooling.  
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2.4.2 Natural disasters 
Natural Disasters (ND) are calamitous events with atmospheric, geologic, or 
hydrologic origins. They can have rapid or slow development and can disrupt the 
supply chain or the operation of power stations. They can have rapid or slow onset 
with worrying health, social, and economic consequences (Watson et al., 2007). They 
include storms, hurricanes, floods, earthquakes, droughts, tsunami, landslides, 
volcanic eruptions, and wildfires which can cause great damage or loss of life. 
It is important to notice that natural disasters can be related to climate change 
(CC) but, not all of natural disasters are caused by climate change. Dealing with 
climate change means considering the root and cause of many natural disasters 
because climate change can increase the likelihood of weather-related natural disasters 
such as droughts which can be caused largely by global warming (Gallina et al., 2016; 
Van Aalst, 2006).  However, in some cases natural disasters may be triggered by other 
causes, even by other natural disasters. For instance, in eastern Taiwan, slow 
earthquakes triggered by typhoons or for example the Fukushima disaster begun by 
an earthquake which triggered a tsunami, which resulted in a nuclear meltdown (Liu 
et al., 2009). It should be noted that many natural disasters rather than being global 
threats are specific to certain systems or regions. For instance, droughts are more 
common in France rather than in Canada. 
Liu et al. (2000) identified natural calamities and animal triggered failures as 
one of the potential sources of system vulnerability. In the recent decade, there have 
been many natural disasters caused blackouts such as 2005 hurricane Katrina, 2011 
Japan earthquake, 2012 hurricane Sandy and 2017 hurricane Irma. Hurricane Irma in 
Florida, USA, for example, caused one of the largest natural disaster-related power 
outages in the US history (Daileda, 2017). Roughly, 679 power cuts were reported in 
the US between 2003 and 2012 each impacting at least 50,000 customers as a result 
of weather events. In the previous decades, analysing methods of natural disaster-
related issues in power systems considerably developed and owing to the complexity 
of the issue and its interdisciplinary characteristic, research is carried out across a 
broad range of fields (Wang et al., 2016). Two strong storms in December 1999 
striked over the southern and northern parts of France, repectively and resulted in 
severe blackouts for more than 3.5 million households (Chevalier, 2006). Wang et al. 
(2016) reviewed the applicable and relevant models and methods to natural disaster 
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scenarios particularly forecast models and restoration techniques. Extraction of shale 
gas by hydraulic fracturing or fracking was observed that could cause low-intensity 
earthquakes (measuring 2.3 and 1.5 on the Richter scale) in 2011 in North West 
England which resulted in shale gas extraction suspension nationally (Stamford and 
Azapagic, 2014).  
2.4.3 Environmental and health safety 
The energy system can potentially threaten the health of the public and can have 
negative impacts on the environment. Environmental and Health Safety (EHS) risk 
can then consequently pose a threat to the security of the energy supply chain by social 
pressure or legislation leading to stricter environmental laws. As a typical example, 
nuclear waste disposal is one of the constraints that challenges public health and the 
environment. Generally, these impacts can be categorised into radiological and non-
radiological impacts and could be caused by accidents or even routine operations 
(Ramana, 2009). Tsoutsos et al. (2005) studied environmental impacts from the solar 
energy technologies (Photovoltaics (PV), solar thermal, solar power). It is indicated 
that considerable environmental benefits are provided from them compared to 
conventional energy sources. However, there would be potential negative 
environmental implications in their wide scale deployment. Aman et al. (2015) 
presented an overview of solar energy technologies and explored their Safety, Health 
and Environmental (SHE) effect to broader sustainability along with 
recommendations to control the potential negative impacts of widespread use of solar 
energy technologies. Fthenakis and Kim (2009) presented the normalised land 
requirements during the life cycles of conventional and RE alternatives. It was 
concluded that PV and biomass cycles need the least and largest amount of land 
among renewables, respectively. However, the estimates differ based on regional and 
technological conditions.  
Carbon Dioxide (CO2) is the most critical GHG and is produced, for instance, 
when fossil fuels are burnt. It is measured by the gCO2eq/kWh that is grams of CO2 
equivalent per kilowatt-hour of electricity generated. Other GHGs like methane are 
quantified as equivalent amounts of CO2. This is carried out by calculating their global 
warming potential in respect to CO2 over a specified time frame, normally 100 years, 
with the aim of minimising long-term climate change (Parliamentary Office of 
Science and Technology, 2011).  
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2.4.4 Technical reliability  
Technical Reliability (TR) risks usually concern system failure due to low capital 
investment or poor condition of the energy system. Asset maintenance also falls in 
this risk dimension. Poor maintenance or lack of asset replacement is a leading cause 
of incidents for instance cable failures which past their projected lifetime (Winzer, 
2012). Therefore, this risk type is about shortcomings in the operation of power plants 
that hinder the proper operation and energy production. These risks are particularly 
significant for electricity generation from renewables, coal, and nuclear production 
(Checchi et al., 2009). In 2003, technical vulnerability caused 18 nuclear plants in 
Japan to be knocked out of service for several months (Chevalier, 2006). Faults in 
energy supply systems such as power outages resulted from accidents or human error 
led to malfunction of grid or generation plant (Ölz et al., 2007).  
2.4.5 Operational safety 
Operational Safety (OS) risk discusses the occurrence possibility of devastating 
damage concerned with a specific type of power generation not during normal 
operation but during accidents. This risk dimension differs from environmental and 
health safety in the sense that environmental and health safety concerns are caused by 
normal operations that would lead to environmental or health issues such as water or 
land contamination and air pollution. However, operational safety focuses on the risk 
of the energy system which causes damage during abnormal and accidental events. 
Beyond the affected power system boundaries, operational safety has knock-on effects 
via regulatory action. Nuclear power stations are regarded as the most dangerous one 
from operational safety perspective (Chalvatzis, 2012). For example, the Fukushima 
event started by the earthquake and subsequent tsunami which were natural disasters 
and disrupted the operation of the local power station. The immediate indirect impact 
was the Japanese policy decision to shut down all nuclear power reactors in the 
country which has caused significantly larger power supply disruption in Japan. One 
further indirect impact was regulatory decisions in Germany and more recently in 
Switzerland to accelerate shutting down of their nuclear energy sectors (Boston, 2013; 
Ranjan and Hughes, 2014; Reuters, 2017). Visschers and Siegrist (2013) conducted a 
longitudinal study to know how a serious accident impacts people’s acceptance of 
nuclear power as well as determinants of acceptance. 
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2.4.6 Disease outbreak 
Disease Outbreak (DO) refers to the disruption in energy generation due to an 
unexpected spread of a disease that can threaten personnel health in a specific region. 
Chevalier (2006) grouped an outbreak of a disease like Severe Acute Respiratory 
Syndrome (SARS) as an unexpected event among world energy uncertainties which 
can potentially lead to a disruption. This disruption can occur for instance by 
unwanted employees’ sickness leave which results in a shortage of staff or by 
fluctuations in global energy carrier prices. As another example, in December 2019, 
a new coronavirus (COVID-19) was identified in Wuhan, China among patients with 
a form of viral pneumonia. The virus spread internationally very fast that numerous 
countries declared confirmed cases which put severe threat on lives and businesses 
(Peeri et al., 2020). It shows the severity of a disease outbreak and pandemic at 
regional and global level can suspend regular operations of businesses. It can 
potentially pose risk on energy supply which hence needs further urgent risk 
considerations.   
2.4.7 Political instability 
Political Instability (PI) refers to social unrest or geopolitical changes which would 
impact the security of the energy supply chain and would cause disruption. Political 
instability can impact on all aspects of energy supply chain including supply, network, 
and demand. It has been regarded as one of the causes of resource unavailability on 
the supply side of the energy supply chain. Varigonda (2013) studied the link between 
energy insecurity and state stability in India. Political challenges and conflicts can be 
a major burden on developing the transmission system. As an example Huda and 
McDonald (2016) explored energy cooperation in South Asia and explained the 
political impediments in implementing transnational pipelines and electricity grids by 
interviewing government officials, scholars, and other experts in Bangladesh, Nepal, 
Pakistan, and India. This point that energy industries are not functioning in a 
competitive market framework in the majority of supplier countries due to 
government interference will cause concern that energy would be utilised as a political 
weapon. Moreover, political instability such as civil wars, local conflicts, and 
terrorism in the supplier countries will threaten the security of supply (Checchi et al., 
2009). Political decision is considered as one of the causes of sudden disruptions in 
oil markets (Correljé and van der Linde, 2006). It is indicated that further collusion 
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between oil producer countries considering growing attention to oil reserves and 
generation could impact on export prices and delay new investments by adopting wait-
and-see strategies (Costantini et al., 2007). A study by Asia Pacific Energy Research 
Centre (APERC) studied the geopolitical risks in the Middle East after the emergence 
of Islamic State and its impact on the energy supply in Asia (Japan Institute of Energy 
Economics, 2016). It is also indicated that there are a few studies that have tried to 
quantify the qualitative element of political stability for SOS measurement (Kruyt et 
al., 2009). The IEA (Blyth and Lefèvre, 2004; International Energy Agency, 2007) 
applied the average of two World Bank’s worldwide governance indicators as political 
stability, absence of violence and regulatory quality for this aim. Jansen et al. (2004) 
quantified the measure of long-term socio-political stability on the United Nations 
Development Programme’s (UNDP) Human Development Indicator (HDI). 
2.4.8 Industrial action 
Industrial Action (IA) is regarded as one of the major causes of disruptions in the 
energy supply and electricity generation. According to Varigonda (2013), industrial 
action is categorised as the social instability. The electricity sector as a state-controlled 
legacy has connections with powerful labour unions. These unions may be regarded 
as main barriers in the way of power sector’s liberalisation and privatisation which is 
underway in many countries. Hence, the threat of coordinated industrial actions is 
often present. It should be noted that disruptions caused by industrial actions are 
considered as short-term or medium-term shocks (depending on the definition) 
(Chalvatzis, 2012). As an example, in the oil market, the Venezuelan industrial action 
in 2002 − 3 also known as oil strike or oil lockout resulted in a gross peak supply 
loss of 2.6 mb/d (million barrels per day) and is regarded as one of the five most 
important disruptions of the past decades (Löschel et al., 2010).  
2.4.9 Sabotage and terrorism 
Sabotage and Terrorism (ST) makes the electricity supply chain confront a serious 
challenge of how to provide more security without compromising the inbuilt 
productivity benefits in highly complicated and interconnected power networks. A 
disruption of electricity supplies can have catastrophic impacts on national security. 
Power systems can never be safeguarded against a determined attack because the 
assets are widely dispersed.  
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Amin (2002) categorised terrorist attacks into three groups as follows:  
1) Attacks upon the power system: the main target is the electricity infrastructure 
and as a result, outages rippling into the customer side. A single component such as a 
critical substation might be regarded as the point of attack or it might be a 
simultaneous, multi-pronged attack to disrupt the whole regional grid.  
2) Attacks by the power system: the final aim is the population by utilising parts 
of the infrastructure as an armament. For example, terrorists may plan to crash an 
airplane on a nuclear power station causing significantly larger damage than just loss 
of power supply of that specific power station. As another example, terrorists may 
take advantage of power plant cooling towers to disperse chemical agents.  
3) Attacks through the power system: the aim is the civil infrastructure such as 
utility networks. Setréus et al. (2012) identified components which are critical to 
system reliability and vulnerability and importance of each are quantified for two 
scenarios in a model of Britain’s Power Transmission System (PTS). In the study of 
Gjerde et al. (2011), sabotage has identified as one of the threats to the security of the 
system. Tranchita et al. (2009) presented a methodology to evaluate the power system 
security with respect to the likelihood of terrorist acts, regarding the uncertainties 
related to load and generation.  
One of the capabilities of smart grids is that it autonomously or by controlling 
from remote locations allows distribution systems to be largely automated as well as 
letting transmission systems be monitored at the regional scale. The goals of smart 
grid are always improving efficiency of delivery and enhancing availability of power. 
Achieving these goals is not simple and involves dealing with many likely risks and 
vulnerabilities such as increased vulnerability to cyber-attacks (Clements and 
Kirkham, 2010). Cyber-attackers can be grouped into five categories (Flick and 
Morehouse, 2011):  
1) Non-malicious attackers who look at the system security as a puzzle to be solved.  
2) Consumers driven by vengeance towards other consumers causing them to perceive 
ways to shut down their home’s power.  
3) Terrorists.  
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4) Disgruntled or ill-trained employees.  
5) Competitors for the aim of financial gain.  
Moreover, cyber-attacks can also be grouped into three major sets: (1) component-
wise (2) protocol-wise, and (3) typology-wise (Aloul et al., 2012).  
2.4.10 Resource availability 
Resource Availability (RA) is relevant to both fossil fuels and renewable energy 
sources. The lack of resources to generate power can pose a significant risk to power 
networks. This risk dimension can be discussed in a broad range of contexts as there 
are various kinds of primary resources such as renewables or non-renewables. Here, 
it is discussed under two categories of fossil fuels and renewable energy as follows: 
2.4.10.1 Fossil fuels 
With regards to fossil fuels, Correljé and van der Linde (2006) distinguished three 
types of oil market disruptions:  
1) Sudden disruptions: which may occur due to a political decision of not offering oil 
on the market, an international armed forces conflict or even technical/operational 
issues. 
2) Slowly emerging supply gaps: they are caused by either lagging investments in 
production and/or transport capacity.  
3) Ideological choices of oil producing governments.  
Horsnell (2000) analysed the probability of oil market disruptions with an 
emphasis on the Middle East. He identified two types of discontinuities (policy and 
fundamental discontinuity) and three types of disruptions (force majeure, export 
restriction, and embargo) (Correljé and van der Linde, 2006). The international oil and 
gas markets have recently experienced a resource abundance period mainly as a result 
of shale oil and gas exploration which has increased US production to unprecedented 
level (Kilian, 2016). Exploitation of shale gas in the UK is at an early stage but its 
reserves and potential resources could be substantial. There is an ongoing debate on 
the way that shale gas can contribute to fossil fuel consumption reduction and 
hazardous climate change prevention (Stamford and Azapagic, 2014).  
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2.4.10.2 Renewable energy 
For electricity generation, Renewable Energy (RE) (including hydropower) is 
growing very fast compared to natural gas and nuclear energy within the timescale of 
2018 to 2050, by an average rate of 3.6% per year. While for non-hydropower RE, 
the average yearly increase during the same time frame is 5.7% (US Energy 
Information Administration, 2019). Renewables reached a record of nearly 3% of the 
global primary energy consumption. Moreover, renewable energy in power generation 
increased by 15.2% in 2015 slightly lower than 10-year average growth rate (British 
Petroleum, 2016). The renewable share of total electricity generation is expected to 
grow from 22% in 2012 to 29% (with US CPP1 30%) in 2040. Hydropower and 
wind make up the two main contributors to the rise in global electricity generation 
from renewable energy sources. They account for nearly 67% of the total increment 
from 2012 to 2040. The produced global electricity in 2004 was around 17450 TWh 
and estimated to be about 31657 TWh in 2030 (Dincer, 2011; Güler, 2009; Yu and 
Qu, 2010). Net electricity generation worldwide grows by 1.9% a year on average 
from 2012 to 2040. The corresponding number in OECD2 nations is 1.2% per year 
where infrastructures are more mature and population growth is fairly sluggish or 
decreasing (US Energy Information Administration, 2019). As electricity is a 
secondary energy carrier and relies on primary energy sources, availability of primary 
resources (renewable or non-renewable) is absolutely essential for power generation 
(Chalvatzis, 2012).  
RE technologies potentially have a lower risk profile in comparison with regular 
energy sources but they yet may be susceptible to technological, financial, and 
regulatory risk exposures. Johansson (2013) analysed energy security aspects of 
renewable energy systems in accordance with a wide typology on energy and security. 
Dependence on variable flowing resources and competition for hard to find land 
resources can be some causes of concern for energy security based on renewables. 
The intermittency of renewables that impacts on energy quality can be associated with 
resource availability. Sovacool (2009) explored the intermittency of renewables in the 
US and after conducting many interviews, concluded that intermittency of renewables 
can be foreseen and managed. Grave et al. (2012) explored the secured electricity 
 
1 US Clean Power Plan 
2 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
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generation capacity of intermittent renewable energy sources for Germany until 2030 
in the short and long terms. 
2.4.11 Market failure 
Market Failure (MF) relates to the reliable market operation regarding smooth 
contracting and dispatching of energy. Market failures relating to the price, supply, 
and demand of energy sources in different markets can threaten energy security. As 
electricity cannot be stored, there is a necessity for immediate supply and demand to 
be in balance; otherwise the integrity of the system might be affected (Eydeland and 
Wolyniec, 2003). Price works as a balancing mechanism for demand and supply in a 
well-functioning market. Price can signal scarcity but is also influenced by other 
factors such as speculation, strategic communication and short-term shortages (Kruyt 
et al., 2009). High volatility of oil prices is the result of structural inflexibility on the 
oil market because of high fixed production costs, and low substitution elasticity, 
respectively (Costantini et al., 2007). The APERC (Koyama et al., 2016) explored the 
impact of the crude oil price drop on the world energy market. Market liquidity is also 
linked to price elasticity (Kruyt et al., 2009). Kilian (2016) studied how the increased 
availability of shale oil has affected US oil and gasoline prices. The process of 
electricity liberalisation and deregulation in Europe is causing new uncertainties for 
investors. Making a single electricity market should bring about more 
interconnections and less possibility for any disruption. However, in practice, capacity 
margins are inclined to lower new generating capacities. Furthermore, priority 
interconnected transmissions are not constructed at the right moment (due to many 
different reasons such as change or environmental resistance) (Chevalier, 2006). 
Fisher and Rothkopf (1989) explored various types of market failures which are 
significant in energy. Additionally, they studied the efficient allocation of resources 
and finally in case of market failure and distortion occurrence what remedies can be 
carried out. Liu et al. (2000) identified vulnerability in a competitive electricity market 
environment such as lack of incentives to construct transmission reinforcement and 
also to replace worn out control, protection, and generation equipment. Sensfuß 
(2008) analysed the effect of renewable electricity generation on the electricity market 
in Germany. Sáenz de Miera et al. (2008) tried to empirically explore the neglected 
benefit which is the reduction in the wholesale price of electricity due to more RE 
generation.  
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2.4.12 Affordability 
Affordability (AF) refers to the price of energy and the capacity of domestic and 
business users to afford it.  It demonstrates that availability of energy is not enough if 
energy is available at very high prices. It is related to vulnerable consumers who may 
not be able to meet their basic energy needs leading to what is known as energy 
poverty. At the same time, business and industrial consumers can be threatened by 
high prices since they impact on their profitability and may prevent investment and 
competitiveness. State owned electricity sectors have tried to address affordability by 
government controlled tariffs (Chalvatzis, 2012, 2009). The social dimension of SOS 
is important because SOS has a cost and in case of a price shock certain types of 
consumers who are exposed to volatile prices may not be able to afford supply of 
energy (Chevalier, 2006).  
2.5 Energy Supply Chain Risk Classifications 
Based on the literature review, it is revealed that there are five different perspectives 
for risk classifications as context-based, position-based, temporal, origin-based, and 
hybrid classifications. Context-based classification studies focus on the nature, 
context, discipline or occurrence realm of risks. For instance, physical, economic, 
social, and environmental risks defined by European Commission (2000) or 
geological, technical, economic, geopolitical, and environmental risks defined by 
Checchi et al. (2009) can be two typical examples. In position-based classification, 
risks are categorised in accordance with their position in the energy supply chain 
which can be upstream (generation), midstream (network), and downstream 
(demand). In temporal-based classification, researchers categorised risks on the basis 
of their timescales over which they operate that can be long, medium, or short time 
frames. Some risks have their origins inside the national border or energy system 
which can be regarded as internal, being related to production, transformation, and 
distribution of energy within national borders. Whereas on the other hand, many risks 
are related to imported energy that can be viewed as external. This kind of 
classification is discussed in the provenance-based attitude towards energy supply 
chain risk classification. Finally, there are hybrid classifications that consolidate two 
or more other classifications and provide a hybrid perspective of various dimensions. 
In the following sections, each classification is discussed and analysed within its 
respective literature.  
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2.5.1 Context-based classification 
This type of risk classifications has been a recurring theme in the literature. Here, it is 
called context-based classification as the focus is on the context, nature, discipline or 
occurrence realms of risks. Bearing in mind that various risk categories are usually 
analysed in totally separate disciplines. For instance, studies regarding natural 
disasters (such as earthquakes, floods, storms) or studies about supply intermittency 
discuss the natural risk sources (Skea et al., 2008; van Kooten, 2010). Engineering 
studies of system reliability take into account the analysis of technical risk sources’ 
impact (Billinton and Allan, 1996; Guo et al., 2009; Li, 2014, 2005; Makarov and 
Moharari, 1999). Table 2.1  summarises the context-based energy risk classifications. 
Table 2.1 An overview of context-based classifications  
Reference Risk classifications 
European Commission (2000) physical, economic, social, environmental 
Chevalier (2006) climate change and environmental policies, 
geopolitical, regulatory, unexpected 
Ölz et al.  (2007) energy market instabilities, technical failures, 
physical actions 
Checchi et al. (2009) geological, technical, economic, geopolitical, 
environmental 
Cherp and Jewell  (2011) robustness, resilience, sovereignty 
Winzer (2012) technical, human, natural 
Global Energy Institute (2019) geopolitical, economic, reliability, environmental 
 
European Commission (2000) categorised risks of energy supply into the 
following four groups: 
I) Physical risks: include permanent or temporary disruptions. Permanent 
physical disruption happens when an energy source is exhausted, or production is 
halted. The temporary disruptions can be brought about due to an industrial action, a 
geopolitical crisis, or a natural calamity. 
II) Economic risks: include erratic energy products price fluctuations on the 
European and global energy market. 
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III) Social risks: the instability of energy supplies caused either by unpredictable 
fluctuations in prices or physical disruptions which may lead to consequential social 
disruption. Industrial actions fall in this category.  
IV) Environmental risks: the damage to the environment resulted from energy 
supply chain. It may be regarded as accidental events such as oil spills/slicks, nuclear 
accidents, and methane leaks. It might also be originated from polluting emissions 
such as urban pollution and GHG emissions. Global warming is another cause of 
concern that is why the Kyoto Protocol set targets of declining GHG emissions for 
EU.  
Chevalier (2006) identified four categories of uncertainties which are 
surrounding the world energy scene: 
I) Climate change and environmental policies uncertainties: predicting the 
short, medium, and long-term effects of climate change is quite difficult in a way that 
determining what actions should be performed based on specific policies. 
II) Geopolitical uncertainties: raising amount of imported fuel in Europe from 
producer/transit countries with unstable or potentially unstable political and social 
situations would give rise to geopolitical uncertainty. Thus, it emphasises on the 
significance of diversified energy sources and would lead to higher prices, tight 
market and price volatility. 
III) Regulatory uncertainties: energy market liberalisation aimed at having 
competition and liquidity to motivate fuel substitution and as a result improving SOS. 
Hence, new forms of interactions between market mechanisms and public regulatory 
interventions must be applied in order to overcome the complexity of reaching 
competition. Additionally, for energy investors, threat of regulatory changes should 
be regarded.  
IV) The unexpected: there are a wide variety of unexpected events which are 
completely or almost unpredictable and pose risks on the energy security. Examples 
are terrorist attacks, civil unrest, wars, heat waves, hurricanes, earthquakes, tsunami, 
and pandemic diseases such as SARS and COVID-19. 
 
46 
 
Ölz et al. (2007) categorised energy security risks as the following three groups: 
I) Energy market instabilities: came about by unpredicted changes in 
geopolitical or other external factors such as trade embargoes and supply disruption 
on international oil price fluctuations. 
II) Technical failures: faults in energy supply systems such as power outages 
resulted from accidents or human error led to malfunction of grid or generation plant.  
III) Physical security threats (physical actions): acts of terrorism, sabotage and 
also natural disasters can impact on any section of energy supply chain. 
Checchi et al. (2009) identified the following five types of risks: 
I) Geological risks: level of global energy consumption is growing, and the 
majority of global fossil-fuel reserves are governed by government firms in the Middle 
East and Eurasia, while fossil-fuel reserves in the EU are decreasing. All these reasons 
cause concern for the long-term availability of resources. 
II) Technical risks: they concern system failures due to weather, low capital 
investment or weak status of the energy system. These risks are particularly significant 
for electricity generation. 
III) Economic risks: include unpredictable fluctuations in the market price of 
energy products.  
IV) Geopolitical risks: this point that energy industries are not functioning in a 
competitive market framework in the majority of supplier countries due to 
government interference will cause concern that energy would be utilised as a political 
weapon. Moreover, political instability such as civil wars, local conflicts, and 
terrorism in the supplier countries will threaten the security of supply. 
V) Environmental risks: define the potential environmental effects for instance 
from oil spills, or nuclear accidents.  
Cherp and Jewell (2011) proposed three perspectives on energy security as 
sovereignty, robustness, and resilience. They categorised threats by each perspective 
as follows: 
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I) Robustness: it has its roots in natural science and engineering and consists of 
threats such as failures of energy infrastructure, and extreme natural events, just to 
name a few. 
II) Resilience: it stems from economics and complex systems analysis and 
includes threats such as technology changes, variations of climate, market volatility, 
and regulatory changes. 
III) Sovereignty: it has its roots in political science and its related threats are 
sabotage and terrorist attacks, and political embargoes, just to name a few.  
Winzer (2012) recommended three main sources of risks as technical, human, 
and natural risk sources as follows: 
I) Technical risk sources: failure of infrastructure components such as 
transmission lines, or transformers due possibly to mechanical, thermal or 
communication network failures, or unintentional human error. 
 II) Human risk sources: sabotage and terrorism, political instability, and 
geopolitical risks (such as wars and economic sanctions), just to name a few examples. 
III) Natural risk sources: this category consists of examples such as 
intermittency of RE supplies, decline in fossil fuels stocks, or even natural disasters. 
The 2019 edition of index of the US energy security risk which employs 37 
distinct measures of energy security risk and covers the time frame from 1970 to 
2040 is made up of the following four sub-indexes that determine the main categories 
of risk to the US energy security (Global Energy Institute, 2019): 
I) Geopolitical: oil and natural gas are considerably becoming globally-traded 
commodities while are fairly well concentrated in a handful of countries which have 
uncertain political stability or are reluctant business partners with the US. Thus, 
dependence on these energy sources incurs political and military risks. 
II) Economic: price volatility may have severe negative effect which can put 
more pressure on family budgets and idle manufacturing facilities. 
III) Reliability: disruptions to energy supplies are considered costly. Long-
distance supply chains are susceptible to accidents and sabotage. Oil and natural gas 
fields geographically situated in weather-sensitive regions can get out of service. Lack 
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of sufficient electricity generation or refinery capacity may result in outages and 
blackouts. Outdated and inadequate electrical grids may overload and fail. 
IV) Environmental: Combusting these fuels would result in releasing GHG 
emissions such as carbon dioxide and correspondingly climate change poses risks on 
the economy and energy market.   
It is evident that there are close interrelations between some categories of each 
individual classification perspective. For instance, based on the European 
Commission (2000), a temporary physical disruption caused by an industrial action 
grouped into the physical risks while industrial action itself has fallen into social risks. 
It demonstrates particularly when it comes to the roots or causes of each risk category, 
the interconnections between risk categories will play a crucial role for an effective 
explanation. Moreover, it is also clear that there are many common risk categories 
shared in accordance with distinct context-based classifications. For example, 
economic risk category is similar among other classifications with just different names 
such as resilience (Checchi et al., 2009; Cherp and Jewell, 2011; European 
Commission, 2000; Global Energy Institute, 2019). Thus, it goes clearly that some 
risk categories based on different perspectives may appear with various names but 
nearly similar definition.  
The main drawback of the majority of context-based perspectives in the 
literature is that they lack thoroughness. It means they are not capable of covering all 
types of risks and there would be sometimes a few missing risk dimensions. The other 
negative aspect is lack of proper definition for each risk classifications. Mainly based 
on the work of Cherp and Jewell (2011) and considering other perspectives in the 
literature the following six classifications for the context-based classification are 
proposed: (1) Engineering science; (2) Economics; (3) Environmental science; (4) 
Sociology; (5) Politics; (6) Health sciences. This proposed classification is thought to 
be more comprehensive compared to other attitudes as it covers most relevant fields. 
It should be noted that some risk dimensions may belong to more than one group. For 
example, resource availability can be involved with many contexts such as economics, 
politics or sociology depending on which associated risk elements are being studied 
under the resource availability. Therefore, it is clear that certain risk dimensions will 
have to be considered under a definitional discussion in order to clarify their scope.    
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2.5.2 Position-based classification  
Based on this classification, risks are classified in terms of position in the system 
which can be upstream (generation), midstream (network) and downstream (demand). 
In the upstream, the generation or supply of energy sources which can be either 
primary such as oil or secondary such as electricity is considered. Midstream or 
network manages transformation (transport/storage and refining/conversion) and 
distribution/transmission of the energy sources. Downstream or demand side of the 
energy supply chain is where energy/electricity is delivered to consumers. Climate 
change is a risk dimension which has effect on all levels of the system (generation, 
network and demand). It implies that risk dimensions are not limited to merely one 
position and may act simultaneously on various levels. Gracceva and Zeniewski 
(2014) considered the positions in the energy supply chain that risks may occur in any 
position (see Figure 1.2). 
2.5.3 Temporal classification 
Stirling (2014) indicated that vulnerabilities can be mitigated only via looking at their 
dynamics over time (expressed as temporality). Chevalier (2006) regarded the time 
dimension of SOS as very important. Egenhofer et al. (2004) also held the view that 
risks or threats to physical supply vary across short, medium, and long-term 
perspectives.  
2.5.3.1 Short timescale 
Those risks that threaten security in the short-term are shocks to the system. They are 
threats to security that generally operate over less than an hour. In the short term, risks 
are usually related to disruptive effects of a price shock or an unpredicted lack of 
supply.  
2.5.3.2 Medium timescale 
Medium-term risks are threats to security that generally occur and develop between a 
few days up to a few months.  In the medium timescale, SOS may be threatened by 
enduring political or social turmoil, shortage of available resources or even delay/lack 
of investment in productive capacity, transmission, and storage.   
2.5.3.3 Long timescale 
Long-term risks are threats to security that generally operate over years and even 
decades. In the long timescale, the concern is more about the stability and 
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sustainability of economic development which will be facilitated by the availability 
of sufficient energy supply. It may also include long-term changes in weather patterns 
which impact on renewable energy generation.  
2.5.4 Origin-based classification 
Chevalier (2006) elaborated dimensions such as space, time, and social for the SOS. 
The space dimension of SOS states that disruption in supply of energy can have local, 
national, and international causes and implications, and in this sense associates with 
geography. Here, origin reflects whether the risks have external or internal cause. 
Some elements of supply are external like world oil price or storms and some 
components are internal which are linked, for instance, to the organisation of energy 
industries, safety standards, and storage obligations. Liu et al. (2000) indicated that 
vulnerability sources are either internal or external to the infrastructure constituting 
the power system. 
2.5.4.1 Internal events 
Internal events can be controlled which means there is a freedom to select strategies 
which would have impact on reducing the likelihood of the threats (Checchi et al., 
2009).  
2.5.4.2 External events 
Elements grouped into external risks are linked to energy imports dependency 
(Checchi et al., 2009). The major strategy available in the case of external events is 
responsive capacity development. It means maintaining the quality of energy services 
or improving the system’s capacity to conform to events (e.g. by expanding the storage 
to enhance short-term flexibility) (Gracceva and Zeniewski, 2014).  
2.5.5 Hybrid classification 
This classification incorporates two or three previously indicated perspectives. It is 
divided into two major groups as  
a) Two-dimensional which deals with two axes of temporality and position; 
temporality and origin; or position and origin. 
b) Three-dimensional that involves temporality, position, and origin together.  
Boston (2013) presented a hybrid classification by considering two dimensions 
of temporality and position in the system (Figure 2.1). For instance, loss of expertise 
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is a long timescale risk that is positioned in both generation and network levels. 
Gracceva and Zeniewski (2014) categorised energy security risks based on three main 
dimensions including position, temporality, and origin. 
 
Figure 2.1 Risks in two dimensions (position and timescale) (adapted from Boston, 2013) 
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2.6 Knowledge Gap 
After reviewing literature, firstly, there has been no comprehensive risk identification 
framework to help categorise energy supply chain risks in the UK (see RQ 1). 
Secondly, this thesis takes the view that there is some degree of interconnection 
between risks; that is, there should be causal relations among them, which indicates 
that the occurrence of one risk could lead to exposure to another.  Based on the 
literature, there are just a limited number of studies in the supply chain risk 
management literature that have addressed interactions between risks (Babu et al., 
2020; Chaudhuri et al., 2016; Qazi et al., 2017; Ritchie and Brindley, 2007; Wei et al., 
2010). This is even less explored in the energy risk management literature, particularly 
when focusing on the UK power supply chain. Thus, it is critical to take advantage of 
a method that can analyse these types of interrelationships as well as effectively deal 
with subjective judgments of experts such as a combined NR-DEMATEL and then 
understand how these risks are ranked and prioritised (see RQs 2 and 3). Thirdly, there 
was a need for a specific study to aid policymakers in the UK power supply chain to 
effectively realize significant risk dimensions and risk mitigation strategies 
considering the identified risks based on causal interrelationships among them. It can 
be quite useful in the risk mitigation stage in the long-term by taking into account UK 
socio-economic situations (see RQs 4 and 5). 
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2.7 Conclusions 
In this chapter, it was aimed at reviewing the literature on four main topics including 
(1) decision analysis methods in energy planning and risk management; (2) energy 
security; (3) energy supply chain risks; and (4) energy supply chain risk 
classifications.  
The review of decision analysis methods and energy security revealed that there 
is a need for analysing interrelationships between energy risks as they inherently are 
linked together and there would be causal relations between them. After recognising 
this gap in the literature, it is important to come up with a framework to identify and 
classify energy risks. To this end, 12 energy supply chain risk dimensions were 
explained based on a systematic literature review search protocol (Table 5.1). 
Additionally, various energy supply chain risk classifications were also identified and 
elaborated drawing upon the literature in Section 2.5. The proposed risk identification 
framework is introduced later in Chapter 5 (Section 5.2).  
It is surmised that the provided literature review can construct a basis for a 
comprehensive perspective towards energy risks by encompassing all energy risks 
throughout the entire UK energy supply chain. The framework and studies in response 
to research questions regarding outlined research aims and objectives are provided in 
Chapters 5, 6 and 7.  
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Chapter 3 Theories and Preliminaries  
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, some basic definitions, theories, and preliminaries are described. 
Understanding them is required to better grasp the idea behind the methods in Chapter 
4 as well as analysis parts in Chapters 5, 6, and 7.  
This chapter is comprised of seven sections including Multiple Criteria Decision 
Making (MCDM), weighting methods, uncertainty theory, graph theory, Concept of 
Stratification (CST), and game theory, respectively. As it was discussed in Chapter 1, 
the research aim is to develop decision-making tools based on various theories and 
methods. Thus, the main link that connects these tools to each other is the fact they 
are all related to decision analysis parts carried out in the next chapters of this thesis. 
Readers should refer to this chapter in order to understand the concept behind 
implementation steps of the utilised tools in the next chapters.  
 
3.2 Multiple Criteria Decision Making 
Multiple Attribute Decision-Making (MADM) methods are developed to select a 
suitable alternative from a pre-defined discrete set of alternative courses of action. As 
it is commonly seen in the literature, the terms MADM, MCDM, and Multi Criteria 
Decision Analysis (MCDA) are often used interchangeably (Govindan and Jepsen, 
2016). MCDM methods aim to select a suitable course of action, choice, policy, or 
strategy in decision problems with multiple and often conflicting qualitative and/or 
quantitative criteria under certainty or uncertainty (Kuo, 2017; Srinivasa Raju and 
Nagesh Kumar, 2010). The main goal in MADM is to provide a number of attribute 
aggregation methods which make model development possible based on Decision 
Makers’ (DMs’) or subject experts’ preferential system and judgement policy 
(Doumpos and Zopounidis, 2002; Tavana and Hatami-Marbini, 2011). The number of 
published applications of MADM has grown rapidly over the last two decades (Huang 
et al., 2011; Marttunen et al., 2017) considering a large number of available MADM 
methods (Mulliner et al., 2016, 2013).  
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3.3 Weighting Methods 
In decision making, in order to obtain the relative importance of each criterion or 
factor under study, generally a rank-order weighting method can be used where 
weights of criteria are distributed as Equation (3.1), where ∑ 𝑤𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 = 1 
 𝑤1 ≥ 𝑤2 ≥ ⋯ ≥ 𝑤𝑛 ≥ 0 (3.1) 
The rank-order weighting methods are also categorised into three groups (Wang et al., 
2009): 
1. Subjective weighting methods such as Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) and Best-
Worst Method (BWM). 
2. Objective weighting method such as Entropy method. 
3. Combination weighting method such as additive synthesis. 
Three elements are recognised in order to calculate weights (Wang et al., 2009) 
including (1) the variance degree; (2) the independence; and (3) the subjective 
preference of DMs. 
3.4 Uncertainty Theory 
Uncertainty in MADM has close relation with uncertainty theories. Booker and Ross 
(2011) stated that uncertainty could be defined as what is not known precisely, though, 
Zimmermann (2000) indicated that he had not been successful in finding any general 
definition for uncertainty. Since the introduction of Fuzzy Sets (FS) by Zadeh (1965), 
probability theory was challenged. The reason was that probability theory had been 
the sole representation for uncertainty. Subsequently, developments in mathematical 
uncertainty theories have been proposed such as the possibility theory in 1988 (Dubois 
and Prade, 2012), Dempster-Shafer evidence theory that has been developed by 
Dempster (1968), and then by Shafer (1976) to model belief or evidence (Kämpke, 
1988), imprecise probability theory (Walley, 1991), and random intervals (Joslyn and 
Booker, 2004). Smarandache introduced a non-classical logic, which has roots in 
philosophy as an alternative to the existing logical systems, namely neutrosophic logic 
to offer mathematical insight about uncertainty (Smarandache, 2002, 1999). 
Smarandache (1999) proposed Neutrosophic Sets (NS) which show fuzzy information 
utilising the functions of truth, indeterminacy and falsity like Intuitionistic Fuzzy Sets 
(IFS). Atanassov (1986) introduced IFS as an enhancement of the Fuzzy Set Theory 
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(FST) of Zadeh (1965) to improve it via offering the concept of non-membership 
degree (Vafadarnikjoo et al., 2018). Independency of the indeterminacy function from 
the truth and falsity functions in NS, differentiates it from IFS (Ji et al., 2018). The 
IFS was generalised to the NS, so as to present valuable information on how a DM 
would effectively deal with uncertainty within subjective judgements (Vafadarnikjoo 
et al., 2018). Levary and Wan (1998) indicated that there are two types of 
uncertainties. First, uncertainty related to the prospective traits of the decision-making 
environment characterised by a set of scenarios. Second, uncertainty regarding the 
decision-making judgement associated with pairwise comparisons. This research 
deals with the second type of uncertainty. In the literature, apart from uncertainty 
theories, various decision support tools have been proposed to deal with uncertainty. 
An example is the work of Baudry et al. (2018) that proposed a new framework to 
support participatory decision-making under uncertainty. This trend reinforces the 
importance of decision-making under uncertainty where the focus is to produce 
reliable solutions for complex real-world problems. Temur (2016) also emphasised 
this growing trend in the integration of uncertainty theories with MADM methods in 
handling uncertainty. Please see Appendix A for detailed definitions on utilised 
uncertainty theories.  
3.5 Graph theory 
Graph theory is an area of mathematics. The definition of graph 𝐺 = (𝑉, 𝐸) is a finite 
non-empty set 𝑉 of objects (vertex set) and a set 𝐸 (edge set-includes two-element 
subsets of  𝑉). Sometimes the vertex and edge sets of graph 𝐺 is represented as 𝑉(𝐺) 
and 𝐸(𝐺) , respectively (Benjamin et al., 2015). In Figure 3.1, graph 𝐺, is shown as 
an example where 𝑉 = {𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑑, 𝑒, 𝑓} , and 𝐸 = {𝑎𝑏, 𝑏𝑐, 𝑏𝑒, 𝑎𝑐, 𝑎𝑒, 𝑐𝑒, 𝑐𝑑}. Please 
see Appendix B for detailed definitions on graph theory. 
 
Figure 3.1 A graph 𝐺 
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3.6 Concept of Stratification 
The Concept of Stratification (CST) as an innovative version of stratification has been 
introduced by Zadeh (2016). In CST, a number of states should be traversed by a 
system in order to reach the target set (i.e. a desired state). Inputs and outputs of any 
state are incrementally stratified on the basis of their distance from the target set 
(Asadabadi, 2018; Rajabi Asadabadi et al., 2018). The CST is a very similar concept 
to Dynamic Programming (DP), while being much more straightforward to 
comprehend and then apply. As an example, knowing the population of Washington 
is 658,000 then the stratified count can provide more informative information. Given 
the area around Washington is partitioned into nested strata 𝑆1, 𝑆2, … , 𝑆𝑛 centring on 
downtown Washington. Stratified count is the collection (𝑆1, 𝑃1),… , (𝑆𝑛, 𝑃𝑛) where 
𝑃𝑖 is the population of Stratum 𝑆𝑖. The population might be stratified on the basis of 
gender, career, race, and so on. It is also indicated that stratified polls can be a highly 
important tool for politicians who run for office (Zadeh, 2016). The following 
concepts are identified in CST (Rajabi Asadabadi et al., 2018):  
System: It is defined as a set of objects which traverse states towards a state in 
the target set. 
State: 𝑆𝐸𝑡  signifies 𝑡
𝑡ℎ state and is characterised by the values of its related 
variables which are determined by experts. The system would transition from one state 
to the other by changing values of variables.  
State-transition function: moves the system from 𝑖𝑡ℎ state to (𝑖 + 1)𝑡ℎ  state as 
Equation (3.2).   
 𝑆𝐸(𝑡+1) = 𝑓(𝑆𝐸𝑡 , 𝑢𝑡) (3.2) 
          
If the system is situated at state 𝑡(𝑆𝐸𝑡), by receiving an input 𝑢𝑡, it transitions from 
𝑆𝐸𝑡   to 𝑆𝐸𝑡+1     
Inputs and outputs: Many inputs (𝑢𝑡) might exist for 𝑆𝐸𝑡 . Equation (3.3) shows 
the relation between each input and an output (𝑣𝑡). 
 𝑣𝑡 = 𝑔(𝑆𝐸𝑡 , 𝑢𝑡) (3.3) 
           Target state: The goal of the system is to reach the target set. 
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Target set: It is defined when there are multiple target states. 
Stratum: Stratum 𝑁 is defined as a set of states from which a system can get the 
target state in 𝑁 or less than 𝑁 steps. 
Reachability: It exists when there would be a path between two states.  
Incremental enlargement process would equip CST with high dynamicity. The 
primary goal of enlargement is identifying possible paths towards the target where 
reaching the target is costly; consumes excessive resources or is presently vague and 
gets obvious at coming times (Asadabadi et al., 2018).  
The foundation of CST is a model called Finite-State Machine (FSM) which is 
a discrete-time, discrete-state dynamical system. The importance of FSM lies in the 
fact that by using granulation and/or quantisation nearly any type of systems can be 
approximated to by a finite state system. Target set reachability plays a central role in 
FSM. Reachability includes moving or transitioning from a state 𝑆𝐸𝑡  to a state in the 
target set 𝑇0 within a least number of steps (Zadeh, 2016). In Figure 3.2, the target set 
(𝑇0) is at the bottom and comprises two states. Then by absorbing two states via 
enlargement process, the first stratum (𝑇1) is recognised by four states. Similarly, all 
states are stratified with respect to their distances from target states (Rajabi Asadabadi 
et al., 2018).  
 
Figure 3.2 Target set, stratum, and state in CST 
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3.7 Game Theory  
Since publication of The Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour by Von Neumann 
and Morgenstern (1947), game theory has been extensively utilised as a logical 
approach in various research realms such as economics and management. In this 
section, a basic model of game theory is explained. 
3.7.1 A general model of game of chance 
Generally, there are three types of games including games of skill; games of chance; 
and games of strategy. Apart from games of skill which are one-player games, the 
other two groups of games involve at least two players. Games of strategy involve two 
or more players, not including nature, each of whom has partial control over the 
outcomes (Kelly, 2003). Games of chance are grouped as either involving risk or 
involving uncertainty and are one-player games against nature (Table 3.1). Games of 
chance have been also called individual decision making under risk or uncertainty. In 
spite of being one-person games, they are modelled in terms of two players, thus they 
can be recognised within the field of game theory. In the game of chance involving 
risk, although the player does not know with certainty what moves will be made by 
nature, the player is aware of the meaningful probability of responses of nature, and 
thus realises the success probability of each of their strategies or actions. The expected 
monetary/utility value (EMV) can be utilised to reach a decision in this type of games 
(Colman, 1982).  
Additionally, games of chance involving uncertainty, are one-player games 
against nature and probabilities of nature's responses are unknown. Three principles 
for making a decision in such circumstances have been suggested:  
1) The maximax principle (super-optimistic approach) recommends that the 
player chooses the strategy that contains the greatest pay-off. 
2) The maximin principle (super-pessimistic risk-averse strategy approach) 
recommends that a player avoids the worst possible pay-off. In other words, the player 
should choose the strategy that offers the best worst-case scenario.  
3) The minimax principle (a good balance between the super-optimistic and the 
super-pessimistic; greatest regret avoidance) recommends that a player avoids the 
strategy of greatest regret. Utilising this approach, the payoff matrix must first be 
transformed into a regret matrix (Kelly, 2003).  
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Table 3.1 General game of chance model 
PLAYER 1  PLAYER 2 
(NATURE) 
  
 OUTCOME 1 OUTCOME 2 … OUTCOME 𝑀 
CHOICE 1 𝑃𝐹11 𝑃𝐹12 … 𝑃𝐹1𝑀 
CHOICE 2 𝑃𝐹21 𝑃𝐹22 … 𝑃𝐹2𝑀 
 …
 
…
 … 
…
 
CHOICE 𝑵 𝑃𝐹𝑁1 𝑃𝐹𝑁2 … 𝑃𝐹𝑁𝑀 
 
 
3.8 Conclusions 
A number of theories which are connected to the applied methodologies in Chapters 
4, 5, 6 and 7, and are necessary to understand the methods and analyses were described 
in the current chapter.  
The aim was to provide a brief guideline for readers to become familiar with 
these theories which would help them understand the methods, models, theoretical 
contributions, analysis and consequently results which are presented later on in 
Chapters 5, 6 and 7. However, in the later chapters, readers are often referred to these 
theories, so as to acquire essential and basic information to understand the used 
technical terms and implementation steps. This understanding would make the later 
chapters less complicated to read and follow. In the next chapter, the proposed 
decision-making tools are explained in detail.  
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Chapter 4 Proposed Decision-Making Tools 
4.1 Overview 
In this chapter, proposed decision-making tools in the thesis are discussed. They are 
novel tools including methods and models which have theoretical contributions to the 
body of knowledge. The reasons why these tools are proposed and applied are 
explained in the related chapters in detail. In general, MCDM methods are considered 
as valid and reasonable methods to deal with causal relationships between risks and 
for risks prioritisation. This point was also confirmed in the literature as discussed in 
Loken (2007) who reviewed energy planning literature and indicated that energy 
planning is a suitable field for the MCDM applications. Also, in a study by Lin et al. 
(2018) who identified risk elements of the New Energy Power System (NEPS) in 
China and analysed their internal influence relations based on a MCDM method (i.e.  
D numbers and DEMATEL). However, there are other methods in the literature such 
as Bayesian Networks (BNs) which can deal with risks by analysing occurrence 
probability of risks. But in this study as it was explained, the identified risks based on 
the proposed framework are recognised as risk dimensions which are of macro-level 
nature such as climate change or natural disasters. It is believed that BNs can be more 
helpful in dealing with risk elements which are of micro-level nature and are 
positioned at the lowest level of the proposed framework. The reason is that obtaining 
occurrence probabilities for risk elements can be more straightforward and meaningful 
compared to macro-level risk dimensions such as climate change.   
In this chapter, the application procedure for each one is described step by step. 
Furthermore, a brief background of their applications drawing upon the literature is 
also provided for some tools where it could benefit understanding of their importance 
in practical research contexts. The five new tools which are explained in this chapter 
are as follows: 
1) Proposed Expert Selection Model (ESM) (Section 4.2). 
2) Proposed Neutrosophic Revised Decision-Making Trial and Evaluation Laboratory 
(NR-DEMATEL) method (Section 4.3). 
3) Proposed Hybrid Spanning Trees Enumeration and Best-Worst Method (STE-
BWM) (Section 4.4). 
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4) Proposed Neutrosophic Enhance Best-Worst Method (NE-BWM) (Section 4.5). 
5) Proposed stratified model of game of chance involving risk which is named as 
stratified decision-making model (Section 4.6). 
4.2 Proposed Expert Selection Model 
In many Multi Attribute Group Decision Making (MAGDM) problems there is a need 
to establish a number of subject experts or specialists to obtain their opinions or elicit 
information. The process deals with subjectivity, validity, and criteria fixing  
(Mediouni et al., 2019). In previous studies, the task of experts’ weights determination 
was carried out in a relatively subjective, and unstructured way. Here, an Expert 
Selection Model (ESM) is proposed to facilitate this process while providing a 
profound logic to explain the overall process. It also helps get the importance weight 
of each expert which is useful to evaluate the chosen experts’ assessments. The 
proposed versatile model can be applied in any similar decision-making situation. It 
is comprised of the following three steps: 
Step 1: Initial Screening 
An initial list of experts in the context of the study including both practitioners 
and scholars is drawn up. All the practitioners and academics in the field of study who 
can be regarded as potential experts and directly contactable are included in the list.  
Step 2: Expert Eligibility Screening 
In this phase, the Expert Eligibility Value (EEV) is calculated for each expert 
either practitioner or academic. The EEV for the chosen experts in this phase should 
be greater than or equal to a predefined inclusion value of 𝛼 (𝐸𝐸𝑉 ≥ 𝛼). Four 
inclusion value ranges have been proposed which are measured in years as follows: 
Undemanding inclusion (𝛼 < 3) 
Acceptable inclusion (3 ≤ 𝛼 < 10)  
Favourable inclusion (10 ≤ 𝛼 < 20)  
Solid inclusion (𝛼 ≥ 20) 
Note that, the inclusion value can be changed based on stakeholders’ opinion 
and the specific circumstances of the study. Nonetheless, defining such a value to filter 
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out some potential experts can be cumbersome especially in specific fields that having 
access to experts is challenging. The EEV is calculated in close connection to years 
of experience influenced by other factors like education, level of experience, 
professional qualifications, and professional associations affiliation. The EEV for 
practitioners and academics can be calculated using Equation (4.1) and (4.2), 
respectively. 
 𝐸𝐸𝑉 = [∑(𝑌𝑖 × 𝐿𝑖)
3
𝑖=1
] × 𝐸𝑗 ×∏𝑄𝑚
𝑘
𝑝
𝑘=1
× 𝐴𝑙  (4.1) 
 
 𝐸𝐸𝑉 = [∑(𝑌𝑖 × 𝐿𝑖)
3
𝑖=1
] ×∏𝑄𝑚
𝑘
𝑝
𝑘=1
× 𝐴𝑙  (4.2) 
Where, 
Variable: 
 𝑌𝑖 : Years of experience at each level of experience 𝑖 
Parameters: 
 𝐿𝑖 :  The importance weight of experience at each level of experience 𝑖 
 𝐸𝑗 : The importance weight of the highest level of achieved education (𝑗 = 1,2,3,4) 
 𝑄𝑚
𝑘  : The importance weight based on holding (𝑚 = 1) or not holding (𝑚 = 2) of 
𝑘𝑡ℎ  professional qualifications; equal importance weight for various 
qualifications is assumed for simplicity, 𝑄1
𝑘  is shown as 𝑄1 and also for 𝑄2
𝑘  
as 𝑄2 (𝑝 is the number of professional qualifications that an expert holds) 
 𝐴𝑙  : The importance weight according to the highest-ranked professional association 
where an expert is a member of (𝑙 = 1,2,3)  
In the EEV calculations for practitioners, 𝐿, 𝐸, 𝑄𝑘  and 𝐴 can take on values 
based on Equation (4.3) to (4.6), respectively. 
 𝐿 = {
𝑈𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑟 − 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝐿1
𝑀𝑖𝑑 − 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝐿2
𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡 − 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝐿3
 (4.3) 
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 𝐸 = {
𝑃ℎ𝐷 𝐸1
𝑀𝑆𝑐/𝑀𝐴 𝐸2
𝐵𝑆𝑐/𝐵𝐴 𝐸3
𝐵𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝐵𝑆𝑐/𝐵𝐴 𝐸4
 (4.4) 
 
 𝑄
𝑘 = {
𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑘𝑡ℎ 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑄1
𝑘 = 𝑄1
𝑁𝑜 𝑘𝑡ℎ 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑄2
𝑘 = 𝑄2 = 1
 (4.5) 
 
 𝐴 = {
𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝐴1
𝑁𝑜𝑛 − 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝐴2
𝑁𝑜 𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 𝐴3
 (4.6) 
 
In EEV calculations for academics, 𝐸 is not considered for academics as they all 
presumed to have been awarded doctorates (PhD) or equivalent degrees. Secondly, 𝐿 
for academics is the general academic hierarchy at universities which is shown in 
Equation (4.7) and can differ among various higher education settings. 𝑄 and 𝐴 for 
academics are calculated in the same way as for practitioners.  
 𝐿 = {
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑟   𝐿1
𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑟 𝐿𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑟  𝐿2
𝐿𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑟   𝐿3
 (4.7) 
 
Step 3: Importance Weights Normalisation 
The calculated EEV values are transformed into the scale between 0 and 1 to 
act as importance weights calculated by Equation (4.8), where 𝑒 indicates the 
maximum number of experts who were involved in the study. 
 𝑤𝑖 =
𝐸𝐸𝑉𝑖
∑ 𝐸𝐸𝑉𝑖
𝑒
𝑖=1
 (4.8) 
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4.3 Proposed Neutrosophic Revised DEMATEL Method 
The DEMATEL method is built based on the graph theory (i.e. digraph) which enables 
analysts to analyse and solve problems by the visualisation method. These graphs are 
more helpful than undirected graphs because they can show the directed relationships 
of sub-systems (Gabus and Fontela, 1973, 1972; Vafadarnikjoo et al., 2015; Wu and 
Lee, 2007). This method puts all factors into two distinct categories called (1) cause; 
and (2) effect, by applying impact values between factors. In DEMATEL, factors are 
elements that a researcher is keen on determining their interrelationships by 
constructing a pair-wise relation matrix. Lee et al. (2013) proposed a revised 
DEMATEL that is applied in the current thesis. In the proposed NR-DEMATEL 
method, the revised DEMATEL is integrated with Neutrosophic Set Theory (NST). 
However, in other neutrosophic DEMATEL methods in the literature, the original 
DEMATEL was used. For instance, Kilic and Yalcin (2020) utilised neutrosophic 
DEMATEL and TOPSIS for the evaluation of environmental sustainability 
performance. Abdel-Baset et al. (2019b) showed application of neutrosophic 
DEMATEL and TOPSIS for project selection. F. Liu et al. (2018) proposed SVNN-
DEMATEL and applied it in transport service provider selection problem. Tian et al. 
(2018) applied single-valued neutrosophic DEMATEL for market segment evaluation 
and selection. Abdel-Baset et al. (2018) used neutrosophic DEMATEL in order to 
develop supplier selection criteria.  
Steps of the NR-DEMATEL are revised and elaborated as follows (Govindan et 
al., 2016; Vafadarnikjoo et al., 2016) (In this thesis, factors are considered as risk 
dimensions):  
Step 1: Subject experts and factors identification 
In this initial step, it is required to identify a set of factors that should be 
evaluated by an appropriate number of experts who have rich knowledge and 
experience in the subject matter. Note that experts may not necessarily be eligible for 
evaluation of all of the factors and they may choose to evaluate one or more factors 
that they can provide proper evaluation for. Moreover, assigning importance weights 
to each expert’s opinion is another crucial part that should be handled in a systematic 
way. The Hesitant Expert Selection Model (HESM) is explained in Section 5.4 to 
facilitate this expert selection and importance weight allocation process. The weight 
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of 𝑘𝑡ℎ expert is represented as 𝑤𝑘 in a way that 0 ≤ 𝑤𝑘 ≤ 1 and ∑ 𝑤𝑘
𝐻
𝑖=1 = 1 given 
𝐻 is the total number of experts providing their opinions.    
Step 2: The initial direct-relation matrix 𝐵 construction 
The pairwise comparison matrix (𝐵𝑛×𝑛) is generated by pairwise comparisons 
between the 𝑛 factors being explored. It is carried out by experts who were asked to 
indicate the degree to which, factor 𝑖 affects factor 𝑗. The influence of factor 𝑖 on 
factor 𝑗 indicates how changes in factor 𝑖 can result in variations in factor 𝑗. The 
pairwise comparison between the 𝑖𝑡ℎ, and 𝑗𝑡ℎ factor given by the 𝑘𝑡ℎ expert is 
represented as 𝑏𝑖𝑗
(𝑘)
 that takes on integers based on the seven-grade Likert scale 
ranging from 0 to 6 (Table 4.1). The provided scores will construct a 𝑛 × 𝑛 non-
negative matrix 𝐵(𝑘) = [𝑏𝑖𝑗
(𝑘)
]
𝑛×𝑛
 with 1 ≤ 𝑘 ≤ 𝐻. Thus 𝐵(1), 𝐵(2), … , 𝐵(𝐻) are the 
matrices of 𝐻 experts. The diagonal elements of each matrix 𝐵(𝑘) are zero (Lee et al., 
2013). Some rows of the matrix can have missing values in case that an expert is not 
well-qualified to evaluate the specific factor. In this case, missing values have been 
treated by the deletion method.       
Step 3: The initial neutrosophic-based direct-relation matrix 𝑆 construction 
The Single-Valued Trapezoidal Neutrosophic Numbers (SVTNN) as revealed 
in Table 4.1 are utilised to substitute the influence scores in the direct relation matrix 
𝐵. The 𝑛 × 𝑛 non-negative neutrosophic matrix 𝑆(𝑘) = [𝑠𝑖𝑗
(𝑘)
]
𝑛×𝑛
 where 1 ≤ 𝑘 ≤ 𝐻 
is constructed by replacing the 𝑏𝑖𝑗
(𝑘)
 values in 𝐵(𝑘) with the corresponding SVTNN 
values as shown in Table 4.1.  
Step 4: The initial weighted average matrix 𝐴 construction  
In order to deal with the less complex calculation in the later computational 
steps, the corresponding crisp values (𝑐𝑠𝑖𝑗
(𝑘)
) of SVTNN values as shown in Table 4.1, 
are considered to generate the weighted crisp matrix 𝑉(𝑘) = [𝑣𝑖𝑗
(𝑘)
]
𝑛×𝑛
where  𝑣𝑖𝑗
(𝑘)
=
𝑐𝑠𝑖𝑗
(𝑘)
× 𝑤𝑘. To compute the crisp amount of SVTNN, the described score function in 
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Equation (A.34) has been applied. The 𝑛 × 𝑛 weighted average matrix 𝐴 = [𝑎𝑖𝑗]𝑛×𝑛
 
is then generated where 𝑎𝑖𝑗 =
∑ 𝑣𝑖𝑗
(𝑘)𝐻
𝑘=1
∑ 𝑤𝑘
𝐻
𝑘=1
  
 Table 4.1 Linguistic scale of SVTNN 
Linguistic Phrase Influence 
score 
SVTNN Crisp 
Value 
No Influence (NI) 0 〈(0.0,0.0,0.0,0.0); 0.0,0.0,0.0〉 0.00 
Low Influence (LI) 1 〈(0.2,0.3,0.4,0.5); 0.6,0.2,0.2〉 0.26 
Fairly Low Influence 
(FLI) 
2 
〈(0.3,0.4,0.5,0.6); 0.7,0.1,0.1〉 0.38 
Medium Influence 
(MI) 
3 
〈(0.4,0.5,0.6,0.7); 0.8,0.0,0.1〉 0.50 
Fairly High 
Influence (FHI) 
4 
〈(0.7,0.8,0.9,1.0); 0.8,0.2,0.2〉 0.68 
High Influence (HI) 5 〈(1.0,1.0,1.0,1.0); 0.9,0.1,0.1〉 0.90 
Absolutely High 
Influence (AHI) 
6 
〈(1.0,1.0,1.0,1.0); 1.0,0.0,0.0〉 1.00 
 
Step 5: The normalised initial direct-relation matrix 𝐷 construction 
The normalised initial direct-relation matrix 𝐷 = [𝑑𝑖𝑗]𝑛×𝑛
is generated by 
normalising the weighted average matrix 𝐴 using Equations (4.9) and (4.10) where  
is a very small positive value like 10−5 (Lee et al., 2013). ∑ 𝑎𝑖𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1  is the total direct 
effect that the factor 𝑖 gives to other factors and ∑ 𝑎𝑖𝑗
𝑛
𝑖=1  is the total direct effect 
received by factor 𝑗.  
 𝑝 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥 (max
1≤𝑖≤𝑛
∑𝑎𝑖𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
, + max
1≤𝑗≤𝑛
∑𝑎𝑖𝑗
𝑛
𝑖=1
) (4.9) 
 
 𝐷 =
𝐴
𝑝
 (4.10) 
Step 6: The total relation matrix 𝑇 construction 
The total relation matrix is produced by Equation (4.11) in which 𝐼 is the identity 
matrix. 
 𝑇 = 𝐷(𝐼 − 𝐷)
−1 (4.11) 
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Step 7: The impact-relations map (IRM) construction 
In the DEMATEL literature, the IRM (Lee et al., 2013) is also named as 
influence-relations map (Wang et al., 2012), causal diagram (Govindan et al., 2015), 
network relation map (Hsu et al., 2012), impact digraph map (Tzeng et al., 2007), and 
cause-effect diagram (Tzeng, 2014). An IRM is generated by applying Equation 
(4.12)-(4.14) as follows.  
 𝑇 = [𝑡𝑖𝑗]𝑛×𝑛
𝑖, 𝑗 = 1,2,… , 𝑛 (4.12) 
 
 𝑐 = [∑𝑡𝑖𝑗
𝑛
𝑖=1
]
1×𝑛
= [𝑡.𝑗]1×𝑛
= [𝑐𝑗]1×𝑛
 (4.13) 
 
 𝑟 = [∑𝑡𝑖𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
]
𝑛×1
= [𝑡𝑖.]𝑛×1 = [𝑟𝑖]𝑛×1 (4.14) 
 
Sum of rows (𝑟) and sum of columns (𝑐) are calculated according to matrix 𝑇. 
The 𝑟𝑖 is the sum of the 𝑖
𝑡ℎ row of the matrix 𝑇 and represents the total effect, both 
direct and indirect, given by the factor 𝑖 to other factors. And 𝑐𝑖 is the sum of the 𝑖
𝑡ℎ 
column of the matrix 𝑇 and presents the total effect, both direct and indirect received 
by the factor 𝑖 from other factors (Lee et al., 2013).  
The (𝑟𝑖 + 𝑐𝑖) is on the horizontal axis of IRM while (𝑟𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖) makes the vertical 
axis of IRM. The (𝑟𝑖 + 𝑐𝑖) represents the total sum of the effects given and received 
by the factor 𝑖. It is also named Prominence because it indicates the relative 
importance of each factor 𝑖. The (𝑟𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖) is named Relation and represents the net 
effect that the factor 𝑖 contributes to the system. In general, we have: 
If (𝑟𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖) > 0 →     the factor i is a member of cause group or a net causer 
If (𝑟𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖) < 0 →     the factor i is a member of effect group or is a net receiver 
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Cause factors impact on the entire system and their performance can influence the 
overall goal. Moreover, a factor belonging to a cause group should receive more 
attention. Effect factors tend to be easily impacted by other factors (Lin, 2013).  
Step 8: Setting threshold value 
Based on the total relation matrix (𝑇), each element 𝑡𝑖𝑗 of matrix 𝑇, provides 
information about how factor 𝑖 impacts on factor 𝑗. If all the information in matrix 𝑇 
converts to IRM then the map would be hardly conducive to appropriate decision 
making as it is too complicated to reveal any necessary information. This is 
particularly the case when there are numerous factors being explored. To obtain a 
proper IRM, researchers must set a threshold value for the impact level. Only factors 
with influence levels higher than the threshold value in matrix 𝑇 can be chosen and 
converted into IRM (Tzeng et al., 2007). In the literature, the threshold value is 
determined in various ways. Si et al. (2018) indicated a number of them such as the 
brainstorming technique (Azadeh et al., 2015), the average of all elements in the 
matrix 𝑇  (Sara et al., 2015), the maximum value of the diagonal elements of the matrix 
𝑇 (Tan and Kuo, 2014). In this study, the MMDE method (Lee and Lin, 2013; Li and 
Tzeng, 2009) is utilised which is explained in Appendix D. The reason is owing to its 
compelling rationale and logic as well as its capability in efficiently discovering strong 
relationships.   
Step 9: The net influence matrix 𝑁 construction   
After depicting the intricate causal relationships among factors using the IRM 
and MMDE,  Wang et al. (2014, 2012) further developed the net influence matrix 𝑁 =
[𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑗]𝑛×𝑛
 to assess the strength impact of a factor on another where 𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑗 = 𝑡𝑖𝑗 −
𝑡𝑗𝑖  
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4.4 Proposed Hybrid Spanning Trees Enumeration and BWM 
In the original BWM, a DM (i.e. expert) must be able to provide one decision-making 
criterion as the best and another decision-making criterion as the worst with certainty 
with no room for hesitancy. In the real-world decision-making process applying the 
original BWM dealing with subjective judgements of human beings, it is not always 
that straightforward for DMs to choose only one criterion as either the best or the 
worst without any level of hesitancy. What if a DM has two or more criteria in mind 
as equal, yet as the most important (i.e. the best) or as equally the least important (i.e. 
the worst)? In other words, there might be a set of best and a set of worst criteria 
instead of just one single best/worst criterion. The original BWM does not suggest 
any solution in this case and expect a DM to offer only one criterion as the best and 
one criterion as the worst criterion. The BWM can only recognise one criterion as the 
best and one criterion as the worst and is unable to handle more than one criterion for 
each of the best and the worst group.  
In order to deal with this type of uncertainty and capture the hesitancy of DMs, 
I propose the hybrid use of STE and the BWM. The STE can be accomplished by 
either EAST (Siraj et al., 2012) or GMAST (Lundy et al., 2017) which are explained 
in Appendix H. In the proposed approach, the following two additional steps (steps 
2.1 and 2.2) shall be added to the original BWM which are explained in detail as 
follows (see Appendix E for the steps in the original BWM): 
Step 1: Identifying set of decision-making criteria (in this thesis, risk dimensions or 
simply risks). The identified risks can be signified as shown in Equation (4.15).  
 𝑁 = {𝐶1,𝐶2, … , 𝐶𝑛} (4.15) 
 
Step 2.1: Determining the best set of risks (i.e., the most critical or most important 
group of risks), and the worst set of risks (i.e., the least critical or least important group 
of risks). The best and worst set of risks are denoted by Θ and Γ which are identical 
subsets of 𝑁 as represented in Equation (4.16) and (4.17), respectively.  
 Θ = {𝑀1,𝑀2, … ,𝑀𝑚}       Θ ⊂ 𝑁,Θ ≠ Γ (4.16) 
 Γ = {𝐿1,𝐿2, … , 𝐿𝑛−𝑚}       Γ ⊂ 𝑁, Γ ≠ Θ (4.17) 
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Step 2.2: Applying STE to obtain the best risk 
In this step, by applying STE (EAST or GMAST) the weights of each combination of 
the best and the worst risks is calculated and the maximum weight in Θ determines 
the best and the minimum weight in Γ determines the worst risk.  
The maximum number of calculations equals to 𝑚 × (𝑛 −𝑚) because of |Θ| = 𝑚 
and |Γ| = 𝑛 −𝑚. For instance, if |Θ| = 2 , and |Γ| = 3 , then 2 × 3 = 6 times, the 
STE calculations should be carried out. 
Then the rest of the analysis should be followed from Step 3 in the original 
BWM which are explained in the Appendix E. The analysis applying the proposed 
STE-BWM is represented in Chapter 6 , Section 6.2.2. 
4.5 Proposed Neutrosophic Enhanced BWM 
The original BWM was described in Rezaei (2016, 2015) and follows a five-step 
approach. The Non-Linear model (NL-BWM) was proposed in Rezaei (2015) and the 
Linear model (L-BWM) was explained in Rezaei (2016). The proposed Neutrosophic 
Enhanced BWM (NE-BWM) is constructed based on the NL-BWM model and has 
two additional steps, which are explained as follows (In this thesis, criteria are risk 
dimensions): 
Step 1: Decision criteria 
A set of decision criteria (𝑁) should be established in order to make a decision 
and do the analysis as shown in Equation (4.15).  
Step 2:  The best and worst criteria 
A DM determines the best criterion (i.e. the most favourable one) and the worst 
criterion (i.e. the least favourable one). 
Step 3: Best-to-others vector 
As shown in Table E.1, a DM expresses their preference of the best criterion 
over all other criteria using a scale from 1 to 9 (Ishizaka, 2012; Rezaei, 2015; Saaty, 
2005, 1977). The resulting vector is represented by 𝐴𝐵 = (𝑎𝐵1, 𝑎𝐵2, … , 𝑎𝐵𝑛)  where 
𝑎𝐵𝑗  signifies the preference of the best criterion 𝐵  over criterion 𝑗. It is also obvious 
that 𝑎𝐵𝐵 = 1.   
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Step 4: Others-to-worst vector 
A DM determines the preference of all criteria over the worst criterion using a 
scale from 1 to 9 (Table E.1). The resulting vector is represented by 𝐴𝑊 =
(𝑎1𝑊, 𝑎2𝑊, … , 𝑎𝑛𝑊)  where 𝑎𝑗𝑊  indicates the preference of the criterion 𝑗  over the 
worst criterion 𝑊. Clearly, 𝑎𝑊𝑊 = 1.  
The following two steps are uniquely introduced for the proposed NE-BWM: 
Step 5: DM’s uncertain confidence on the best-to-others preferences 
A DM is asked to provide their confidence on the best-to-others preferences, 
which would inherently include the uncertainty of their choice on the best criterion. 
Note that a DM is required to indicate their confidence using linguistic phrases 
presented in Table 4.2. Appendix F (Table F.1-Q1) presents a sample question used to 
acquire a DM’s uncertainty on their best-to-others preferences. The neutrosophic 
value of the DM’s confidence on the best-to-others preferences (𝜌+) is a SVTNN, 
which is then substituted for the provided verbal term (Table 4.2). It reveals the degree 
of DM’s confidence on Separation 𝐼. The crisp values in Table 4.2 are calculated based 
on Equation (A.34). 
Table 4.2 The confidence rating scale 
Linguistic Phrase Score SVTNN Crisp Value 
No Confidence 0 〈(0.0,0.0,0.0,0.0); 0.0,0.0,0.0〉 0.00 
Low Confidence 1 〈(0.2,0.3,0.4,0.5); 0.6,0.2,0.2〉 0.26 
Fairly Low Confidence 2 〈(0.3,0.4,0.5,0.6); 0.7,0.1,0.1〉 0.38 
Medium Confidence 3 〈(0.4,0.5,0.6,0.7); 0.8,0.0,0.1〉 0.50 
Fairly High Confidence 4 〈(0.7,0.8,0.9,1.0); 0.8,0.2,0.2〉 0.68 
High Confidence 5 〈(1.0,1.0,1.0,1.0); 0.9,0.1,0.1〉 0.90 
Absolutely High Confidence 6 〈(1.0,1.0,1.0,1.0); 1.0,0.0,0.0〉 1.00 
 
Step 6: DM’s uncertain confidence on others-to-worst preferences 
A DM is asked to provide their confidence on their others-to-worst preferences, 
which inherently include the uncertainty of their choice on the worst criterion. Note 
that a DM is required to indicate their confidence using linguistic phrases as 
represented in Table 4.2. Appendix F (Table F.1-Q2) presents a sample question used 
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to acquire the DM’s uncertainty on others-to-worst preferences. The neutrosophic 
value of the DM’s confidence on the others-to-worst preferences (𝜌−) is a SVTNN 
which is then substituted for the verbal term (Table 4.2). It reveals the degree of DM’s 
confidence on Separation 𝐼𝐼.  
Step 7: Optimal weights 
Model (4.18) (i.e. a non-linear model) was proposed in the original BWM and 
then transformed to Model (4.19) which provides the optimal weights (Rezaei, 2015). 
The proposed Model (4.20) can be established by applying 𝜌+ and 𝜌− in the objective 
function of Model (4.18) where 0 < 𝜌+ ≤ 1  and 0 < 𝜌− ≤ 1.  
 
 min max ,
jB
Bj jW
j
j W
WW
a a
W W
  
− − 
  
 (4.18) 
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 
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 subject to  
 
  
 𝑤𝑗 ≥ 0      j N    
 
Model (4.20), is then transformed into Model (4.21) and (4.22). 
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Finally, by solving Model (4.22) the criteria weights are obtained. 
 min
 
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 
− +
− +
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4.5.1 Consistency ratio 
There are two types of consistency: cardinal and ordinal consistency (Siraj et al., 
2015). The current Consistency Ratio (CR) values of BWM only measure cardinal 
and output-based consistency  (Liang et al., 2019). Liang et al. (2019) proposed 
consistency thresholds for BWM on the basis of both input and output-based 
consistency measurement. The consistency thresholds are based on combination of 
(1) number of criteria, and (2) maximum grade values (i.e. scales) (Table 4.3). 
Table 4.3 Consistency thresholds (adapted from Liang et al. (2019)) 
    Criteria    
Scales 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
𝟑 0.2087 0.2087 0.2087 0.2087 0.2087 0.2087 0.2087 
𝟒 0.1581 0.2352 0.2738 0.2928 0.3102 0.3154 0.3273 
𝟓 0.2111 0.2848 0.3019 0.3309 0.3479 0.3611 0.3741 
𝟔 0.2164 0.2922 0.3565 0.3924 0.4061 0.4168 0.4225 
𝟕 0.2090 0.3313 0.3734 0.3931 0.4035 0.4108 0.4298 
𝟖 0.2267 0.3409 0.4029 0.4230 0.4379 0.4543 0.4599 
𝟗 0.2122 0.3653 0.4055 0.4225 0.4445 0.4587 0.4747 
 
 The CR for the proposed NE-BWM is described in this section. The lower the 
CR the higher the consistency of evaluations. Given 𝑎𝐵𝑊  is the preference of the best 
criterion over the worst criterion, then, a comparison is fully consistent when 
𝑎𝐵𝑗 × 𝑎𝑗𝑊 = 𝑎𝐵𝑊. The minimum consistency of a comparison is calculated as 
follows: 
 Consider 𝑎𝑖𝑗 ∈ {1,… , 𝑎𝐵𝑊}  and that the highest possible value of  𝑎𝐵𝑊  is 9. 
Consistency decreases when 𝑎𝐵𝑗 × 𝑎𝑗𝑊 ≠ 𝑎𝐵𝑊 and the highest inequality occurs 
when 𝑎𝐵𝑗 = 𝑎𝑗𝑊 = 𝑎𝐵𝑊  . Given the highest inequality as a result of assigning the 
maximum value by 𝑎𝐵𝑗 and 𝑎𝑗𝑊 then, Model (4.22) can be used to calculate the 
consistency ratio based on Equation (4.23).  
 Bj jW BWa a a
   

   
− +
+ − − +
      +
−  − = +       
      
 (4.23) 
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As for the minimum consistency, 𝑎𝐵𝑗 = 𝑎𝑗𝑊 = 𝑎𝐵𝑊,  we can then obtain Equation 
(4.24). 
 BW BW BWa a a
   

   
− +
+ − − +
      +
−  − = +       
      
 (4.24) 
Based on Equation (4.24), Equation (4.25) can then be obtained. 
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 + + + 
 − + − = 
    
 (4.25) 
 
𝑎𝐵𝑊 can take on values {1,… ,9} (Table E.1) and based on Table 4.2, 
 0.26,0.38,0.50,0.68,0.90,1.00+  and  0.26,0.38,0.50,0.68,0.90,1.00− = .  It is 
assumed that 𝜌+ and 𝜌− could not be 0, as the evaluation of a DM with no confidence 
on their opinion could be easily dismissed. The maximum possible value of   can be 
calculated solving Equation (4.25). The obtained values are recognised as the 
consistency index (𝐶𝐼) values and are represented in Appendix G. After solving Model 
(4.22), the ∗ would be obtained and then the 𝐶𝑅 can be calculated by Equation (4.26). 
 𝐶𝑅 =
∗
𝐶𝐼
 (4.26) 
 
4.5.2 Confidence difference 
The Confidence Difference (CD) is proposed to measure the output of the NE-BWM. 
It is the difference between the confidence degree on separations 𝐼 and 𝐼𝐼 as shown in 
Equation (4.27).  
 𝐶𝐷 = |𝜌
+ − 𝜌−| (4.27) 
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4.6 Proposed Stratified Decision-Making Model 
The stratified game theory model comprised of 𝑁 status (𝑆𝑆) and 𝑀 outcome (𝑂𝐶) 
while under each 𝑆𝑆𝑖   there are 𝑛𝑖 strategies that result in various payoff (𝑃𝐹) values 
under different nature’s outcomes. As the model is game of chance involving risk, 
there would be a probability about each nature’s move or outcomes (Section 3.7). In 
Table 4.4, the payoff matrix of the model, and in Table 4.5 the states are presented.  
4.6.1 Notations 
𝑃: status transition probability matrix 
𝑄: outcome transition probability matrix 
𝑆: state transition probability matrix 
𝑝𝑖𝑗: the probability of transition from status 𝑖 (𝑆𝑆𝑖) to status 𝑗 (𝑆𝑆𝑗)    
𝑞𝑖𝑗: the probability of transition from outcome 𝑖 (𝑂𝐶𝑖) to outcome 𝑗 (𝑂𝐶𝑗)    
𝑠𝑖𝑗: the probability of transition from state 𝑖 (𝑆𝐸𝑖) to state 𝑗 (𝑆𝐸𝑗)    
𝑃𝐹𝑖𝑗𝑘: the payoff value under 𝑆𝑆𝑖 , strategy 𝑗 and 𝑂𝐶𝑘 
𝑂𝑃𝑘: the occurrence probability of 𝑂𝐶𝑘  (𝑘 = 1,… ,𝑀)  
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Table 4.4 The payoff values in the stratified game table  
PLAYER 
1 
  PLAYER 2 
(NATURE) 
  
  OUTCOME 1 OUTCOME 2 … OUTCOME M  
STATUS 
1 
Strategy 1 
111PF  
112PF  … 11MPF  
 Strategy 2 
121PF  122PF  … 12MPF  
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
… 
…
  Strategy 1n  1
1n 1PF
 1
1n 2PF
 … 1
1n MPF
 
STATUS 
2 
Strategy 1 
211PF  212PF  … 21MPF  
 Strategy 2 
221PF  222PF  … 22MPF  
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
… 
…
  Strategy 2n  2
2n 1PF
 2
2n 2PF
 … 2
2n MPF
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
… 
…
 STATUS 
N  
Strategy 1 
N11PF  N12PF  … N1MPF  
 Strategy 2 
N 21PF  N 22PF  … N 2MPF  
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
… 
…
  Strategy 
Nn  
N
Nn 1PF
 N
Nn 2PF
 … N
Nn MPF
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
80 
 
 
Table 4.5 The states in the stratified game table 
PLAYER 
𝟏 
  PLAYER 𝟐 
(NATURE) 
  
  OUTCOME 1 OUTCOME 2 … OUTCOME 𝑀 
STATUS 
𝟏  
Strategy 1 
STATE 1 STATE 2 … STATE 𝑀  Strategy 2 
 
…
  Strategy 𝑛1 
STATUS 
𝟐 
Strategy 1 
STATE 𝑀 + 1 STATE 𝑀 + 2 … STATE 2𝑀  Strategy 2 
 
…
  Strategy 𝑛2 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
… …
 
STATUS 
𝑵 
Strategy 1 
STATE 
 𝑁𝑀 −𝑀 + 1 
STATE  
𝑁𝑀 −𝑀 + 2 
… STATE 𝑁𝑀  Strategy 2 
 
…
  Strategy 𝑛𝑁 
 
4.6.2 Status transition probability matrix 
There are N  status in the model and given the probability of transitions between iSS  
and jSS  as ijp , the status transition probability matrix P  can be shown as Equation 
(4.28) 
 P =
N´N
ijp
é
ëê
ù
ûú
 (4.28) 
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For instance, 
11
p , is the probability of persistence at the current 1SS . In Figure 4.1, 
status transitions are depicted. 
 
Figure 4.1 Graphical representation of status transitions and respective probabilities 
 
4.6.3 Outcome transition probability matrix 
There are M outcomes and given the probability of transition from iOC  to jOC  as
ij
q , the outcome transition probability matrix Q can be shown as Equation (4.29) 
 Q =
M´M
ijq
é
ëê
ù
ûú
 (4.29) 
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For instance, 
11
q , is the probability of persistence at the current 1OC . In Figure 4.2, 
outcome transitions are depicted. 
 
Figure 4.2 Graphical representation of outcome transitions and respective probabilities 
 
4.6.4 State transition probability matrix 
There are N M  states as represented in Table 4.5. Given ijs , the probability of 
transition from state i  ( iSE ) to state j  ( jSE ), then state transition probability matrix 
𝑆 can be represented as Equation (4.30) 
 S =
N´M
ijs
é
ë
ù
û
 (4.30) 
For instance, 𝑠11 is the probability that 1SE  persists which means 1SS  and 1OC  
persist that can be calculated as 𝑠11 = 𝑝11 × 𝑞11. Given N = 3 and M = 4 the twelve 
states in the stratified game table are shown schematically in the Table 4.6. As such, 
in Appendix I (Table I.1), the 𝑆 matrix is represented. It is clear that as the dimensions 
of the matrix ( N andM ) increase, the computational time would rise dramatically.  
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Table 4.6 Twelve states in the stratified game table for N=3 and M=4 
PLAYER 𝟏   PLAYER 𝟐 
(NATURE) 
  
  
1OC  2OC  3OC  4OC  
1SS  Strategy 1 
1SE  2SE  3SE  4SE  
 Strategy 2 
 
…
  Strategy 𝑛1 
2SS  Strategy 1 
5SE  6SE  7SE  8SE  
 Strategy 2 
 
…
  Strategy 𝑛2 
3SS  Strategy 1 
9SE  10SE  11SE  12SE  
 Strategy 2 
 
…
  Strategy 𝑛3 
 
The pseudo code for calculating the matrix 𝑆 is represented in Table 4.7, and state 
transitions and respective probabilities are shown graphically in Figure 4.3. 
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Figure 4.3 Graphical representation of state transitions and respective probabilities 
 
4.6.5 Model assumptions  
In the proposed model, it is assumed that the following assumptions are in place: 
1) The same strategies exist under various status of the model meaning  
1n = 2n = ...= Nn = B  
2) The payoff values all acquire the benefit nature meaning their maximisation is the 
aim (𝑍 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑃𝐹𝑖𝑗𝑘). Payoff values can also be represented as utility values in 
situations where obtaining monetary values is difficult or they are more based on the 
DMs’ perceptions and evaluations rather than tangible monetary values (𝑍 =
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑈𝑖𝑗𝑘). Utility value is a dimensionless number between 0 and 1.  
3) It is presumed that payoff/utility values stay constant throughout the state change.  
4) The summation of all status transition probabilities is 1, and also the same is correct 
for outcome transition probabilities as shown in Equation (4.31) and (4.32). 
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∑𝑝𝑖𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1
= 1         ∀𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁 
(4.31) 
 
          
∑𝑞𝑖𝑗
𝑀
𝑗=1
= 1         ∀𝑖 = 1, … ,𝑀 
 
(4.32) 
 
Table 4.7 Pseudo code for the calculation of the state transition probability matrix 
Input 
N = number of status 
M = number of outcomes 
P =
N´N
ijp
é
ëê
ù
ûú
 
Q =
M´M
ijq
é
ëê
ù
ûú
 
Output 
ijs = the probability of transition from state i  to state j  
for 1l =  to N  
        for 1k =  to N   
               for 1i kM M= − + to kM   
                           for 1j lM M= − + to lM   
                                        
( )( )ij kl i kM M j lM M
p qs − + − +=     
                            end 
               end 
       end 
end 
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4.6.6 Model solving 
Given the assumptions, considering the current state of the system is 𝑥 then by using 
Equation (4.33), the value of strategy 𝑏 (
b
x
V ) given 1,...,b B=  can be obtained (𝑁𝑀 =
𝑁 ×𝑀). Knowing that 𝑘 = 1 if 𝑗 = {1,𝑀 + 1, 2𝑀 + 1,… , 𝑁𝑀 −𝑀 + 1}, 𝑘 = 2 if 
𝑗 = {2,𝑀 + 2, 2𝑀 + 2,… ,𝑁𝑀 −𝑀 + 2},…, 𝑘 = 𝑀 if 𝑗 = {𝑀, 2𝑀, 3𝑀,… , 𝑁𝑀}. In 
case that utility values are used then Equation (4.34) is utilised.   
𝑉𝑏
𝑥 =∑ ∑ 𝑠𝑥𝑗𝑃𝐹𝑖𝑏𝑘
𝑖𝑀
𝑗=𝑖𝑀−𝑀+1
𝑁
𝑖=1
    
∀𝑏 = 1,… , 𝐵,∀𝑥 = 1, … ,𝑁𝑀, 𝑘 = {1,2,… ,𝑀} 
    
(4.33) 
 𝑉𝑏
𝑥 = ∑ ∑ 𝑠𝑥𝑗𝑈𝑖𝑏𝑘
𝑖𝑀
𝑗=𝑖𝑀−𝑀+1
𝑁
𝑖=1    
∀𝑏 = 1,… , 𝐵,∀𝑥 = 1, … ,𝑁𝑀 , 0 ≤ 𝑈𝑖𝑏𝑘 ≤ 1, 𝑘 = {1,2, … ,𝑀} 
(4.34) 
Then, the after-transition payoff/utility decision matrix would be obtained as shown 
in Table 4.8. If the current state (before-transition state) of the system is known, then 
the corresponding column of that state in Table 4.8 is only considered, otherwise it is 
needed to give probability to those states for which there is uncertainty. Then, by 
calculating the EMV of each strategy the final strategy can be resulted (throughout 
this thesis, the same term EMV is used for both Expected Monetary Value and 
Expected Utility Value). 
Table 4.8 The after-transition payoff/utility decision matrix 
STRATEGY  STATE   
 STATE 1 STATE 2 … STATE 𝑁𝑀 
STRATEGY 𝟏 
1
1
V  1
2
V  
… 
1
NM
V  
STRATEGY 𝟐 
2
1
V  2
2
V  
… 
2
NM
V  
 
…
 
…
 
… 
…
 STRATEGY 𝑩 
B
1
V  B
2
V  
… 
B
NM
V  
For example, the EMV of each strategy 𝑏 ( bEMV ) considering equal probabilities 
can be calculated as Equation (4.35).  
 𝐸𝑀𝑉𝑏 =
∑ 𝑉𝑏
𝑖𝑁𝑀
𝑖=1
𝑁𝑀
      ∀𝑏 = 1, … , 𝐵 (4.35) 
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4.7 Conclusions 
All the methods applied in Chapters 5, 6, and 7 were explained in detail in the current 
chapter. The reason why each specific method is required and their importance in this 
thesis a long with their computational steps were described. A number of tools are 
novel and have theoretical contributions including ESM (Section 4.2), NR-
DEMATEL (Section 4.3), hybrid STE-BWM (Section 4.4), NE-BWM (Section 4.5), 
and stratified decision-making model (Section 4.6).  
In group decision-making where numerous experts with different levels of 
experience and knowledge are involved, it is important to assign a proper importance 
weight to each expert. In previous studies, the task of experts’ weights determination 
was carried out in a relatively subjective, and unstructured way. In this thesis, a unique 
model named ESM was proposed to facilitate this process while providing a profound 
logic to explain the overall process. The proposed ESM is generalisable and can be 
used in other decision-making problems where experts’ importance weights 
assignment is required. The application for the ESM is discussed in Hesitant ESM 
(HESM) in Section 5.4.  
The NR-DEMATEL is tailored for the specific intention of this thesis which is 
exploring the causal interrelationships between identified macro-level energy risk 
dimensions. The proposed NR-DEMATEL has a theoretical contribution as it uses the 
revised DEMATEL rather than the original DEMATEL as it is discussed in Lee et al. 
(2013). The other advantage of the NR-DEMATEL is the integration with the 
Neutrosophic Set Theory (NST) which has considerable merits over most uncertainty 
theories such as Fuzzy Set Theory (FST) (see Appendix A). In this thesis, the 
subjective judgements of experts must be gathered and analysed and as there is always 
a degree of ambiguity in subjective opinions of humans (i.e. experts), this integration 
can help capture this ambiguity and vagueness in experts’ opinions more efficiently. 
The application of the NR-DEMATEL is presented in Section 5.5. 
For the ranking and prioritisation of the final most critical risk dimensions, 
hybrid STE-BWM and NE-BWM are developed as two extensions of the original 
BWM. In the original BWM (see Appendix E), an expert or Decision Maker (DM) 
has to provide a criterion as the best and a criterion as the worst with certainty, 
assuming there is no hesitancy. To improve the BWM, the hybrid STE-BWM is 
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proposed by applying spanning trees enumeration which offers an opportunity for 
DMs (i.e. experts) to suggest more than one best or worst criteria. Additionally, in the 
original BWM (see Appendix E), two vectors of pairwise comparisons including best-
to-others and others-to-worst vectors are treated with the same level of importance. In 
other words, the degree of a DM’s confidence on the best-to-others preferences and 
others-to-worst preferences have been overlooked by giving equal importance to them 
in the original BWM. This observed feature was the motivation to propose NE-BWM. 
The application of NE-BWM and STE-BWM are presented in Chapter 6. 
Ultimately, for risk mitigation analysis, a novel stratified decision-making 
model is proposed. It is based on Concept of Stratification (CST), game theory and 
Shared Socio-economic Pathway (SSP) to deal with long-term risk mitigation 
planning for the most critical identified risks (i.e. CC, and ND). The model is applied 
in the region of Highland and Argyll in Scotland to prioritise flooding risk mitigation 
strategies which were suggested by the Scottish Environment Protection Agency 
(SEPA). The model takes into account both UK socio-economic situations and 
flooding risk impacts for the long-term decision making (5 to 20-year time frame). 
Chapter 7 illustrates the application of the proposed stratified decision-making model. 
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Chapter 5 Risk Analysis by NR-DEMATEL 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the causal relationship between risks is studied, indicating that the 
occurrence of one risk could lead to exposure to the other one.  Based on the literature 
review, there is just a limited number of studies in the supply chain risk management 
literature that have addressed cause-effect interrelations between risks (Chaudhuri et 
al., 2016; Ritchie and Brindley, 2007). This is even less explored in the energy risk 
management literature, particularly when focusing on the energy supply chain macro-
level risk dimensions. Thus, it is critical to take advantage of a method that can analyse 
these types of interrelationships between energy risk dimensions. The selected input 
for this analysis is coming from experts’ opinions (more details to follow) and 
therefore NR-DEMATEL is selected to provide a means to effectively deal with their 
subjective judgements. Few methods such as Interpretive Structural Modelling (ISM) 
and DEMATEL are suitable to analyse the interrelationships among multiple criteria. 
The DEMATEL is preferred over ISM because ISM cannot analyse the strength of 
interrelationships between multiple criteria.  For this reason, ISM is often used in 
conjunction with other methods such as Matrice d’Impacts Croisés Multiplication 
Appliquée à un Classement (MICMAC) also known as “cross impact matrix 
multiplication applied to classification”. The combination of ISM and MICMAC often 
adds another layer of complexity to the solution procedure. The DEMATEL method 
is widely used to rank related factors while considering the causal relationships among 
them (Feng et al., 2018). In summary, the main advantage of DEMATEL is its ability 
to uncover the causal relationships and interdependencies between various risks while 
utilising minimal data. As it was explained in Section 4.3, the proposed NR-
DEMATEL has a theoretical contribution as it uses the revised DEMATEL rather than 
the original DEMATEL as it is discussed in Lee et al. (2013). Additionally, it is aimed 
at understanding causal relationships between macro-level energy risk dimensions 
within the UK which was less explored in the literature.   
The Neutrosophic Set Theory (NST) provides a considerable advantage over the 
Fuzzy Set Theory (FST) and the Intuitionistic Fuzzy Set (IFS) theory in processing 
experts’ subjective judgements. The NST, unlike the FST, can quantify the rejection 
information derived from the falsity-membership function. In addition, the NST, 
unlike the IFS theory, can define the hesitancy function values independently from 
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the falsity and truth-membership function values (more details are provided in Section 
3.4 and Appendix A).      
An Expert Selection Model (ESM) is also proposed in this study, which provides 
a basis for the selection process in similar decision-making problems, where subject 
expert selection is required. In other words, it provides a reliable model that helps 
researchers decide who can be an expert or DM based on their credentials and 
experience. It is also useful in assigning on each expert a relative importance weight 
(for more information regarding ESM please see Section 4.2). This model is integrated 
with Hesitant Fuzzy Set (HFS) theory and named the Hesitant Expert Selection Model 
(HESM) in the study. In this chapter, the two first phases of the whole research are 
carried out as shown in Figure 5.1  
 
Figure 5.1 Phases I and II of the whole research carried out in this chapter  
In Figure 5.2, the research steps for causal risk interrelations analysis in the applied 
method are illustrated. 
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Figure 5.2 Research steps for causal risk interrelations analysis   
The research in this chapter offers methodological and practical implications for both 
academics and practitioners. The research contributions in this chapter are fourfold as 
follows:   
(I) Presenting a simple framework for risk identification and classification 
which can be used in strategic risk mitigation analysis resulted from systematic 
literature review and experts’ feedback. 
 (II) Proposing a NR-DEMATEL method to analyse risk dimensions based on 
the causal interrelationships and interdependencies among them, which has been 
missing in the current energy risk management practices. 
 (III) Introducing a HESM to systematically assist researchers with the expert 
selection process. 
(IV) Aiding policy makers in the UK energy supply chain to recognise most 
critical risks efficiently. 
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5.2 Energy Supply Chain Risk Identification Framework 
An energy risk identification framework is proposed in this section (Figure 5.3). It 
facilitates the risk identification and classification process in the energy supply chain 
and further possible utilisation in the later process of risk management such as risk 
mitigation. The risk identification framework is comprised of three main sections as 
follows:  
1) Risk classifications  
2) Risk dimensions  
3) Risk elements 
Risk classifications essentially present the discipline and framing of risks 
aiming to position them within the wider risk literature. Risk classifications can help 
understand and analyse risk dimensions properly from various perspectives such as 
position and origin within the UK power supply chain. The framework identified 
context-based, position-based, temporal, origin-based and hybrid classifications. The 
context-based classification concentrates on the risk discipline and includes 
economics, politics, sociology, health, engineering and environmental science 
(Checchi et al., 2009; Cherp and Jewell, 2011; Chevalier, 2006; Winzer, 2012) (see 
Section 2.5.1). In position-based classification, risks are categorised in accordance 
with their position in the energy supply chain which can be upstream, midstream, or 
downstream (Gracceva and Zeniewski, 2014) (see Section 2.5.2). In temporal-based 
classification, researchers categorised risks on the basis of their timescales over which 
they operate that can be long, medium or short time frames (Chevalier, 2006) (see 
Section 2.5.3). Some risks have their origins inside the national border or energy 
system and named internal, while many risks are related to imported energy that are 
named external. This kind of classification is discussed in the origin-based attitude 
towards energy supply chain risk classification (Babich et al., 2007; Chevalier, 2006; 
Huang et al., 2016; Tang et al., 2014; Yang et al., 2009) (see Section 2.5.4). Finally, 
there are hybrid classifications that consolidate two or three other classifications and 
provide a hybrid perspective of various dimensions (Boston, 2013) (see Section 2.5.5).  
Risk elements lie at the lowest level of the framework. They can also be divided 
into more detailed risk elements with more specific characteristics depending on the 
system under study and targeted plan for risk assessment. Ultimately, risk dimensions 
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are those aspects of risks that are significant enough to include meaningful risk 
elements under their paradigm. They are recognised as macro-level risks in contrast 
to risk elements which are of micro-level nature. In other words, risk dimensions need 
to incorporate a number of risk elements in their context. For example, technical 
reliability is regarded as a risk dimension which can contain a wide variety of risk 
elements such as lack of cooperation, inability to synthesise information, or human 
error. To this end, the analysis can explore and go down the hierarchy depending on 
many factors such as the availability of information, the required managerial 
assessment, and the method of risk assessment.  
 
Figure 5.3 The framework of energy risk identification 
Risk dimensions, as shown in the risk identification framework are the key 
components of the process because they assist analysis with obtaining appropriate 
risks that each one can facilitate the identification of risk elements. All the proposed 
risk dimensions are identified based on the literature and verified based on the experts’ 
feedback. They are chosen in a way that all potential risk elements can be categorised 
under at least one dimension’s definition. It is attempted to shed light on risk 
dimensions that are undertreated in the literature that may bring about severe 
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consequences in case of occurrence. For instance, a disease outbreak or a pandemic is 
proposed in this framework as an almost untapped risk dimension in the literature.  
The twelve risk dimensions were recognised based on a systematic and in-depth 
scrutinising of the literature. The systematic literature review was carried out to 
identify the critical risks and risk categories in the UK energy supply chain. The 
systematic literature review protocol is described in Table 5.1. 
Table 5.1 The systematic literature review protocol 
Element  Systematic review protocol 
Research field Energy security 
Search keywords energy AND risk, electricity AND generation AND risk, 
energy AND supply AND risk, energy AND supply AND 
chain AND risk, energy AND network AND risk  
Database Web of Science, Scopus, Google Scholar 
Language English 
Document types Journal articles, Reports, Books, Textbooks, and 
Conference Proceedings  
Years of publication 1989-2018 
 
As can be seen in Table 5.1, wide variety of documents from different disciplines were 
explored by using different keywords in several library databases. At initial stages, it 
soon became clear that finding risk dimensions cannot be carried out by merely 
looking at keywords, titles, or abstracts. Hence, cross-references found in the 
identified articles were utilised to reach more related papers. Ultimately, this approach 
returned approximately 100 documents, from 1989 to 2018, and offered enough 
substantial information to allow risk dimensions to emerge. Finally, to verify the 
identified risk dimensions, experts who participated in the survey were asked to 
indicate if the list of risks is comprehensive or any other risk is missing. Their 
feedback verified the identified risks as explained in more detail in data collection 
section (Section 5.3).  
These risk dimensions were identified as: (1) Climate Change (CC); (2) Natural 
Disasters (ND); (3) Environmental and Health Safety (EHS); (4) Technical Reliability 
(TR); (5) Operational Safety (OS); (6) Disease Outbreak (DO); (7) Political Instability 
(PI); (8) Industrial Action (IA); (9) Sabotage and Terrorism (ST); (10) Resource 
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Availability (RA); (11) Market Failure (MF); and (12) Affordability (AF). The 
detailed description of all risks based on the literature are provided in Section 2.4. The 
approach towards identifying these risk dimensions was not only focusing on energy 
supply but also the whole energy supply chain from upstream to downstream. It might 
be argued that some of the risk dimensions are only threats to energy supply and some 
of them are not. As it is shown in the framework (Figure 5.3), the five risk 
classification approaches can provide more clear insights from different perspectives 
to make this issue clear. For example, the position-based classification deals with the 
impacted segment(s) of the energy supply chain. The other important point that 
already explained in origin-based classification is that some of the risk dimensions are 
caused by the energy system itself such as environmental and health safety that are 
classified as internal causes. These risks can then in case of occurrence pose a threat 
to the security of supply. Their incident is the result of poor organisation and 
performance of the energy system unlike the risks with external causes such as market 
failure (e.g. world oil price) which their causes have roots in the outside of the system. 
Thus, each risk classification perspective can provide insightful view on 
understanding the risk dimensions efficiently. All the proposed risk dimensions are 
categorised in a distinct way separating them from each other to avoid overlaps. Even 
risk dimensions, which are not extensively covered in the literature, have been 
included to enable a wide-ranging approach. The detailed definition of each risk 
classification regarding the literature is provided in Section 2.5.  
Focusing on the UK power supply chain, twelve energy supply chain risk 
dimensions are evaluated based on the knowledge and experience of experts in the 
UK energy supply chain. The analysis is on the basis of the revised DEMATEL in the 
uncertain neutrosophic decision-making environment (namely NR-DEMATEL) so as 
to explore the causal interrelationships between risk dimensions. Moreover, the 
proposed ESM (Section 4.2) will be utilised by integrating HFS theory (Appendix A) 
(i.e. HESM) to obtain experts’ importance weights.  
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5.3 Data Collection 
Experts involved in this phase of research are comprised of both academics and 
practitioners with a proper level of knowledge and experience on the UK electricity 
supply chain. In total 161 experts were initially contacted through email to participate 
in the study by completing an online internet questionnaire. The data collection phase 
was carried out within four months (8th Nov 2017-5th Mar 2018) and collected the 
views of 31 experts including 25 academics and 6 practitioners, resulting in a response 
rate of 19% which is acceptable due to low response rate in web surveys from experts 
(Fan and Yan, 2010). This decision-making problem is categorised as Large-Scale 
Group Decision-Making (LSGDM) problems because higher than 20 experts 
participated in this study. The LSGDM problems can be characterised by involving at 
least 20 experts (H. Liu et al. 2018; Jiang et al. 2020). Experts’ fields of knowledge in 
various energy sectors along with the number of experts in each category include 
renewable energy (21 experts); policy and economics (20 experts); energy storage and 
grid modernisation (10 experts); fossil and nuclear energy (6 experts); environmental 
impacts (5 experts); energy end use and efficiency (5 experts); and other (4 experts) 
(see Figure 5.4). As shown in Figure 5.4, four experts grouped as other, because they 
indicated their energy expertise areas as whole system analysis, energy social 
research, sustainability, societal engagement with sustainable energy, environmental 
psychology, behaviour change, geoengineering and technological systems which all 
grouped into the category named as other.  Most experts (74%) had an overlapping 
expertise in more than one area.  
Practitioner experts’ professional associations include five organisations 
Nuclear Institute, The Scottish Oil Club, Engineering Industries Association (EIA), 
The Institution of Engineering and Technology (IET), and Society of Petroleum 
Engineers (SPE). Professional associations of the academic experts’ involved in our 
study comprise twenty-two organisations including International Association for 
Energy Economics (IAEE), Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), 
IET, Higher Education Academy (HEA), International Council on Large Electric 
Systems (CIGRE), The Technical Chamber of Greece (TEE-TCG), The Energy 
Institute, American Society of Heating, Refrigerating and Air-Conditioning Engineers 
(UK ASHRAE), The Chartered Institute of Logistics and Transport, British Institute 
of Energy Economics (BIEE), Institution of Mechanical Engineers (IMechE), 
97 
 
Institution of Chemical Engineers (IChemE), European Association for the study of 
Science and Technology (EASST), European Sociological Association (ESA), Nuclear 
Institute, Royal Geographical Society, Athens Institute For Education and Research 
(ATINER), Sustainable Consumption Research and Action Initiative (SCORAI), 
Research Association on Monetary Innovation and Community and Complementary 
Currency Systems (RAMICS), Marie Curie Fellows Association, Renewable and 
Appropriate Energy Laboratory (RAEL), and Lindau Nobel Laureate Economics. 
Experts were asked to choose risk dimensions on which they considered 
themselves capable of providing reliable evaluations based on their knowledge and 
expertise. Then, for each risk dimension they were asked to come up with evaluations 
in comparison with other risk dimensions using the scale presented in Table 4.1. 
 
 
Figure 5.4 Experts’ energy expertise areas  
 
For instance, if the expert has chosen to assess Climate Change (CC) then the question 
appeared as “To what extent do you think climate change can impact on the following 
risks in the UK power supply chain?”. The “following risks” refers to the other eleven 
risk dimensions (for more details see Appendix J). Thus, as there are twelve identified 
risk dimensions, each question needed to be answered by providing eleven 
evaluations. In order to capture the theory behind this type of questions construction 
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see step 2 in Section 4.3. On average for each risk dimension, approximately 14 
experts provided evaluations and each expert on average provided nearly 58 
evaluations. This difference in number of experts would lead to more accurate 
evaluations and bias prevention because experts provide assessments about risk 
dimensions in which they have more experience and knowledge.  
A trial pilot run had been carried out with five academics in our school (i.e., 
NBS) before the actual data collection in order to fine tune the questionnaire. Their 
feedback was used to resolve any potential issue in the survey such as the actual time 
for completing the survey, the way the questions are represented and so on. At the end 
of the survey, further questions were asked regarding professional qualifications and 
affiliations, years of experience, and comments to verify the previously twelve 
identified risk dimensions (in case there is any missing risk). Regarding the other 
potential risk dimensions, 6 experts indicated that economic risks, public 
acceptability, lack of skilled workforce, reputational damages from poor management 
of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), cyberterrorism/hacking, end users' 
wasteful practices and military risk might be act as other potential risk dimensions as 
well. While other 25 experts believed that all major risks have been included in the 
study. In response, based on the proposed framework (Figure 5.3), defined risk 
element type of risks would make it possible for more detailed risks like the suggested 
ones to be categorised under each twelve risk dimensions’ spectrums. For instance, 
the following categorisation can be expected for suggested risks by experts like 
economic risks under Market Failure (MF), public acceptability under Political 
Instability (PI) or Industrial Action (IA), lack of skilled workforce under Technical 
Reliability (TR), reputational damages from poor management of CSR under 
Environmental and Health Safety (EHS), cyberterrorism/hacking under Sabotage and 
Terrorism (ST), end users' wasteful practices under Affordability (AF), and military 
risk under Political Instability (PI).        
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5.4 Scenario Analysis by HESM for Experts’ Weights Determination  
The proposed ESM as explained in Section 4.2 combined with HFS theory (namely 
HESM) is applied by implementing the data provided by 31 experts. The average age 
of experts is 39 with the average experience of six years. Concerning education, 87% 
(27 out of 31) of all experts hold PhD degrees while the other 4 hold Masters’ degrees. 
The gathered data show that regarding the professional association among practitioner 
experts, 4 out of 6 (67%) and among academic experts, 19 out of 25 (76%) hold 
professional association membership. As the experts were coming with miscellaneous 
backgrounds so their professional associations varied in a very broad range from 
social sciences to engineering and health sciences (Figure 5.3). Obviously, the experts 
are not at the same level of expertise and knowledge. As a result, the ESM has been 
applied so as to obtain the Expert Eligibility Values (EEV) (see Section 4.2) and 
correspondingly 31 experts’ importance weights.  
A scenario analysis applying HFS theory has been introduced and conducted in 
order to enhance the reliability of the expert selection scheme by obtaining a more 
cogent importance weight for each expert. In other words, instead of filtering out 
potential experts in the first place by the inclusion value of 𝛼 determination, a more 
precise weight determination process through hesitant scenario analysis is introduced. 
With this aim in mind, three scenarios are proposed including High-experience 
focused, Low-experience focused and Moderate. Values are essentially defined based 
on circumstances of the study and in a way that they can produce distinctive weights 
representing High, Moderate, and Low-experience focused scenarios. These scenarios 
for academic and practitioner experts can be seen in Table 5.2 and Table 5.3,  
respectively. 
For academic experts, experience is defined by working experience in academia 
such as university or college and not including experience in industry. In high-
experience focused scenario, more attention is paid to years of experience in three 
levels of Professorship, Senior lectureship and Lectureship (Equation (4.7)) rather 
than Professional Qualifications (Equation (4.5)) or Association Membership 
(Equation (4.6)). As can be seen in Table 5.2, in high-experience focused, one year of 
experience as a professor (𝐿1) accounts for approximately 3 professional 
qualifications (𝑄1), and 2 chartered professional association memberships (𝐴1). While 
in the moderate approach, one year of professorship (𝐿1) weighs as one chartered 
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membership (𝐴1). On the other hand, in low-experience focused scenario, more 
concentration is on professional qualification and association membership attributes 
rather than academic experience. It means one year of experience as a professor (𝐿1) 
is as important as holding one professional qualification (𝑄1) and less important as 
being a chartered member of a professional association in their subject (𝐴1).   
Table 5.2 Academic experts’ importance weight assignment scenarios 
Scenario Experience Qualification Association 
𝐿1 𝐿2 𝐿3 𝑄1 𝑄2 𝐴1 𝐴2 𝐴3 
High-
experience 
focused 
4 3 1 1.5 1 2 1.3 1 
Moderate 2 1.5 1 1.5 1 2 1.3 1 
Low-
experience 
focused 
1.5 1.3 1 1.5 1 2 1.3 1 
 
As it can be seen in the Table 5.3, in calculation of the practitioner experts in the field, 
three scenarios are suggested like in academic case but with the difference that in 
practitioners’ case, experience refers to practical experience while in academics’ case, 
the academic experience like teaching and carrying out research in classic higher 
education levels is meant. It is shown in Table 5.3 that in moderate scenario, one year 
of experience in upper-level of management (𝐿1) (Equation (4.3)) counts equal to 
being a chartered member of the related field (𝐴1), and it also equals to having a 
related PhD degree (𝐸1) (Equation (4.4)). In high-experienced focused scenario, one 
year of work in an upper-level managerial position (𝐿1) accounts for twice as 
significant as holding a PhD degree (𝐸1) or a professional qualification (𝑄1). Whereas 
on the other hand, in low-experience focused scenario working in upper-level 
managerial posts (𝐿1) are equally important as being a chartered member of a 
professional society (𝐴1) and slightly less significant than holding a PhD degree in the 
subject (𝐸1). For those scenarios the relative importance of industry experience is 
adjusted against education and professional qualifications. 
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Table 5.3 Practitioner experts’ importance weight assignment scenarios 
 Experience Education Qualification Association 
Scenario 𝐿1 𝐿2 𝐿3 𝐸1 𝐸2 𝐸3 𝐸4 𝑄1 𝑄2 𝐴1 𝐴2 𝐴3 
High-
experience 
focused 
4 3 1 2 1.5 1 0.8 2 1 3 2 1 
Moderate 2 1.4 1 2 1.5 1 0.8 1.5 1 2 1.3 1 
Low-
experience 
focused 
1.5 1.2 1 2 1.5 1 0.8 1.3 1 1.5 1.2 1 
 
Based upon the proposed model, various scenarios of experience-oriented approaches 
for the two groups of academics and practitioners can be incorporated by applying 
HFS theory to assign importance weights to experts (here, each combination of 
scenarios is called a case). This approach is highly useful especially when judgement 
would not be straightforward and there is no preference in cases and there would be 
expected hesitancy in decisions between the degrees of experience. For example, three 
combinations (i.e. high-high, moderate-moderate, and low-low) out of nine possible 
scenario combinations are chosen for the analysis based on Table 5.2 and Table 5.3. 
The reason is that extreme and middle points are included, which make more sense to 
get the average in the absence of case preferences. The three cases and a fourth one, 
which is their weighted average by utilising HFS theory, are tested with reference to 
the weights presented in Table 5.4 (Govindan et al., 2015) and Table 5.5. By applying 
Best Non-fuzzy Performance (BNP), the crisp values in Table 5.4 can be obtained. 
Given  (𝑙, 𝑚, 𝑟) is a Triangular Fuzzy Number (TFN), the BNP can be calculated using 
[(𝑟−𝑙)+(𝑚−𝑙)]
3
+ 𝑙  (Bhosale and Kant, 2016). 
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Table 5.4 Linguistic variables and fuzzy weights for experts’ weights scenarios  
Linguistic 
Variables 
TFN Crisp Numbers 
Very low (0.0,0.1,0.3) 0.1 
Low (0.1,0.3,0.5) 0.3 
Medium (0.3,0.5,0.7) 0.5 
High (0.5,0.7,0.9) 0.7 
Very high (0.7,0.9,1.0) 0.9 
 
In Table 5.5, the hesitant fuzzy information in each case in order to obtain the weighted 
average weights of all experts are revealed (see Equation (A.8) in order to calculate 
score function values). In cases 1, 2, and 3 for both academic and practitioner experts, 
high-experience, moderate, and low-experience scenarios (Table 5.2 and Table 5.3) 
have been applied in order to obtain the weighted average weights of experts. 
  
Table 5.5 Hesitant fuzzy information for acquiring experts’ weighted average weights  
Case Applied 
Scenarios 
HFS HFE SFV NSFV 
1 High {(0.5,0.7,0.9), (0.7,0.9,1.0)} {0.7,0.9} 0.8333 0.5102 
2 Moderate {(0.1,0.3,0.5), (0.3,0.5,0.7)} {0.3,0. 5} 0.4333 0.2653 
3 Low {(0.0,0.1,0.3), (0.1,0.3,0.5), (0.3,0.5,0.7)} {0.1,0.3,0.5} 0.3667 0.2245 
SFV=Score Function Value; NSFV=Normalised Score Function Value; HFS=Hesitant Fuzzy Set; 
HFE=Hesitant Fuzzy Element 
Various experts’ weights in case 1 (high), case 2 (moderate), case 3 (low) and 
weighted average weights of cases are represented in Table 5.6. The weighted average 
weights are calculated based on the normalised score function values shown in Table 
5.5. Then, this weight is used in the analysis using NR-DEMATEL according to the 
sensitivity analysis of various cases of experts’ weights which is provided in Section 
5.6. 
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Table 5.6 Experts’ weights in high, moderate, low, and weighted average cases 
Experts 
Case 1  
(High) 
Case 2 
(Moderate) 
Case 3  
(Low) 
Weighted 
average 
1 0.0268 0.0395 0.0439 0.0340 
2 0.0864 0.0636 0.0556 0.0734 
3 0.0179 0.0263 0.0292 0.0227 
4 0.0229 0.0338 0.0375 0.0291 
5 0.0046 0.0068 0.0075 0.0058 
6 0.2711 0.2041 0.1784 0.2325 
7 0.0103 0.0152 0.0169 0.0131 
8 0.0321 0.0473 0.0525 0.0407 
9 0.0229 0.0338 0.0375 0.0291 
10 0.0238 0.0351 0.0390 0.0302 
11 0.0045 0.0066 0.0073 0.0057 
12 0.0298 0.0241 0.0239 0.0270 
13 0.0060 0.0088 0.0097 0.0076 
14 0.0089 0.0132 0.0146 0.0113 
15 0.0069 0.0101 0.0112 0.0087 
16 0.0916 0.0692 0.0592 0.0784 
17 0.0060 0.0088 0.0097 0.0076 
18 0.0069 0.0101 0.0112 0.0087 
19 0.0030 0.0044 0.0049 0.0038 
20 0.0183 0.0176 0.0180 0.0180 
21 0.0137 0.0203 0.0225 0.0174 
22 0.0715 0.0527 0.0439 0.0603 
23 0.0357 0.0527 0.0585 0.0453 
24 0.0275 0.0197 0.0175 0.0232 
25 0.0179 0.0263 0.0292 0.0227 
26 0.0275 0.0263 0.0270 0.0271 
27 0.0357 0.0527 0.0585 0.0453 
28 0.0137 0.0203 0.0225 0.0174 
29 0.0030 0.0044 0.0049 0.0038 
30 0.0119 0.0176 0.0195 0.0151 
31 0.0412 0.0290 0.0283 0.0351 
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5.5 NR-DEMATEL Analysis 
The NR-DEMATEL method that has been elaborated in Section 4.3 is applied to 
evaluate the cause and effect interrelationships between identified energy risk 
dimensions. The analysed factors are the twelve risk dimensions Climate Change 
(CC); Natural Disasters (ND); Environmental Health and Safety (EHS); Technical 
Reliability (TR); Operational Safety (OS); Disease Outbreak (DO); Industrial Action 
(IA); Political Instability (PI); Sabotage and Terrorism (ST); Resource Availability 
(RA); Market Failure (MF); and Affordability (AF). The weighted average for 
experts’ weights is considered in the calculation. The analysis of various experts’ 
weights cases is presented in the Section 5.4. The total relation matrix obtained from 
the NR-DEMATEL analysis is shown in Table 5.7. Based on the total relation matrix, 
the Prominence, and Relation values along with total effect given by each risk 
dimension to others (𝑟𝑖) and total effect received by each risk dimension from others 
(𝑐𝑖) are calculated (regarding step 7 in Section 4.3), and are shown in Table 5.8.  
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Table 5.7 Total relation matrix 
 CC ND EHS TR OS DO PI IA ST RA MF AF 
CC 0.1105 0.1856 0.2717 0.2722 0.2803 0.1859 0.2541 0.2243 0.1746 0.2744 0.2644 0.3129 
ND 0.1362 0.0695 0.2517 0.2623 0.2849 0.1836 0.2245 0.2001 0.1446 0.2453 0.2311 0.2756 
EHS 0.1183 0.0831 0.1514 0.2161 0.2438 0.1815 0.1952 0.2075 0.1488 0.2091 0.2065 0.2639 
TR 0.1153 0.0793 0.2185 0.1584 0.2532 0.1320 0.2012 0.1998 0.1540 0.2201 0.2377 0.2862 
OS 0.1005 0.0725 0.2468 0.2411 0.1724 0.1340 0.2018 0.2221 0.1617 0.2163 0.2241 0.2705 
DO 0.1167 0.0986 0.2436 0.2071 0.2432 0.1027 0.2210 0.2258 0.1400 0.2032 0.2259 0.2611 
PI 0.1537 0.1068 0.2234 0.2418 0.2622 0.1621 0.1814 0.2586 0.2192 0.2489 0.2693 0.3146 
IA 0.1288 0.0825 0.2324 0.2768 0.2956 0.1721 0.2767 0.1764 0.1891 0.2726 0.2823 0.3224 
ST 0.1165 0.0797 0.2527 0.2641 0.2847 0.1446 0.2661 0.2225 0.1257 0.2697 0.2816 0.3147 
RA 0.1584 0.1074 0.2191 0.2262 0.2425 0.1316 0.2448 0.2070 0.1526 0.1711 0.2663 0.3038 
MF 0.1623 0.0921 0.2112 0.2433 0.2562 0.1356 0.2333 0.2282 0.1499 0.2511 0.1787 0.3088 
AF 0.1694 0.0982 0.2457 0.2583 0.2848 0.1507 0.2603 0.2404 0.1622 0.2707 0.2763 0.2258 
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Table 5.8 Prominence, relation, and total effect given/received by each risk to/from others  
 Total effect 
given by each 
risk to other 
risks (𝒓𝒊) 
Rank 
Total effect 
received by each 
risk from other 
risks (𝒄𝒊) 
Rank 
Prominence 
(𝒓𝒊 + 𝒄𝒊) 
Rank 
Relation 
(𝒓𝒊 − 𝒄𝒊) 
Rank Causer/Receiver 
CC 2.8109 1 1.5865 11 4.3973 10 1.2244 2 Net Causer 
ND 2.5093 6 1.1553 12 3.6646 12 1.3540 1 Net Causer 
EHS 2.2252 12 2.7682 6 4.9934 8 -0.5430 9 Net Receiver 
TR 2.2557 11 2.8675 4 5.1232 7 -0.6119 10 Net Receiver 
OS 2.2638 10 3.1037 2 5.3675 4 -0.8399 12 Net Receiver 
DO 2.2890 9 1.8165 10 4.1054 11 0.4725 4 Net Causer 
PI 2.6420 4 2.7604 7 5.4024 2 -0.1184 6 Net Receiver 
IA 2.7076 2 2.6126 8 5.3201 5 0.0950 5 Net Causer 
ST 2.6226 5 1.9226 9 4.5452 9 0.7001 3 Net Causer 
RA 2.4307 8 2.8525 5 5.2833 6 -0.4218 7 Net Receiver 
MF 2.4507 7 2.9441 3 5.3948 3 -0.4934 8 Net Receiver 
AF 2.6426 3 3.4602 1 6.1029 1 -0.8176 11 Net Receiver 
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5.5.1 Impact-relations map 
The Impact-Relations Map (IRM) (Figure 5.5), represents four quadrants. Quadrant 𝐼 
(core risks) is characterised by high Prominence, and positive Relation values. Risks 
in quadrant 𝐼𝐼 (minor key risks) have positive Relation but low Prominence values. 
Both quadrant 𝐼 and 𝐼𝐼 include net causer risks (cause group) because of positive 
Relation values. Quadrant 𝐼𝐼𝐼 (independent risks) has low Prominence, and negative 
Relation values while situated in the south-west part of the IRM and are disconnected 
from the system. Finally, risks in quadrant 𝐼𝑉 (impact or indirect risks) have high 
Prominence and negative Relation values and are mainly impacted by other risks. 
Risks in quadrants 𝐼𝐼𝐼 and 𝐼𝑉 are net receivers (effect group) as their Relation values 
are negative. Thus, based on IRM and four quadrants, risk dimensions can be grouped 
into four categories of (1) core risks; (2) minor risks; (3) independent risks; and (4) 
impact/indirect risks. 
The five risk dimensions of Natural Disasters (ND); Climate Change (CC); 
Sabotage and Terrorism (ST); Disease Outbreak (DO); and Industrial Action (IA) are 
positioned in quadrant 𝐼 (core risks).  
Based on the findings in Table 5.8 and depicted IRM in Figure 5.5, Natural 
Disasters (ND) has the highest relation value which means it has the highest influence 
on the system. It is followed by Climate Change (CC), Sabotage and Terrorism (ST), 
Disease Outbreak (DO), Industrial Action (IA), Political Instability (PI), Resource 
Availability (RA), Market Failure (MF), Environmental and Health Safety (EHS), 
Technical Reliability (TR), Affordability (AF), and the lowest factor in the relation 
category is Operational Safety (OS). In terms of Prominence, Affordability (AF) has 
the highest total effect which indicates its relative importance. Risk dimensions, 
Political Instability (PI), Market Failure (MF), Operational Safety (OS), Industrial 
Action (IA), Resource Availability (RA), Technical Reliability (TR), Environmental 
and Health Safety (EHS), Sabotage and Terrorism (ST), Climate Change (CC), 
Disease Outbreak (DO), and Natural Disasters (ND) stand in other ranks after 
Affordability (AF), respectively in the prominence list. Five risk dimensions of 
Natural Disasters (ND), Climate Change (CC), Sabotage and Terrorism (ST), Disease 
Outbreak (DO), and Industrial Action (IA) are positioned in quadrant I, which can be 
recognised as core factors. Additionally, they all belong to cause group which 
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indicates these five risk dimensions are net causers because their (𝑟𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖) values are 
positive.  
The rest of the risk dimensions including the seven risk dimensions of Political 
Instability (PI); Resource Availability (RA); Environmental and Health Safety (EHS); 
Market Failure (MF); Technical Reliability (TR); Operational Safety (OS); and 
Affordability (AF) are positioned in quadrant 𝐼𝑉 (indirect risks). In addition, all the 
risk dimensions in the effect group, which are net receivers, are positioned in quadrant 
𝐼𝑉. There is no minor key and independent risk in this study because no risk dimension 
is positioned in quadrants 𝐼𝐼 and 𝐼𝐼𝐼 respectively. 
 
 
Figure 5.5 The IRM 
 
5.5.2 Resulted rankings 
As can be seen in Table 5.8, four rankings have been obtained: (𝑟𝑖 , 𝑐𝑖 , 𝑟𝑖 + 𝑐𝑖 , 𝑟𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖) 
namely the Causers, Receivers, Prominence, and Relation lists, respectively. In 
DEMATEL, considering merely one ranking either Relation or Prominence would not 
be thoroughly compelling to reach a satisfactorily analysis. In fact, they both together 
with other analyses like causers, receivers and strong relationships should be 
considered for their complimentary features. 
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5.5.2.1 Net causers (cause group) and key factors 
These risk dimensions are situated in quadrant 𝐼 and include Natural Disasters (ND); 
Climate Change (CC); Sabotage and Terrorism (ST); Disease Outbreak (DO); and 
Industrial Action (IA). These risk dimensions are net causers that belong to the cause 
group (Figure 5.5 and Table 5.8). This means that in their occurrence, they can 
significantly influence or trigger other risks. 
5.5.2.2 Net receivers (effect group) 
These risk dimensions are situated in quadrant 𝐼𝑉 and include Operational Safety 
(OS); Affordability (AF); Technical Reliability (TR); Environmental and Health 
Safety (EHS); Market Failure (MF); Resource Availability (RA); and Political 
Instability (PI). Risk dimensions in this quadrant are more influenced rather than they 
influence other risks. 
5.5.2.3 Prominence 
In terms of Prominence, Affordability (AF) has the highest total effect (adding 
together given and received influences) which indicates its relative importance. It is 
followed by Political Instability (PI); Market Failure (MF); Operational Safety (OS); 
Industrial Action (IA); Resource Availability (RA); Technical Reliability (TR); 
Environmental and Health Safety (EHS); Sabotage and Terrorism (ST); Climate 
Change (CC); Disease Outbreak (DO); and Natural Disasters (ND). 
5.5.2.4 Relation 
Based on the findings in Table 5.8, and the IRM depicted in Figure 5.5, Natural 
Disasters (ND) has the highest Relation value, which means it has the highest 
influence on the system. It is followed by Climate Change (CC); Sabotage and 
Terrorism (ST); Disease Outbreak (DO); Industrial Action (IA); Political Instability 
(PI); Resource Availability (RA); Market Failure (MF); Environmental and Health 
Safety (EHS); Technical Reliability (TR); Affordability (AF);  the lowest factor in the 
Relation category is Operational Safety (OS). 
5.5.2.5 Causers 
Among risks that can have higher influence on others without subtracting the received 
impacts: Climate Change (CC); Industrial Action (IA); Affordability (AF); Political 
Instability (PI); Sabotage and Terrorism (ST); Natural Disasters (ND); and Market 
Failure (MF) are the top seven risk dimensions, respectively (𝑟𝑖 list in Table 5.8).  The 
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results show that Climate Change (CC) is the most important risk dimension in terms 
of influencing other risks. However, when compared to Natural Disasters (ND), 
Climate Change (CC) receives more impact from other risks, which is the reason why 
Natural Disasters (ND) is the most significant net causer and not Climate Change 
(CC). 
 
5.5.2.6 Receivers 
Among receivers or risks that can be highly influenced by others, Affordability (AF) 
and Operational Safety (OS) are found as the top ones followed by Market Failure 
(MF); Technical Reliability (TR); Resource Availability (RA); Environmental and 
Health Safety (EHS); and Political Instability (PI) ( 𝑐𝑖 list in Table 5.8). 
 
5.5.3 Threshold value 
For setting the threshold value (Step 8 in Section 4.3), the MMDE algorithm has been 
applied. The results from steps 1 to 5 of the MMDE algorithm (Appendix D) are 
summarised in Table 5.9. All 144 MDE values of dispatch-node set (𝑀𝐷𝐸𝑡
𝐷𝑖) and 
receive-node set (𝑀𝐷𝐸𝑡
𝑅𝑒) are illustrated in Figure 5.6 and Figure 5.7, respectively.  
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Table 5.9 MMDE algorithm calculation results 
Item Data 
𝑻∗ 
{
(0.3224,8,12), (0.3147,9,12), (0.3146,7,12),
(0.3129,1,12),… , (0.0725,5,2), (0.0695,2,2)
} 
𝑻𝑫𝒊  {8,9,7,1,11,10,… ,4,5,2} 
𝑻𝒕
𝑫𝒊  and 
𝑴𝑫𝑬𝒕
𝑫𝒊  
𝑇1
𝐷𝑖 = {8}, 𝑀𝐷𝐸1
𝐷𝑖 = 0; 𝑇2
𝐷𝑖 = {8,9}, 
 𝑀𝐷𝐸2
𝐷𝑖 = 0; … ; 𝑇8
𝐷𝑖 = {8,9,7,1,11,10,8,4}, 
 𝑀𝐷𝐸8
𝐷𝑖 = 0.005679; …; 𝑇143
𝐷𝑖 = {8,9,… ,4,5},  
𝑀𝐷𝐸143
𝐷𝑖 = 0.000023; 𝑇144
𝐷𝑖 = {8,9,… ,4,5,2}, 𝑀𝐷𝐸144
𝐷𝑖 = 0 
𝑴𝑫𝑬𝒕
𝑫𝒊  {0,0,0,0,0,0,0.007315,0.005679, 0.004531, … ,0.000023, 0} 
Max 𝑴𝑫𝑬𝒕
𝑫𝒊  0.026274 
𝑻𝒎𝒂𝒙
𝑫𝒊   𝑇22
𝐷𝑖 = {8,9,7,1,11,10,8,4,2,12,9,8,9,1,8,8,12,2,1,8,1,1} = 
{1,2,4,7,8,9,10,11,12} 
𝑻𝑹𝒆  {12,12,12,12,12,12,5,12,5,5,5,11,11,5,… , 2,2,2} 
𝑻𝒕
𝑹𝒆  and 
𝑴𝑫𝑬𝒕
𝑹𝒆  
𝑇1
𝑅𝑒 = {12}, 𝑀𝐷𝐸1
𝑅𝑒 = 0; … , 
 𝑇7
𝑅𝑒 = {12,12,12,12,12,12,5},  
𝑀𝐷𝐸7
𝑅𝑒 = 0.141515; … ,  
𝑇144
𝑅𝑒 = {12,12,12,12,12,12,5, … ,2,2}, 𝑀𝐷𝐸144
𝑅𝑒 = 0 
𝑴𝑫𝑬𝒕
𝑹𝒆  {0,0,0,0,0,0,0.141515,0.158189,… ,0.000023,0} 
Max 𝑴𝑫𝑬𝒕
𝑹𝒆  0.158189 
𝑻𝒎𝒂𝒙
𝑹𝒆  𝑇8
𝑅𝑒 = {12,12,12,12,12,12,5,12} = {5,12} 
𝑻𝑻𝒉 
{
(0.3224,8,12), (0.3147,9,12), (0.3146,7,12),
(0.3129,1,12), (0.3088,11,12),
(0.3038,10,12), (0.2956,8,5), (0.2862,4,12),
(0.2849,2,5), (0.2848,12,5), (0.2847,9,5)
} 
Threshold 
value 
0.2847 
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Figure 5.6 The 144 MDE values of dispatch-node set (𝑀𝐷𝐸𝑡
𝐷𝑖)  
 
 
Figure 5.7 The 144 MDE values of receive-node set (𝑀𝐷𝐸𝑡
𝑅𝑒)   
 
Regarding the obtained threshold value which is 0.2847 then risk dimensions with 
the influence level of equal or greater than 0.2847 in matrix 𝑇 (Table 5.7) are chosen 
and the relationships between them are shown in Figure 5.8. As can be seen, eleven 
relationships among ten risk dimensions have the influence levels equal or greater 
than 0.2847. Environmental and Health Safety (EHS) and Disease Outbreak (DO) are 
the only risk dimensions that have no significant impact (either dispatching or 
receiving) on other risk dimensions because their influence levels are less than 
0.2847.  Compared to other threshold setting methods, by applying the average of all 
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elements in the matrix 𝑇, the threshold will be 0.2073 leading us to identify 81 strong 
relationships, which is not helpful because it identifies numerous strong relationships. 
While using MMDE algorithm, the threshold value is 0.2847 providing us with 11 
strong relationships.     
5.5.4 Strong relationships and net relationships 
Risk dimensions with influence level equal or greater than the threshold value 
(0.2847) from matrix 𝑇 (Table 5.7), and the relationships between them are shown in 
Figure 5.8. Eleven relationships of ten risk dimensions have an influence level equal 
or greater than 0.2847. Environmental and Health Safety (EHS) and Disease 
Outbreak (DO) are the only risk dimensions that have no significant impact (either 
causing or receiving) on other risk dimensions because their influence level is below 
0.2847.   
The net influence matrix is represented (Table 5.10), and the corresponding 
values of eleven major relationships are illustrated (Figure 5.8). For instance, the 
influence level from Natural Disasters (ND) to Operational Safety (OS) is 0.2849 
(Figure 5.8) while the net influence value from Natural Disasters (ND) to Operational 
Safety (OS) is −0.2124 (Table 5.10). The negative value of −0.2124 reveals that the 
level of influence from Operational Safety (OS) to Natural Disasters (ND) is lower 
than the level of influence from Natural Disasters (ND) to Operational Safety (OS) 
and the difference value is 0.2124. The total relation values and ranking of eleven 
major relationships among risk dimensions as depicted in Figure 5.8 along with their 
net influence values and corresponding ranking are presented (Table 5.11). 
   
 
Figure 5.8 Total relations between risk dimensions based on the threshold value 0.2847
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Table 5.10 Net influence matrix 
 CC ND EHS TR OS DO PI IA ST RA MF AF 
CC             
ND -0.0494            
EHS -0.1534 -0.1686           
TR -0.1569 -0.1830 0.0024          
OS -0.1798 -0.2124 0.0030 -0.0121         
DO -0.0692 -0.0850 0.0621 0.0751 0.1092        
PI -0.1004 -0.1177 0.0282 0.0406 0.0604 -0.0589       
IA -0.0955 -0.1176 0.0249 0.0770 0.0735 -0.0537 0.0181      
ST -0.0581 -0.0649 0.1039 0.1101 0.1230 0.0046 0.0469 0.0334     
RA -0.1160 -0.1379 0.0100 0.0061 0.0262 -0.0716 -0.0041 -0.0656 -0.1171    
MF -0.1021 -0.1390 0.0047 0.0056 0.0321 -0.0903 -0.0360 -0.0541 -0.1317 -0.0152   
AF -0.1435 -0.1774 -0.0182 -0.0279 0.0143 -0.1104 -0.0543 -0.0820 -0.1525 -0.0331 -0.0325  
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In Table 5.11, total relation values and ranking of eleven major relationships among 
risk dimensions as depicted in Figure 5.8 along with their net influence values and 
corresponding ranking are presented.  
Table 5.11 Total relation and net influence of eleven major relationships 
From To Total Relation Rank Net Influence Rank 
IA AF 0.3224 1 0.0820 5 
ST AF 0.3147 2 0.1525 2 
PI AF 0.3146 3 0.0543 7 
CC AF 0.3129 4 0.1435 3 
MF AF 0.3088 5 0.0325 9 
RA AF 0.3038 6 0.0331 8 
IA OS 0.2956 7 0.0735 6 
TR AF 0.2862 8 0.0279 10 
ND OS 0.2849 9 0.2124 1 
AF OS 0.2848 10 0.0143 11 
ST OS 0.2847 11 0.1230 4 
 
The influence of Industrial Action (IA) on Affordability (AF) is the strongest 
relationship followed by ten other impacts (Table 5.11 and Figure 5.8). It shows that 
Industrial Action (IA); Natural Disasters (ND); Affordability (AF); and Sabotage and 
Terrorism (ST) can have strong influence on Operational Safety (OS). But only the 
influence of Natural Disasters (ND) on Operational Safety (OS) has the strongest net 
relationship (Table 5.11 and Figure 5.8) which could be expected due to the 
characteristic of the Operational Safety (OS) risk that is much more affected by 
Natural Disasters (ND) rather than having influence on it. Also, Industrial Action (IA); 
Sabotage and Terrorism (ST); Political Instability (PI); Climate Change (CC); Market 
Failure (MF); Resource Availability (RA); and Technical Reliability (TR) strongly 
affect Affordability (AF). Between Affordability (AF) and Operational Safety (OS), 
the strongest influence is received by Affordability (AF) (from Industrial Action (IA)) 
while Affordability (AF) itself subsequently has strong influence on Operational 
Safety (OS). The evaluation of strong relationships revealed that Environmental and 
Health Safety (EHS), and Disease Outbreak (DO) do not have any strong relationships 
with other risk dimensions. It also revealed that Affordability (AF) and Operational 
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Safety (OS) are the only two major strong individual influence receivers (Table 5.11 
and Figure 5.8). 
 
5.6 Sensitivity Analysis 
The cases of high, moderate, low, and weighted average are explained in Section 5.4 
(Table 5.6). Note that equal weights of experts are taken into consideration for the 
sensitivity analysis. The Prominence, and Relation values in NR-DEMATEL for all 
twelve risk dimensions under five sensitivity analysis cases have been calculated and 
presented in Table 5.12.  
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Table 5.12 Sensitivity analysis results under Equal, Moderate, High, Low, and Weighted Average weights  
 Equal Moderate High Low Weighted Average 
Prominence Relation Prominence Relation Prominence Relation Prominence Relation Prominence Relation 
AF 5.4749 -1.1400 5.8053 -0.8492 6.5720 -0.7587 5.5802 -0.8776 6.1029 -0.8176 
MF 5.3871 -0.6225 5.1916 -0.5180 5.7102 -0.4491 5.0471 -0.5474 5.3948 -0.4934 
PI 5.2044 -0.1824 5.1184 -0.1663 5.8297 -0.0654 4.8963 -0.2027 5.4024 -0.1184 
OS 5.1112 -0.7924 5.0963 -0.8195 5.7903 -0.8749 4.8910 -0.8057 5.3675 -0.8399 
IA 4.9834 -0.3369 5.0251 -0.0192 5.7628 0.2654 4.8176 -0.0993 5.3201 0.0950 
TR 4.9635 -0.4959 4.8755 -0.5741 5.5099 -0.6635 4.6937 -0.5493 5.1232 -0.6119 
RA 4.8252 -0.3113 4.9926 -0.3796 5.7384 -0.4780 4.7769 -0.3514 5.2833 -0.4218 
EHS 4.4579 -0.4227 4.6650 -0.4906 5.5047 -0.6171 4.4186 -0.4518 4.9934 -0.5430 
CC 4.2405 1.4377 4.2126 1.2668 4.6786 1.1619 4.0847 1.2996 4.3973 1.2244 
ST 4.1989 0.9014 4.3085 0.7432 4.9105 0.6349 4.1314 0.7755 4.5452 0.7001 
ND 3.7024 1.5008 3.5188 1.3501 3.8921 1.3604 3.4142 1.3552 3.6646 1.3540 
DO 3.4615 0.4642 3.7915 0.4565 4.5799 0.4842 3.5637 0.4549 4.1054 0.4725 
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In Figure 5.9, Prominence values of all risk dimensions in five cases are illustrated. 
The demonstrated trend is almost the same for all risk dimensions over various 
experts’ weights. As can be seen, the Weighted Average and Moderate lines are both 
positioned between the two extents of the High and Low charts with the difference 
that the Weighted Average chart is closer to the High chart, which is predictable based 
on the higher hesitant weights assigned to case 1 (Table 5.5).  From a practical 
standpoint, it means that opinions of more experienced experts can be given higher 
value by choosing the Weighted Average generating close Prominence values to the 
High case. Moreover, the Equal line and either Low or Moderate lines overlapped in 
some risks producing exactly the same weights.  
 
  Figure 5.9 Prominence values of risks in various cases of experts’ weights 
In Figure 5.10, Relation values for different risk dimensions were depicted and as can 
be seen the lines overlapped almost perfectly except for the Equal chart that is 
significantly different in few risks such as Natural Disasters (ND), Sabotage and 
Terrorism (ST), Climate Change (CC), Affordability (AF), and Industrial Action (IA). 
It means that in the Equal case, the Relation values of risks can vary more compared 
to other cases.     
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Figure 5.10 Relation values of risks in various cases of experts’ weights 
 
To better realise the changes of weights, the rankings of the Prominence and Relation 
values are provided in Table 5.13. And in Table 5.14, and Table 5.15 descriptive 
statistics for Relation and Prominence weights ranking are presented, respectively. 
Furthermore, the Kendall’s coefficient of concordance is calculated to statistically test 
the level of agreement between rankings in five cases for the Prominence and Relation 
values (Table 5.16). 
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Table 5.13 Rankings obtained from sensitivity analysis under Equal, Moderate, High, Low, and Weighted Average weights  
 Equal Moderate High Low Weighted Average 
 Prominence Relation Prominence Relation Prominence Relation Prominence Relation Prominence Relation 
AF 1 12 1 12 1 11 1 12 1 11 
MF 2 10 2 9 6 7 2 9 3 8 
PI 3 5 3 6 2 6 3 6 2 6 
OS 4 11 4 11 3 12 4 11 4 12 
IA 5 7 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 
TR 6 9 7 10 7 10 7 10 7 10 
RA 7 6 6 7 5 8 6 7 6 7 
EHS 8 8 8 8 8 9 8 8 8 9 
CC 9 2 10 2 10 2 10 2 10 2 
ST 10 3 9 3 9 3 9 3 9 3 
ND 11 1 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 1 
DO 12 4 11 4 11 4 11 4 11 4 
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Table 5.14 Descriptive statistics of Relation rankings under five cases (Equal, Moderate, 
High, Low, and Weighted Average) 
 N Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
AF 5 11.60 0.548 11 12 
MF 5 8.60 1.140 7 10 
PI 5 5.80 0.447 5 6 
OS 5 11.40 0.548 11 12 
IA 5 5.40 0.894 5 7 
TR 5 9.80 0.447 9 10 
RA 5 7.00 0.707 6 8 
EHS 5 8.40 0.548 8 9 
CC 5 2.00 0.000 2 2 
ST 5 3.00 0.000 3 3 
ND 5 1.00 0.000 1 1 
DO 5 4.00 0.000 4 4 
 
Table 5.15 Descriptive statistics of Prominence rankings under five cases (Equal, Moderate, 
High, Low, and Weighted Average) 
 N Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
AF 5 1.00 0.000 1 1 
MF 5 3.00 1.732 2 6 
PI 5 2.60 0.548 2 3 
OS 5 3.80 0.447 3 4 
IA 5 4.80 0.447 4 5 
TR 5 6.80 0.447 6 7 
RA 5 6.00 0.707 5 7 
EHS 5 8.00 0.000 8 8 
CC 5 9.80 0.447 9 10 
ST 5 9.20 0.447 9 10 
ND 5 11.80 0.447 11 12 
DO 5 11.20 0.447 11 12 
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Table 5.16 Kendall’s W Test 
 N Kendall’s Wa Chi-Square df P-value 
Relation 5 0.978 53.800 11 0.000*** 
Prominence 5 0.971 53.400 11 0.000*** 
             aKendall’s coefficient of concordance 
         ***indicates statistical significance at 1% level 
 
As high values of Kendall's 𝑊 = 0.978, and 𝑊 = 0.971 are obtained for Relation, 
and Prominence, respectively (Table 5.16), it can be realised that the obtained rankings 
for the Relation and Prominence values of twelve risk dimensions under five cases 
agree with each other at a statistically significant level (𝑃 < 0.001***) and there is 
no statistically significant difference between them. In other words, even if detailed 
differences occur, Relation, and Prominence rankings, which are central to this 
research, are not statistically sensitive to the changes in level of experience of experts 
under the predefined parameter settings described in the proposed HESM. However, 
the Weighted Average weights are used in this study, because the Weighted Average 
resembles a more rational weight assignment method since it aggregates all three other 
weights including Low, High, and Moderate. 
The IRM diagrams for four cases including Equal, Moderate, Low, and High 
are depicted in Figure 5.11. The IRMs provided show that Natural Disasters (ND), 
Climate Change (CC), Sabotage and Terrorism (ST), and Disease Outbreak (DO) are 
consistently positioned in quadrant 𝐼 under Equal (a), Moderate (b), Low (c), and High 
(d) cases while in case Moderate (b) the Natural Disasters (ND) is pushed to the border 
of two quadrants 𝐼 and 𝐼𝐼. Furthermore, only in case High (d), Industrial Action (IA) 
is also moved to quadrant 𝐼.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
123 
 
 
Figure 5.11 The IRMs in four cases of experts’ weights Equal (a), Moderate (b), Low (c), and High (d) 
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5.7 Discussion 
The identification of the key risks in an energy supply chain is fundamental to 
reducing the likelihood of disruption. Risks rarely occur independently, that is, the 
incidence of one risk can cause another to occur (domino effect or chain reaction). For 
the first time, this study highlighted these interdependencies, and provided significant 
insight into the relationship between the energy risks by identifying those risks that 
should be prioritised in order to minimise the occurrence of others. This approach has 
the potential to put forward risk mitigation strategies that focus on the highly 
interdependent risks. Therefore, policy makers must develop mitigation strategies that 
make best use of resources in a targeted approach since certain risks occur 
concurrently and are often amplified by other risks. For example, Industrial Action 
(IA) can strongly lead to Affordability (AF) risk. Equally, Natural Disasters (ND) can 
lead to risks relevant to Operational Safety (OS); therefore, vulnerability to natural 
disasters should be primarily tested against its potential to lead to operational safety 
damages (Figure 5.8). This approach can signify a departure from past practice that 
did not consider risks’ interdependencies. However, as climate change reshapes both 
the natural environment and the regulatory framework that power supply chains 
operated in, it is imperative that risk assessment also changes to accommodate our 
best understanding of risk interdependencies.  
Critical risk dimensions recognition and how the analysis results are being 
construed are on the basis of the chosen risk analysis perspective that can be either 
proactive or reactive. In case of proactive attitude towards risk analysis the focal point 
is on risks with higher damage potential to the system via the capability of propagating 
from one risk to another in the longer run. Therefore, a proactive approach considers 
a prospective situation of the system by taking into consideration net causers (i.e 
Relation). The reactive perspective focuses on the ongoing status of the system rather 
than the resulting risks. It seeks dealing with the current occurred critical risks rather 
than future ones (i.e. Prominence). In reactive perspective, it is tried to identify 
important risks to suggest strategies more in order to resolve the current systems’ 
malfunctions rather than to prevent from future risks that might happen as a result of 
current risks. Based on the findings, Natural Disasters (ND) lies at the first rank of 
Relation list which means it has the highest total effect given to others (propagation 
capability), whereas on the other hand it stands at the bottom of Prominence list due 
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to its low receiving effect (𝑐𝑖 value).  It means, when Natural Disasters (ND) occur 
(the occurrence probability is not discussed in this study) can result in triggering many 
other risks in the system. It can influence other risks as it has the highest Relation 
value, while itself can hardly be influenced by them due to low 𝑐𝑖 value. It indicates 
Natural Disasters (ND) has the capacity to bring about many other risks in future (it 
can be short-term, medium-term, or long-term), so if the risk analysis perspective is 
proactive, Natural Disasters (ND) must be absolutely more desirable and the 
mitigation strategy recommendations must be more preventive or proactive rather than 
reactive. Whereas on the other hand, in the reactive case, the opposite is true and the 
proposed mitigation strategies are more after temporary treatments. Overall, 
considering merely one factor either Relation or Prominence would not be thoroughly 
cogent and to reach a satisfactory risk analysis they both along with other analyses 
like causers, receivers, and strongest relationships should be considered. Note that net 
receivers are different from receivers, likewise for net causers and causers. Net causers 
and net receivers are those risk dimensions with positive and negative values in the 
relation list. Net causers belong to cause group and net receivers belong to effect 
group. On the other hand, causers and receivers are top risk dimensions in the (𝑟𝑖) and 
(𝑐𝑖) list (see Table 5.8).  
The findings revealed that Natural Disasters (ND), Climate Change (CC), 
Sabotage and Terrorism (ST), Disease Outbreak (DO) and Industrial Action (IA) are 
core risk dimensions and among them Industrial Action (IA) has the highest 
Prominence value. Out of five high-ranked Prominence risk dimensions, Industrial 
Action (IA) is the only one that appears in the list of the top five Relation risk 
dimensions which are Affordability (AF), Political Instability (PI), Market Failure 
(MF), Operational Safety (OS), and Industrial Action (IA) (Table 5.8). The findings 
are summarised as follows: 
1. Net causers (cause group) and key factors:  
The Natural Disasters (ND), Climate Change (CC), Sabotage and Terrorism 
(ST), Disease Outbreak (DO), and Industrial Action (IA) are core risk dimensions (the 
first five factors in Relation list and positioned in quadrant 𝐼) and all are net causers 
that belong to cause group (see Figure 5.5, and Table 5.8). It means apart from their 
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occurrence likelihoods, in case of occurring, they can significantly influence other 
risks.  
2. Net receivers (effect group):  
Operational Safety (OS), Affordability (AF), Technical Reliability (TR), 
Environmental and Health Safety (EHS), Market Failure (MF), Resource Availability 
(RA), and Political Instability (PI) are all risk dimensions in effect group or net 
receivers, respectively. It means these risk dimensions are more influenced by other 
risks rather that have impact on others. 
3. Prominence:  
Affordability (AF), Political Instability (PI), Market Failure (MF), Operational 
Safety (OS), Industrial Action (IA), Resource Availability (RA), Technical Reliability 
(TR), Environmental and Health Safety (EHS), Sabotage and Terrorism (ST), Climate 
Change (CC), Disease Outbreak (DO), and Natural Disasters (ND) are ranked in the 
prominence list, respectively. It represents the relative importance of each risk 
dimension by adding together their given and received influences. 
4. Causers:  
Among causers or risks that can have higher influence on others without 
subtracting the received impacts; Climate Change (CC), Industrial Action (IA), 
Affordability (AF), Political Instability (PI), Sabotage and Terrorism (ST), Natural 
Disasters (ND), and Market Failure (MF) are top seven risk dimensions, respectively 
(see 𝑟𝑖 list in Table 5.8). It shows Climate Change (CC) is the most important factor 
influencing other risks but compared to Natural Disasters (ND) it receives more 
impact from other risks that is why Natural Disasters (ND) is the most significant net 
causer not Climate Change (CC).  
5. Receivers:  
Among receivers or risks that can be highly influenced by others, Affordability 
(AF) and Operational Safety (OS) were found as top ones followed by Market Failure 
(MF), Technical Reliability (TR), Resource Availability (RA), Environmental and 
Health Safety (EHS), and Political Instability (PI) (see 𝑐𝑖 list in Table 5.8).  
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6. Strongest relationships:  
The influence of Industrial Action (IA) on Affordability (AF) is the strongest 
relationship followed by ten other impacts Sabotage and Terrorism (ST) on 
Affordability (AF), Political Instability (PI) on Affordability (AF), Climate Change 
(CC) on Affordability (AF), Market Failure (MF) on Affordability (AF), Resource 
Availability (RA) on Affordability (AF), Industrial Action (IA) on Operational Safety 
(OS), Technical Reliability (TR) on Affordability (AF), Natural Disasters (ND) on 
Operational Safety (OS), Affordability (AF) on Operational Safety (OS) and Sabotage 
and Terrorism (ST) on Operational Safety (OS), respectively (see Table 5.11 and 
Figure 5.8). It shows that Industrial Action (IA), Natural Disasters (ND), Affordability 
(AF), and Sabotage and Terrorism (ST) can have strong influence on Operational 
Safety (OS). Also, Industrial Action (IA), Sabotage and Terrorism (ST), Political 
Instability (PI), Climate Change (CC), Market Failure (MF), Resource Availability 
(RA), and Technical Reliability (TR) strongly impact on Affordability (AF). Between 
Affordability (AF) and Operational Safety (OS), the strongest influence is received 
by Affordability (AF) as indicated from Industrial Action (IA) while Affordability 
(AF) itself subsequently has strong influence on Operational Safety (OS). 
7. Strongest net relationships:  
The influence of Natural Disasters (ND) on Operational Safety (OS) is the 
strongest net relationship followed by ten other strong net impacts of Sabotage and 
Terrorism (ST) on Affordability (AF), Climate Change (CC) on Affordability (AF), 
Sabotage and Terrorism (ST) on Operational Safety (OS), Industrial Action (IA) on 
Affordability (AF), Industrial Action (IA) on Operational Safety (OS), Political 
Instability (PI) on Affordability (AF), Resource Availability (RA) on Affordability 
(AF), Market Failure (MF) on Affordability (AF), Technical Reliability (TR) on 
Affordability (AF) and Affordability (AF) on Operational Safety (OS) respectively 
(see Table 5.11, and Figure 5.8).  
8. The evaluation on strong relationships revealed that Environmental and Health 
Safety (EHS) and Disease Outbreak (DO) do not have any strong relationships with 
other risk dimensions. It also revealed that Affordability (AF) and Operational Safety 
(OS) are the only two major strong individual influence receivers (see Table 5.11, and 
Figure 5.8).  
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9. Considering all the analysis, the final suggestion would be to focus on the six risk 
dimensions of Natural Disasters (ND), Climate Change (CC), Industrial Action (IA), 
Affordability (AF), Political Instability (PI), and Sabotage and Terrorism (ST). It is 
surmised that offering mitigation strategies based on them can be quite beneficial for 
the UK power supply chain sustainability. 
In the related literature, the importance of identified risks is confirmed. For 
instance, Mideksa and Kallbekken (2010) reviewed studies on the effect of climate 
change on electricity markets, although it was stated that there has been a surprisingly 
scant number of research on the effects of climate change on the energy sector mainly 
because of the wide-ranging consequences that are rarely brought together in any 
single study. The Venezuelan strike in 2002/3, also known as an oil strike or oil 
lockout resulted in a gross peak supply loss of 2.6 mb/d (million barrels per day) and 
is regarded as one of the five most important disruptions of the past decades indicating 
the immense significance of industrial action (Löschel et al., 2010). Tranchita et al. 
(2009) presented a methodology to evaluate the power system security with respect to 
the likelihood of terrorist acts, regarding the uncertainties related to load and 
generation. Chevalier (2006) explained the social dimension of SOS as the fact that 
SOS has a cost and in case of a price shock certain types of consumers who are 
exposed to volatile prices may not be able to afford a supply of energy. 
Lin et al. (2018) identified security defence ability as one of the three main 
identified risk elements in NEPS in China out of 18 initially identified risks.  The 
security defence ability can be associated with the risk dimension Sabotage and 
Terrorism (ST) which was among the final risk list in this Chapter. Hammond and 
Waldron (2008) recognised severe weather conditions as the fourth significant risk 
out of fifteen recognised ones. They assessed risks based on the multiplication of 
likelihood and consequence of the hazard occurring while in this chapter, the causal 
relationships between risks via proactive perspective were evaluated. In their study, 
reliance on primary fuels for electricity generation, lack of investment in new 
infrastructure and decommissioning of nuclear-reducing capacity identified as the first 
three important risks. Terrorism was identified as the 12th important risk in Hammond 
and Waldron (2008) out of 15 identified ones while in here Sabotage and Terrorism 
(ST) was identified as the 3rd factor in relation list and 9th in prominence ranking, out 
of the twelve identified risk dimensions. Sabotage and Terrorism (ST) was also among 
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the final six identified significant risk dimensions in the UK. The same study 
highlighted the importance of severe weather conditions risk, which is also 
emphasised in findings in this chapter with the importance of Natural Disasters (ND), 
and Climate Change (CC). Chen and Yano (2010) indicated that weather could affect 
the seasonal product demand as the US National Research Council has estimated that 
around 46% of US gross domestic product is influenced by weather. Jira and Toffel 
(2013) indicated that suppliers’ vulnerability to climate change is of high importance 
and that a growing number of supplier companies are being asked to share information 
about it from buyers leading many managers to better understand supply chain 
management in connection with climate change (Y. Wang et al., 2010). Climate 
change has resulted in the variability of weather conditions and subsequently affecting 
sales of many products. Thus, in order to reduce sales volatility Brusset and Bertrand 
(2018) introduced an approach to transfer weather risks to risk takers utilising weather 
index-based financial instruments. Berger et al. (2017) utilised recent tools in decision 
theory in order to quantify the influence of deep uncertainty on the optimal level of 
emission abatement.  
Considering the causal interrelationships between risks with proactive 
perspective, Natural Disasters (ND), and Climate Change (CC) were also located at 
the top of the significant risks in relation list which are comparable to the severe 
weather conditions risk.  Natural Disasters (ND) can be related to human-made 
Climate Change (CC), however, not all of Natural Disasters (ND) are caused by 
Climate Change (CC) while Climate Change (CC) can increase the likelihood of 
weather-related Natural Disasters (ND). However, in some cases Natural Disasters 
(ND) may be caused by other Natural Disasters (ND). Liu et al (2009) showed that, 
in eastern Taiwan, slow earthquakes can be triggered by typhoons. As another 
example,in 2005, hurricane Katrina caused landslides in Louisiana on the US Gulf 
Coast and caused a disruption for nearly one-quarter of total US oil production at the 
time. Moreover, extraction of shale gas by hydraulic fracturing or fracking was 
observed to cause low-intensity earthquakes (measuring 2.3 and 1.5 on the Richter 
scale) in April 2011 in North West England which resulted in shale gas extraction 
suspension nationally from May 2011 to December 2012 (Stamford and Azapagic, 
2014). Dealing with Climate Change (CC) means regarding the root and cause of 
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many Natural Disasters (ND) such as droughts which can be the result of Climate 
Change (CC) (Gallina et al., 2016; Van Aalst, 2006).  
In support of the findings regarding no critical relation between Disease 
Outbreak (DO) and Natural Disasters (ND) or vice versa (Table 5.11), Watson et al. 
(2007) indicated that risk factors for outbreaks after Natural Disasters (ND) are linked 
primarily to population displacement rather than a fear likely from dead bodies and 
epidemics. The identified strong interaction between Natural Disasters (ND) and 
Operational Safety (OS) can be explained with the Fukushima event when a tsunami 
damaged one nuclear power plant and subsequent policies shut down almost all of 
them causing phasing out many nuclear plants in Japan and Germany  (Boston, 2013). 
The association between Resource Availability (RA) and Political Instability (PI) 
seems to be critical in oil producing countries (Correljé and van der Linde, 2006), but 
the findings have not revealed such a strong relationship in the UK. The link between 
Market Failure (MF) and Affordability (AF) is documented in the study, which is 
predictable since Affordability (AF) deals with the price of the energy, which is 
determined, based on the economic functions in the UK liberalised energy market. 
Finally, although this study focused on the UK power supply chain, but the 
results are relevant, and the findings can be applicable to the power sectors of other 
countries. 
5.8 Conclusions 
The power industry is uniquely vulnerable to natural and human-made risks such as 
natural disasters, climate change, and cybersecurity. In this chapter, a comprehensive 
framework for risk identification and classification focusing on the UK energy supply 
chain was proposed. It was based on scrutinising energy supply chain risks in the 
energy security literature via consolidating information from various fields such as 
engineering, social sciences, and natural sciences. The NR-DEMATEL was tailored 
in this study to analyse interrelationships between risks as well as dealing effectively 
with subjective judgements of experts. Furthermore, a novel proposed HESM along 
with scenario analysis provided a basis for the expert selection and weight assignment 
process. This is the first comprehensive risk causal relationships analysis of the UK 
energy supply chain. The findings revealed that Natural Disasters (ND) and Climate 
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Change (CC) are the most crucial risks followed by Industrial Action (IA), 
Affordability (AF), Political Instability (PI), and Sabotage/Terrorism (ST). 
Three main disciplines are more related to the identified risks including: 
environmental science (Natural Disasters (ND), and Climate Change (CC)), sociology 
and politics (Industrial Action (IA); Political Instability (PI); Sabotage and Terrorism 
(ST)) and economics (Affordability (AF)).  
The findings revealed that Natural Disasters (ND); Climate Change (CC); 
Sabotage and Terrorism (ST); Disease Outbreak (DO); and Industrial Action (IA) 
were core risk dimensions as all were situated in quadrant 𝐼 and among them, 
Industrial Action (IA) had the highest Prominence value indicating its high relative 
importance. Out of five high-ranked Prominence risk dimensions (Affordability (AF); 
Political Instability (PI); Market Failure (MF); Operational Safety (OS); and Industrial 
Action (IA)), Industrial Action (IA) was the only one that appeared in the list of the 
top five Relation risk dimensions as well (Table 5.8). The final six critical risk 
dimensions in the study were Natural Disasters (ND); Climate Change (CC); 
Industrial Action (IA); Affordability (AF); Political Instability (PI); and Sabotage and 
Terrorism (ST) (Figure 5.12). Affordability (AF) has been added to the final list 
because Affordability (AF) ranked first in the Prominence list and was among 8 (out 
of 11) of the strongest relationships (Figure 5.8). Political Instability (PI) has also been 
recognised as one of the final risk dimensions as it ranked second in the Prominence 
ranking and sixth in the Relation list (Table 5.8) while also being the third strongest 
relationship (Table 5.11). Disease outbreak (DO) has not been included in the final 
list, as it has not been recognised among the strong relationships (Table 5.11). 
132 
 
 
Figure 5.12 Final six critical risk dimensions to the UK electricity supply chain and their 
characteristics 
The six most critical risks are particularly important for the UK’s approach in reducing 
risk exposure. Specifically, Natural Disasters (ND) and Climate Change (CC), two 
very interlinked risks are core to the UK’s power supply as legacy nuclear power 
stations are all located in coastal areas, threatened by storm-induced erosion and sea 
level rise. Furthermore, the UK’s ambitious offshore wind program is at risk because 
of potential changes in sea winds that could affect power output. Moreover, like every 
country with an increasingly complex energy supply portfolio, the UK has to take into 
account the risk of Sabotage and Terrorism (ST), especially in the form of cyber-
attacks. At the same time Political Instability (PI), and Affordability (AF) are largely 
related to the UK’s power supply as they concern the issue of imported resources, 
largely natural gas in the UK, as the indigenous production is being reduced. Finally, 
despite the UK power supply chain being largely privatised, the risk of Industrial 
Action (IA) remains high mainly due to the still strong reliance on a small number of 
market players and strong unionisation of the sector. 
5.8.1 Limitations and future research directions 
This study suffers from few limitations which can be overcome in future research. 
These limitations and suggestions for future studies are explained as follows: 
(1) First, the identified risk dimensions are generic macro-level risks in the UK 
energy supply chain and not dealing with micro-level risk elements. In other words, 
risks can be studied in more details in a specific part of the supply chain such as supply 
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or demand or even can be studied in a specific power generation sector such as 
offshore wind industry, just as an example. This would open up an avenue for future 
studies based on the result of the current study where the risk dimensions with generic 
nature were proposed. A more detailed analysis at the lower level called risk elements 
based on the proposed framework can be realised as beneficial. For instance, under 
ND (risk dimension), what natural calamities (risk elements) should be explored in a 
specific power supply chain region or sector such as offshore wind energy, and a 
similar exploration for other risk dimensions. 
(2) Second, due to nature of MCDM methods the primary data has to be 
collected from experts in the field which can be strengthened in order to lead to a more 
reliable outcome by expanding the number of experts who are participating in the data 
collection process. The validation in primary data collection for quantitative methods 
can be considered as another source of concern which should be dealt with methods 
such as face validation or validation through expert elicitation.  
(3) Third, the DEMATEL method has a quantitative approach to investigate the 
causal relationships between risks which might make it hard to elicit knowledge 
quantitatively from experts by using a Likert scale in some decision-making problems. 
That is why in this study, the revised DEMATEL was integrated with NST to facilitate 
this knowledge elicitation process from experts. However, results from the 
DEMATEL can be compared with qualitative approaches such as Know-Why method 
or even with other dynamic quantitative methods such as System Dynamics (SD) to 
verify the outcome.   
(4) Fourth, the occurrence probability estimation of each micro-level risk 
elements with a reliable method and using the probability scores along with experts’ 
opinions to prioritise risk elements can be regarded as another future research 
direction.  
(5) Finally, proposing risk mitigation strategies that links to the outcome of vital 
risk elements identification to provide more detailed and efficient response to 
identified risk elements. 
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Chapter 6 Prioritisation of Risks 
 
6.1 Introduction  
In the previous chapter, the causal relationships between identified risk dimensions in 
the UK energy supply chain were studied. The results indicated that that Natural 
Disasters (ND) and Climate Change (CC) are the most crucial risks followed by 
Industrial Action (IA), Affordability (AF), Political Instability (PI), and 
Sabotage/Terrorism (ST). In this chapter, the objective is to develop and apply two 
extensions of the Best-Worst Method (BWM) to prioritise important energy risks 
obtained from the interrelationship analysis in previous chapter. Thus, objectives in 
this chapter are twofold: (1) to theoretically enhance the BWM method, and (2) to 
practically apply it in the UK energy supply chain risks prioritisation in order to show 
the applicability of methodological extensions of the BWM as well as confirming the 
most critical risk dimensions which were identified in the previous chapter.  
The BWM is a Multi Attribute Decision Making (MADM) method for 
evaluating a set of alternatives against a set of decision criteria where two vectors of 
pairwise comparisons are used to calculate the importance weight of those decision 
criteria. The BWM is an efficient and mathematically sound method used to solve a 
wide range of MADM problems by reducing the number of pairwise comparisons and 
identifying the inconsistencies derived from the comparison process. In a number of 
MADM methods like the AHP and the BWM, it is required to acquire experts’ 
opinions in pairwise comparisons of alternatives and criteria. And as there is linguistic 
imprecision and vagueness in human subjective judgements, it is essential to apply an 
uncertainty theory to deal with that imprecision. Each one of the uncertainty theories 
has unique characteristics (Yamaguchi et al., 2007). Reflecting on the drawbacks of 
each uncertainty theory has led to introducing new theories, such as the Neutrosophic 
Set Theory (NST) from mathematics, into the decision-making sphere and applying 
the new developed hybrid MADM methodologies under uncertainty. In spite of 
simplicity and efficiency of the BWM, it does not consider the Decision Makers’ 
(DMs’) (or experts’) confidence about their pairwise comparisons. In this chapter, two 
extensions of the original BWM are applied in order to prioritise the obtained six risk 
dimensions from Phase 𝐼𝐼 of the thesis. The proposed methods are hybrid Spanning 
Trees Enumeration and BWM (STE-BWM) and Neutrosophic Enhanced BWM (NE-
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BWM) which were explained in Section 4.4, and 4.5, respectively. In Figure 6.1, more 
details are provided regarding the study in the current Chapter (Phase 𝐼𝐼𝐼).  
 
Figure 6.1 Phase III of the research carried out in this chapter 
As was explained in Section 4.4, in the original BWM (Appendix E), a DM has to 
provide a criterion as the best and a criterion as the worst with certainty, assuming no 
hesitancy. In the real-world decision-making process applying the original BWM 
dealing with subjective judgements of human beings, it is not always that 
straightforward for DMs to choose a criterion as either the best or the worst because 
there is always a degree of hesitancy which must be regarded. Dong et al. (2019) 
investigated the incomplete preference relations and self-confident preference 
relations in MCDM and realised that using self-confident preference relations instead 
of incomplete preference relations improves the quality of decision-making. This 
finding confirms the importance of capturing the confidence level of DMs in a 
decision-making method like the BWM. Furthermore, a recent survey of the BWM 
literature by Mi et al. (2019) suggests that scholars should focus on the uncertainty 
extension of the original BWM as a predominant research direction. This is the general 
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motivation to propose two extensions of the BWM to overcome this gap in the original 
BWM as follows: 
1) The hybrid STE-BWM (Section 4.4)   
This method by applying spanning trees enumeration offers an opportunity for 
DMs to suggest more than one best or worst criteria. The reason is that in many cases 
DMs are unable to choose only one criterion due to uncertainty, hesitancy or lack of 
information. Then, the proposed method can calculate which ones are actually the 
best, and the worst criteria based on already provided pair-wise comparison values by 
DMs.  
2) The NE-BWM (Section 4.5) 
In the original BWM, two vectors of pairwise comparisons including best-to-
others and others-to-worst vectors are treated with the same level of importance. The 
first vector (i.e. best to others) is named as Separation 𝐼 and the second vector (i.e. 
others-to-worst) is named as Separation 𝐼𝐼. The gap is that the importance of 
separations 𝐼, and 𝐼𝐼 based on an uncertain confidence of a DM has not been taken 
into consideration. The original BWM unrealistically assumes a DM is 100% sure 
about the most and least favourable criteria. In addition, obtaining preference data 
from a DM is not easy due to the lack of underpinning theories for formulating 
uncertainty parameters in the original BWM because it does not consider uncertainty 
in the decision-making process. Thus, the NST is utilised in structuring the value 
assignment process in terms of 𝜌+  and 𝜌−  values while dealing with a DM’s 
uncertainty in the enhanced BWM. In fact, the NST provides a rating scale for DMs 
to express their level of confidence in terms of 𝜌+ and 𝜌− values.  Not utilising such 
a theory, the proposed enhanced BWM would not be able to structure the confidence 
value acquisitions and thus, DMs would find it difficult or impossible to express their 
confidence levels. The reasons to choose the NST out of other uncertainty theories are 
summarised as follows: 
(1) As indicated in Appendix E, fuzzy information and Fuzzy Set Theory (FST) 
has been commonly used in conjunction with the original BWM. Even though fuzzy 
set information proved handy, it is unable to express the information about rejection 
(Ashraf et al., 2019) which is effectively quantified in the NST by introducing the 
falsity-membership function. 
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(2) The NST has the capability to quantify the indeterminacy membership 
independently, which adds an extra level of suitability to it for structuring DMs’ 
confidence level. 
The research steps in this chapter is depicted in Figure 6.2 . 
 
Figure 6.2 Research steps in Phase III in the current chapter 
The research contributions in this chapter are summarised as follows: 
(I) The proposed STE-BWM (Section 4.4) which is a hybrid method of spanning 
trees enumeration and BWM is applied in order to help identification of the best and 
the worst energy risk dimensions in case that DMs were not able to choose only one 
best and one worst risk dimension with full confidence.  
(II) The proposed NE-BWM (Section 4.5) which considers the NST to structure 
a DM’s uncertainty in terms of 𝜌+  and 𝜌−  values is applied to prioritise the six energy 
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risk dimensions (the concept and mathematical definitions of neutrosophic logic is 
provided in Appendix A).  
(III) Two real-world cases are provided in Section 6.3 to demonstrate the 
applicability and efficacy of the proposed NE-BWM. The results are analysed in 21 
test problems under various 𝜌+ and 𝜌− values to verify the proposed NE-BWM.  
(IV) A new output measurement index, namely confidence difference ( CD ) for 
the NE-BWM is proposed and discussed.  
Finally, the obtained average weights in the original L-BWM, NL-BWM, and 
NE-BWM are computed and final ranking of energy risk dimensions is provided. 
6.2 Methodology  
The BWM, introduced by Rezaei (2015), is a relatively new method that has 
successfully attracted researchers’ attention from various fields since its introduction. 
The simplicity of use, the smaller number of pairwise comparisons, and more 
consistent comparisons compared to similar methods like the AHP, have made the 
BWM a reliable and popular method. The BWM can help DMs in defining criteria 
weights in a decision-making problem. The best and the worst criteria must be 
determined by a DM. Secondly, pairwise comparisons are carried out between each 
of the two criteria (i.e. best and worst) and other criteria. Then, the weights of criteria 
are determined by solving a minimax problem. In the following Section 6.2.1, and 
Section 6.2.2 applications of two extensions of the original BWM under uncertainty 
NE-BWM, and STE-BWM are explained, respectively. For computation steps of 
proposed methods of NE-BWM, and STE-BWM see Section 4.5, and Section 4.4, 
respectively. 
6.2.1 The NE-BWM  
Although the ranking of BWM appears reasonable, the degree of a DM’s confidence 
on the best-to-others preferences and others-to-worst preferences has been overlooked 
by giving equal importance to them in the original BWM. This is the motivation to 
propose the NE-BWM (Section 4.5). 
Applying the original BWM requires a DM to provide their best and worst 
criteria as well as corresponding pairwise comparisons while failing to notice their 
subjective confidence or uncertainty on separations 𝐼 and 𝐼𝐼. However, in real-world 
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decision-making, there are situations where a DM has more confidence on their 
provided evaluations on one separation rather than the other. Additionally, human 
judgements are biased by linguistic imprecision and vagueness; thus, in order to 
improve the outcome validity of the original BWM in real-world decision-making 
problems, considering uncertainty over separations 𝐼 and 𝐼𝐼 into the original BWM 
can be beneficial. This notion encouraged this study to improve the efficiency of the 
original BWM by introducing 𝜌+ and 𝜌−  namely the DM’s confidence on the best-
to-others preferences (the degree of certainty on Separation 𝐼) and the DM’s 
confidence on others-to-worst preferences (the degree of certainty on Separation 𝐼𝐼), 
respectively. The 𝜌+and 𝜌− values represent the degree of DM’s uncertainty about 
which criterion is the best and which one is the worst. This is because this uncertainty 
can be extended to pairwise comparisons and affect the confidence degree on 
separations 𝐼 and 𝐼𝐼. In fact, in the original BWM, the two separations’ values are 
considered as being equal to 1 (i.e. 𝜌+ = 1, and 𝜌− = 1). 
6.2.2 The STE-BWM  
As explained in Section 4.4, in the original BWM, a DM must be able to provide one 
decision-making criterion as the best and one decision-making criterion as the worst 
with certainty, assuming no hesitancy. In the real-world decision-making process 
applying the original BWM dealing with subjective judgements of human beings, it is 
not always straightforward for DMs to choose only one criterion as either the best or 
the worst, without any level of hesitancy. The BWM can only recognise one criterion 
as the best, and one criterion as the worst, and is unable to handle more than one 
criterion for each of the best, and the worst group. In this situation, where there would 
be more than one best, and more than one worst criteria, the STE can be applied to 
find out the one criterion as the best and one criterion as the worst. 
6.3 Case Study Analysis by NE-BWM 
Supply chain is a popular application area for the BWM in the literature (Mi et al., 
2019). In this section, two supply chain cases are conducted to verify the proposed 
NE-BWM. In both cases, 21 test problems are chosen based on Table 4.2 and 
calculated Consistency Index (CI) values (Section 4.5.1) for them as shown in 
Appendix G (Table G.1).  
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6.3.1 Parameters setting 
A partial factorial experiment has been conducted to obtain the 21 test problems 
including one original BWM test problem and 20 NE-BWM test problems based on 
various DM’s confidence levels (Table 4.2). Based on Table 4.2, 
 0.26,0.38,0.50,0.68,0.90,1.00+  and  0.26,0.38,0.50,0.68,0.90,1.00− =  can 
make 36 possible combinations in total that out of which, 21 combinations are chosen. 
The obtained 20 test problems in NE-BWM are considered as they provide all unique 
possible CI values (Appendix G). In Figure 6.3, all 20 combinations in NE-BWM 
analysis are depicted as represented in Table 6.3, and Table 6.7 which are test problems 
2 to 21. In one outcome out of 21, the NE-BWM problem would be equal to the 
original BWM problem where the DM is fully confident (i.e., 𝜌+ = 1 and 𝜌− = 1) 
and obviously zero confidence shall not be taken into consideration. 
 
 
Figure 6.3 The obtained 20 test problems 
6.3.2 Case 1: A supplier development problem 
Rezaei et al. (2015) discussed the supplier development problem applying the BWM 
to evaluate eight identified supplier capability criteria and obtain their weights. The 
eight criteria included supplier capability ( 1
c
C ), product quality capability ( 2
c
C ), 
delivery capability ( 3
c
C ), intangible capability ( 4
c
C ), service capability ( 5
c
C ), 
financial/cost capability ( 6
c
C ), sustainable capability 7( )
c
C , and organisational 
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capability ( 8
c
C ). Here, the BWM evaluation data (Table 6.1 and Table 6.2) are utilised 
to compare the results of the original BWM, and the proposed NE-BWM in this case 
application. The best capability criterion is product quality capability ( 2
c
C ), and the 
worst capability criterion is organisational capability ( 8
c
C ) while 9BWa = . Based on 
the CI table in Rezaei (2015), the CR for the original BWM would be  
0.8599
0.1644
5.23
CR = = ,  the acceptable threshold proposed by Liang et al. (2019) is 
0.4587 which indicates the pair-wise comparisons are cardinally consistent based on 
output-based consistency measurement. 
Table 6.1 Best-to-others vector (Case 1) 
Criteria 1
c
C  2
c
C  3
c
C  4
c
C  5
c
C  6
c
C  7
c
C  8
c
C  
The best criterion ( 2
c
C ) 6 1 2 8 5 3 4 9 
 
Table 6.2 Others-to-worst vector (Case 1) 
Criteria 
The worst 
criterion ( 8
c
C ) 
1
c
C  2 
2
c
C  9 
3
c
C  8 
4
c
C  2 
5
c
C  3 
6
c
C  5 
7
c
C  4 
8
c
C  1 
In Table 6.3, the analysis of all test problems considering various  
+
 and 
−
 for the 
original and NE-BWM are provided. Calculated weights of all criteria along with 
numbered new rankings, the objective function value (
*
 ), and CR are shown in Table 
6.3.  
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Table 6.3 Analysis of 21 test problems in Case 1 
 Original BWM 
N

 
 *
1W  
*
2W  
*
3W  
*
4W  
*
5W  
*
6W  
*
7W  
*
8W  
*
  CR  
  0.0532 0.3093 0.2713 0.0393 0.0671 0.1299 0.0985 0.0314 0.8599 0.1644 
1 ranking (0) 6 1 2 7 5 3 4 8 - - 
 NE-BWM 
  *
1W  
*
2W  
*
3W  
*
4W  
*
5W  
*
6W  
*
7W  
*
8W  
*
  CR  
2 
0.26 + =  
0.0624 0.3210 0.2324 0.0371 0.0775 0.1348 0.1022 0.0325 0.2236 0.1827 
0.26 − =  
ranking (0) 6 1 2 7 5 3 4 8 - - 
3 
0.26 + =  
0.0566 0.3125 0.2344 0.0417 0.0790 0.1379 0.1057 0.0322 0.2714 0.1895 
0.38 − =  
ranking (0) 6 1 2 7 5 3 4 8 - - 
4 
0.26 + =  
0.0438 0.3018 0.2323 0.0442 0.0752 0.1648 0.1066 0.0314 0.3037 0.1964 
0.50 − =  
ranking (1) 7 1 2 6 5 3 4 8 - - 
5 0.26 + =  0.0648 0.2989 0.2333 0.0455 0.0786 0.1394 0.1081 0.0313 0.3719 0.2266 
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0.68 − =  
ranking (0) 6 1 2 7 5 3 4 8 - - 
6 
0.26 + =  
0.0659 0.2832 0.2534 0.0450 0.0748 0.1431 0.1047 0.0298 0.4431 0.2603 
0.90 − =  
ranking (0) 6 1 2 7 5 3 4 8 - - 
7 
0.26 + =  
0.0521 0.2890 0.2585 0.0467 0.0772 0.1382 0.1078 0.0305 0.4703 0.2733 
1.00 − =  
ranking (0) 6 1 2 7 5 3 4 8 - - 
8 
0.38 + =  
0.0591 0.3038 0.2665 0.0351 0.0659 0.1420 0.0968 0.0308 0.3268 0.1827 
0.38 − =  
ranking (0) 6 1 2 7 5 3 4 8 - - 
9 
0.38 + =  
0.0630 0.3154 0.2342 0.0402 0.0726 0.1372 0.1049 0.0323 0.3776 0.1872 
0.50 − =  
ranking (0) 6 1 2 7 5 3 4 8 - - 
10 
0.38 + =  
0.0589 0.2864 0.2566 0.0406 0.0741 0.1537 0.1000 0.0297 0.4319 0.1945 
0.68 − =  
ranking (0) 6 1 2 7 5 3 4 8 - - 
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11 
0.38 + =  
0.0614 0.3002 0.2333 0.0450 0.0768 0.1392 0.1127 0.0314 0.5081 0.2155 
0.90 − =  
ranking (0) 6 1 2 7 5 3 4 8 - - 
12 
0.38 + =  
0.0547 0.2902 0.2598 0.0442 0.0746 0.1354 0.1107 0.0304 0.5457 0.2274 
1.00 − =  
ranking (0) 6 1 2 7 5 3 4 8 - - 
13 
0.50 + =  
0.0624 0.3207 0.2323 0.0395 0.0756 0.1349 0.1021 0.0325 0.4300 0.1827 
0.50 − =  
ranking (0) 6 1 2 7 5 3 4 8 - - 
14 
0.50 + =  
0.0592 0.2953 0.2541 0.0416 0.0724 0.1484 0.0988 0.0303 0.5047 0.1879 
0.68 − =  
ranking (0) 6 1 2 7 5 3 4 8 - - 
15 
0.50 + =  
0.0581 0.2984 0.2282 0.0424 0.0773 0.1604 0.1043 0.0310 0.5696 0.1947 
0.90 − =  
ranking (0) 6 1 2 7 5 3 4 8 - - 
16 
0.50 + =  
0.0540 0.3063 0.2365 0.0449 0.0769 0.1407 0.1088 0.0319 0.5925 0.1975 
1.00 − =  
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ranking (0) 6 1 2 7 5 3 4 8 - - 
17 
0.68 + =  
0.0609 0.3131 0.2365 0.0362 0.0756 0.1463 0.0997 0.0318 0.5848 0.1826 
0.68 − =  
ranking (0) 6 1 2 7 5 3 4 8 - - 
18 
0.68 + =  
0.0555 0.2929 0.2629 0.0418 0.0732 0.1462 0.0975 0.0300 0.6776 0.1873 
0.90 − =  
ranking (0) 6 1 2 7 5 3 4 8 - - 
19 
0.68 + =  
0.0537 0.3141 0.2357 0.0452 0.0740 0.1387 0.1063 0.0323 0.7117 0.1897 
1.00 − =  
ranking (0) 6 1 2 7 5 3 4 8 - - 
20 
0.90 + =  
0.0566 0.3021 0.2650 0.0422 0.0662 0.1411 0.0962 0.0306 0.7740 0.1826 
0.90 − =  
ranking (0) 6 1 2 7 5 3 4 8 - - 
 0.90 + =  
0.0564 0.3217 0.2352 0.0415 0.0714 0.1369 0.1042 0.0328 0.8203 0.1841 
21 1.00 − =  
 ranking (0) 6 1 2 7 5 3 4 8 - - 
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Figure 6.4 Trend and ranking of weights in 21 test problems in Case 1 
In Case 1, no severe changes in criteria weights have been observed after alterations 
in  +  and 
−
 (Figure 6.4). Only one new ranking (ranking 1) was observed in test 
problem 4 (Table 6.3 and Figure 6.4). The rest of the rankings remained the same as 
the original BWM’s ranking (test problem 1 and ranking 0). In all the rankings, 2W  
(i.e. weight of the best criterion, 2
c
C ) is at the top and 8W  (weight of the worst 
criterion 8
c
C ) lies at the lowest part of the diagram (Figure 6.4).  
Table 6.4 The NE-BWM weights analysis in Case 1 
Weights N Range Mean 
Ranks of 
Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Ranks of Std. 
Deviation 
1W  20 0.0221 0.0580 6 0.0051 4 
2W  20 0.0385 0.3033 1 0.0119 2 
3W  20 0.0383 0.2441 2 0.0135 1 
4W  20 0.0116 0.0420 7 0.0032 7 
5W  20 0.0131 0.0744 5 0.0035 6 
6W  20 0.0300 0.1430 3 0.0083 3 
7W  20 0.0165 0.1039 4 0.0047 5 
8W  20 0.0031 0.0313 8 0.0010 8 
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The descriptive statistics of 20 test problems (test problem 1 has not been considered 
because it regards the weights in the original BWM) in Case 1 and in the proposed 
NE-BWM are provided in Table 6.4. The standard deviations show that the weights 
of 3W  have been more spread out compared to others. Taking into consideration the 
ranking of mean values, no new ranking has been obtained.  
 
Figure 6.5 The CR-CD diagram in Case 1 
The CR values are moving upward in Case 1, as CD values increase, showing that the 
consistency of the comparisons will decrease. Its surge is more vivid while the CD is 
at the peak (Figure 6.5). The highest CD value (i.e. 0.74) appeared in test problem 7 
( 0.26
+ =  and 1.00
− = ),  but, in test problem 7, the ranking remained unchanged 
(Table 6.3) compared to the original BWM. This point shows that merely an increasing 
CD does not necessarily lead to a change in the ranking, although it reduces the 
consistency of the DM’s comparisons. 
 
6.3.3 Case 2: A supply chain social sustainability problem 
Badri Ahmadi et al. (2017) applied the BWM to analyse eight identified social 
sustainability criteria in a developing economy context. Here, the criteria are assessed 
by the NE-BWM based on the provided evaluation data (Table 6.5 and Table 6.6). The 
social sustainability criteria are work safety and labour health ( 1SSC ),  training 
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education and community development ( 2SSC ), contractual stakeholders' influence (
3SSC ), occupational health and safety management system ( 4SSC ), interests and 
rights of employees ( 5SSC ),  rights of community ( 6SSC ), information disclosure 
7
)(SSC , and employment practices ( 8SSC ). The best social sustainability criterion is 
work safety and labour health ( 1SSC ) and the worst social sustainability criterion is 
rights of community 6)(SSC  and 9BWa = . Based on the CI table in Rezaei (2015), 
the CR for the original BWM is obtained as  
1.7251
0.3298
5.23
CR = = . The threshold in 
this evaluation based on cardinal and output-based consistency measurement is 
0.4587 (Liang et al., 2019) indicating the pair-wise evaluations are consistent.  
 
Table 6.5 Best-to-others vector (Case 2) 
Criteria 1SSC  2SSC  3SSC  4SSC  5SSC  6SSC  7SSC  8SSC  
The best 
criterion (
1SSC ) 
1 3 5 4 5 9 5 7 
 
Table 6.6 Others-to-worst vector (Case 2) 
Criteria The Worst Criterion ( 6SSC ) 
1SSC  9 
2SSC  2 
3SSC  5 
4SSC  3 
5SSC  4 
6SSC  1 
7SSC  5 
8SSC  3 
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Table 6.7 Analysis of 21 test problems in Case 2 
 Original BWM 
N

  
*
1W  
*
2W  
*
3W  
*
4W  
*
5W  
*
6W  
*
7W  
*
8W  
*
  CR  
  0.3794 0.1206 0.1158 0.0981 0.0856 0.0354 0.1158 0.0492 1.7251 0.3298 
1 ranking (0) 1 2 3 4 5 7 3 6 - - 
 NE-BWM 
  
*
1W  
*
2W  
*
3W  
*
4W  
*
5W  
*
6W  
*
7W  
*
8W  
*
  CR  
2 
0.26 + =  
0.3431 0.1192 0.1048 0.1265 0.1048 0.0320 0.1048 0.0650 0.4485 0.3664 
0.26 − =  
ranking (1) 1 3 4 2 4 6 4 5 - - 
3 
0.26 + =  
0.3360 0.1075 0.1152 0.1426 0.0830 0.0322 0.1152 0.0683 0.5417 0.3783 
0.38 − =  
ranking (2) 1 4 3 2 5 7 3 6 - - 
4 
0.26 + =  
0.3410 0.0650 0.1269 0.1405 0.0935 0.0334 0.1269 0.0728 0.6014 0.3890 
0.50 − =  
ranking (3) 1 6 3 2 4 7 3 5 - - 
5 0.26 + =  0.3433 0.0950 0.1389 0.0704 0.1091 0.0344 0.1389 0.0700 0.6575 0.4007 
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0.68 − =  
ranking (4) 1 4 2 5 3 7 2 6 - - 
6 
0.26 + =  
0.3411 0.0602 0.1474 0.0776 0.1125 0.0349 0.1474 0.0791 0.6983 0.4103 
0.90 − =  
ranking (5) 1 6 2 5 3 7 2 4 - - 
7 
0.26 + =  
0.3196 0.0601 0.1410 0.1222 0.1081 0.0329 0.1410 0.0752 0.7147 0.4153 
1.00 − =  
ranking (6) 1 6 2 3 4 7 2 5 - - 
8 
0.38 + =  
0.3509 0.0743 0.1071 0.1542 0.1071 0.0327 0.1071 0.0665 0.6555 0.3664 
0.38 − =  
ranking (7) 1 4 3 2 3 6 3 5 - - 
9 
0.38 + =  
0.3552 0.0712 0.1179 0.1491 0.0841 0.0338 0.1179 0.0708 0.7553 0.3745 
0.50 − =  
ranking (8) 1 5 3 2 4 7 3 6 - - 
10 
0.38 + =  
0.3662 0.0973 0.1335 0.0621 0.1097 0.0357 0.1335 0.0621 0.8573 0.3862 
0.68 − =  
ranking (9) 1 4 2 5 3 6 2 5 - - 
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11 
0.38 + =  
0.3552 0.0650 0.1401 0.0715 0.1145 0.0354 0.1401 0.0783 0.9364 0.3971 
0.90 − =  
ranking (5) 1 6 2 5 3 7 2 4 - - 
12 
0.38 + =  
0.3556 0.0665 0.1441 0.0727 0.1084 0.0357 0.1441 0.0727 0.9624 0.4010 
1.00 − =  
ranking(10) 1 5 2 4 3 6 2 4 - - 
13 
0.50 + =  
0.3552 0.1234 0.1085 0.0963 0.1085 0.0331 0.1085 0.0665 0.8625 0.3664 
0.50 − =  
ranking(11) 1 2 3 4 3 6 3 5 - - 
14 
0.50 + =  
0.3371 0.1095 0.1131 0.1143 0.1131 0.0322 0.1131 0.0677 1.0091 0.3757 
0.68 − =  
ranking (7) 1 4 3 2 3 6 3 5 - - 
15 
0.50 + =  
0.3629 0.1152 0.1325 0.0617 0.0971 0.0354 0.1325 0.0627 1.1304 0.3863 
0.90 − =  
ranking(12) 1 3 2 6 4 7 2 5 - - 
16 
0.50 + =  
0.3571 0.1113 0.1344 0.0642 0.0993 0.0351 0.1344 0.0642 1.1716 0.3905 
1.00 − =  
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ranking(13) 1 3 2 5 4 6 2 5 - - 
17 
0.68 + =  
0.3762 0.1307 0.1149 0.0687 0.1149 0.0351 0.1149 0.0447 1.1731 0.3664 
0.68 − =  
ranking(11) 1 2 3 4 3 6 3 5 - - 
18 
0.68 + =  
0.3358 0.1121 0.1117 0.1440 0.1050 0.0320 0.1117 0.0478 1.3554 0.3747 
0.90 − =  
ranking(14) 1 3 4 2 5 7 4 6 - - 
19 
0.68 + =  
0.3738 0.1227 0.1284 0.0614 0.0925 0.0359 0.1284 0.0568 1.4204 0.3786 
1.00 − =  
ranking(15) 1 3 2 5 4 7 2 6 - - 
20 
0.90 + =  
0.3428 0.1191 0.1047 0.1507 0.1016 0.0320 0.1047 0.0445 1.5526 0.3664 
0.90 − =  
ranking(14) 1 3 4 2 5 7 4 6 - - 
 0.90 + =  
0.3731 0.1088 0.1176 0.0717 0.1176 0.0350 0.1176 0.0586 1.6447 0.3692 
21 1.00 − =  
 ranking(16) 1 3 2 4 2 6 2 5 - - 
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Figure 6.6 Trend and ranking of weights in 21 test problems in Case 2 
Table 6.7 shows the analysis of 21 test problems in Case 2 and indicates that by taking 
into account various  +  and 
−
 values in 20 test problems of the NE-BWM, no 
ranking equal to the original BWM ranking has been obtained (Table 6.7). Figure 6.6 
depicts the trend and rankings of weights in each test problem in Case 2. The best 
criterion’s weight ( 1W ) is considerably higher than other weights, which has made 
other diagrams closer to each other and consequently has resulted in various rankings 
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under different  +  and 
−
 values (Figure 6.6). In total, 16 new rankings are obtained 
in addition to the ranking provided by the original BWM (Table 6.7). 
Table 6.8 The NE-BWM weights analysis in Case 2 
Weights N  Range Mean 
Ranks of 
mean 
Std. 
deviation 
Ranks of std. 
deviation 
1W  20 0.0566 0.3511 1 0.0148 3 
2W  20 0.0706 0.0967 5 0.0246 2 
3W  20 0.0427 0.1241 2 0.0141 4 
4W  20 0.0928 0.1011 4 0.0363 1 
5W  20 0.0346 0.1042 3 0.0099 6 
6W  20 0.0039 0.0339 7 0.0015 7 
7W  20 0.0427 0.1241 2 0.0141 4 
8W  20 0.0346 0.0647 6 0.0101 5 
 
The descriptive statistics of 20 test problems in Case 2 in the proposed NE-BWM are 
provided in Table 6.8. The standard deviation values show that weights of 4W  have 
changed more erratically. The mean values of weights in Case 2 have generated a new 
unique ranking. This result indicates that the mean weight may be able to represent an 
aggregated weight ranking by taking into account all of the uncertainties. 
Figure 6.7 The CR-CD diagram in Case 2 
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Like Case 1, the CR CD−  diagram in Case 2 has an increasing trend, which means 
the greater the  CD value, the higher CR , and the lower the consistency (Figure 6.7). 
The CR CD−  diagram in Case 2, has a more erratic trend compared to Case 1. 
6.3.4 Discussion on case studies 
The NE-BWM analyses show that in Cases 1 and 2, various weight rankings were 
obtained under different  +  and 
−
 values in 21 test problems. In both cases, there 
are 8 criteria with the same 9BWa = . Additionally, with reference to the original 
BWM (i.e. NL-BWM), it was resulted that 0.1644CR =  (Case 1) and 0.3298CR =  
(Case 2). Under various  DMs’ confidence levels on separations I and II  (i.e.  +  
and 
−
 values), sixteen new rankings were obtained in Case 2 and only one new 
ranking in Case 1 (Table 6.3 and Table 6.7). Obtaining so many or few new different 
rankings distinctive to the original BWM ranking represents how the resulted ranking 
can be influenced and altered by DMs’ uncertain opinions compared to the original 
BWM. It shows that under uncertainty the original BWM might not be generating the 
most suitable and reliable result, which validates the need for an uncertainty extension 
of the original BWM.  
In this study, a new measurement index of the NE-BWM output ( CD ) has been 
proposed to better explain the consistency alteration in the provided comparisons. 
Results in both Cases show that an increase in the CD values, would raise the CR 
values, which indicates lower consistency in the comparisons and the DMs’ 
judgements (Figure 6.5 and Figure 6.7). This means that the consistency of evaluations 
is susceptible to an unbalanced confidence of DMs on the two separations I and II  
(i.e. a higher CD value). This shows the integration of uncertainty with the BWM can 
lead to higher inconsistency as was already indicated in the literature.  
The changes in CR values are more erratic in Case 2 (Figure 6.7). The CR value 
in the original BWM in Case 2 (i.e. 0.3298CR = ), is higher than its corresponding 
value in Case 1 (i.e. 0.1644CR = ). The reason for the more erratic change in CR in 
Case 2 can be due to the fact that its CR value in the original BWM shows higher 
inconsistency than in Case 1. Thus, the effect of a change in DMs’ confidence on 
separations I and II  (CD value alterations) would be more influential on CR values 
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in Case 2 (noting that in the original BWM there is a full confidence on the separations 
I and II ). 
It is also concluded that there is no direct relation between CD and a change in 
ranking in the test problems of Cases 1 and 2. For instance, having the highest CD 
value (i.e. 0.74) in Case 1 did not alter the rankings. However, in Case 2, having the 
slightest CD value alterations produced new rankings. This finding shows CD alone 
cannot contribute to a change in ranking and CR values should be taken into 
consideration. Suppose, a DM is completely confident on their comparisons and has 
chosen best, and worst criteria (i.e. 1.00
+ = , 1.00
− = , and 0)CD =  but the 
comparisons are suffering from a high CR value. In this instance, it would cause the 
outcome rankings to become more sensitive to a little scepticism of a DM on their 
choice about either Separation I  or Separation II  (an uncertain DM, or 0CD  ). 
The overall outcomes from case studies can be summarised as follows:  
(I) The new NE-BWM model can change the final ranking of the criteria 
weights. This change in ranking just represents how the resulted ranking can be 
influenced and altered by DMs’ uncertain opinions compared to the full confident 
deterministic approach of DMs in the original BWM. This result shows that under 
uncertain real-world applications, the original BWM might not be able to generate the 
most suitable criteria weights and consequently the most reliable ranking because it 
presumes that DMs are fully confident, and there is no room for hesitancy.  
(II) With growing inconsistency, the DMs’ degree of confidence on the 
separations I and II can play a more critical role in obtaining new rankings. In other 
words, when the original BWM comparisons are consistent (smaller CR  values) then 
the proposed NE-BWM cannot significantly affect the criteria weights and rankings 
under various  +  and 
−
values in different test problems. It means that the final 
ranking and weights are more sensitive to the inconsistency of comparisons under 
various  +  and 
−
 values in different test problems.  
(III) An increase in CD  values, meaning an unbalanced confidence of DMs on 
the two separations I and II would raise the CR  values indicating less consistency in 
comparisons.  
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(IV) The changes in CR  values can be more erratic due to higher inconsistency, 
which makes the changes in CR  more susceptible to CD  value alterations.  
(V) The mean values of weights can represent an aggregated weight and produce 
a unique ranking (i.e. in Case 2, Table 6.8). In some circumstances, applying this 
aggregated weight might be helpful. This would include situations where acquiring 
the DMs’ confidence is impossible because the data is already gathered or for re-
analysing the other original BWM studies by the NE-BWM.  
 
6.4 Data Collection 
The required primary data in the form of pair-wise comparisons for the 
implementation of the original BWM, NE-BWM, and STE-BWM are obtained from 
5 UK energy experts out of 31 experts who already participated in Phase 𝐼𝐼 of the 
research (Chapter 5) and have related strong expertise. Initially, 16 out of 31 experts 
who were capable to provide valuable insights on the six identified risk dimensions 
were contacted and 5 of them participated in this phase of the thesis by providing their 
evaluations. The data is collected through an online survey. In Table 6.9, the best (most 
critical), and worst (least critical) energy risk dimensions identified by experts are 
presented. 
Table 6.9 Most and least critical risks determined by experts 
 
Identified as most critical 
by experts 
Identified as least critical by 
experts 
AF: Affordability 1  
ND: Natural Disasters 4  
IA: Industrial Action  1, 5 
CC: Climate Change 2, 3, 5  
ST: Sabotage/Terrorism 4 3 
PI: Political Instability  2, 4 
 
In Table 6.10, the best-to-other vectors and in Table 6.11, the others-to-worst vectors 
based on the evaluations provided by experts are shown.  
 
158 
 
Table 6.10 Best-to-others vectors  
Experts 
The most 
critical risk 
PI ND IA CC ST AF 
1 AF 1 3 5 2 4 1 
2 CC 9 8 3 1 9 5 
3 CC 5 3 3 1 4 7 
4 
ND 7 1 4 3 1 5 
ST 7 1 4 3 1 5 
5 CC 6 2 8 1 2 3 
  
Table 6.11 Others-to-worst vectors  
Experts 1 2 3 4 5 
The least 
critical risk 
IA PI ST PI IA 
ND 2 6 4 7 7 
CC 3 9 9 5 9 
ST 1 5 1 7 7 
AF 5 7 5 4 5 
PI 4 1 3 1 3 
IA 1 5 5 3 1 
 
In Table 6.12, the confidence levels of each expert are provided and can be used in the 
NE-BWM analysis. The applied scale is presented in Table 4.2 and the questions were 
utilised to acquire the confidence levels can be seen in Appendix F.   
Table 6.12 Confidence levels 
Experts 
confidence on the 
best-to-others 
𝜌+ 
confidence on the 
others-to-worst 
𝜌− 
1 Fairly high 0.68 Fairly high 0.68 
2 Medium 0.50 Medium 0.50 
3 Fairly high 0.68 Medium 0.50 
4 Fairly high 0.68 Medium 0.50 
5 High 0.90 High 0.90 
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The CR values are all in acceptable threshold lower than 0.1 based on Liang et al. 
(2019).  
6.5 Analysis  
In this section, the analysis of the STE-BWM, NE-BWM, and original BWM (L-
BWM, and NL-BWM) based on the acquired data in Section 6.4 are provided. All the 
optimisations are carried out by using the LINGO 18.0.  
6.5.1 The STE-BWM application 
As can be seen in Table 6.9, and Table 6.10; expert 4, hesitated in choosing only one 
best criterion (i.e. the most critical) between Natural Disasters (ND) and Sabotage and 
Terrorism (ST); that is why both were selected. This was made possible through the 
provided survey. Thus, following the proposed steps of STE-BWM explained in 
Section 4.4, the best criterion for expert 4, can be realised.  
Step 1: The identified set of risk dimensions are 𝑁 = {𝐴𝐹,𝑁𝐷, 𝐼𝐴, 𝐶𝐶, 𝑆𝑇, 𝑃𝐼} 
Step 2: The best and worst set of risk dimensions based on expert 4 are Θ = {𝑁𝐷, 𝑆𝑇} 
and Γ = {𝑃𝐼}. Thus, |Θ| = 2, and |Γ| = 1, then the STE calculations must be carried 
out two times (i.e. |Θ| × |Γ| = 2 ). One time for ND and PI, and the second time for 
ST and PI. 
6.5.1.1 The EAST analysis for ND and PI 
The EAST as explained in Appendix H is applied here.  
Step 1: The identified set of risk dimensions are 𝐶 = {𝐴𝐹, 𝑁𝐷, 𝐼𝐴, 𝐶𝐶, 𝑆𝑇, 𝑃𝐼}  
Step 2: Based on provided pair-wise comparison vectors by expert 4 for ND (i.e. the 
best risk dimension), and PI (i.e. the worst risk dimension) as shown in Table 6.10, 
and Table 6.11 the incomplete pair-wise comparison matrix 𝐴 can be obtained (Table 
6.13). The utilised scale is presented in Table E.1 in Appendix E. 
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Table 6.13 The incomplete pair-wise comparison matrix A by expert 4 (ND and PI) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
  AF ND IA CC ST PI 
1 AF 1 0.20    𝟒 
2 ND 𝟓 1 𝟒 𝟑 𝟏 𝟕 
3 IA  0.25 1   𝟑 
4 CC  0.33  1  𝟓 
5 ST  1.00   1 𝟕 
6 PI 0.25 0.14 0.33 0.20 0.14 1 
 
Step 3: The corresponding graph 𝐺 of the pair-wise comparison matrix 𝐴 (Table 6.13) 
is produced as shown in Figure 6.8.  
 
 
Figure 6.8 The undirected (a), and directed (b) graph G of the matrix A (ND and PI)  
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Step 4: The Kirchhoff’s matrix-tree theorem (Theorem B.3 in Appendix B) is used to 
obtain the total number of spanning trees. It is known that for each tree, 𝑛 − 1 = 6 −
1 = 5 edges are needed and as can be seen in Figure 6.8, the obtained graphs have 9 
edges. It indicates that at most there will be (9
5
) =
9!
5!×4!
= 126 potential trees and by 
using the Kirchhoff’s matrix-tree theorem, the total number of spanning trees can be 
obtained as 𝜂 = 48 (see Table C.1 in Appendix C). 
According to the Kirchhoff’s matrix-tree theorem (Theorem B.3 in Appendix 
B), the degree matrix and adjacency matrix of graph 𝐺 are shown in Equation (6.1), 
and Equation (6.2), respectively. 
         𝐷(𝐺) =
[
 
 
 
 
 
2 0 0 0 0 0
0 5 0 0 0 0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2 0 0 0
0 2 0 0
0 0 2 0
0 0 0 5]
 
 
 
 
 
 (6.1) 
 
 
         𝐴(𝐺) =
[
 
 
 
 
 
0 1 0 0 0 1
1 0 1 1 1 1
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1
1 1 1 0]
 
 
 
 
 
 (6.2) 
Then the Laplacian matrix of graph 𝐺 is obtained as represented in Equation (6.3) 
 
𝐿(𝐺) = 
2 -1 0 0 0 -1 
-1 5 -1 -1 -1 -1 
0 -1 2 0 0 -1 
0 -1 0 2 0 -1 
0 -1 0 0 2 -1 
-1 -1 -1 -1 -1 5 
 
(6.3) 
 
𝐿∗(𝐺) can be attained by omitting any row and the corresponding column of the 
Laplacian matrix (for instance, by removing row 1 and column 1 or row 2 and column 
2 and so on). Then, |𝐿∗(𝐺)| = 48 which is the total number of spanning trees for the 
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graph G (Figure 6.8) of the incomplete pairwise comparison matrix A (Table 6.13). 
Ultimately, the Gray code algorithm can be used to generate all 48 spanning trees as 
shown in Table C.1 in Appendix C. 
Step 5: the weights of six risk dimensions in each of the 48 spanning trees are 
calculated. The weight of 𝑖𝑡ℎ risk dimension (𝑖 = 1,… , 6) in 𝑘𝑡ℎ spanning tree (𝑘 =
1,… ,48) is denoted as 𝑤𝑖
(𝑘)
 and computed based on Equations (H.49) and (H.50) in 
Appendix H. All weights are shown in Table 6.14 
Table 6.14 Weights of risk dimensions in all spanning trees (ND and PI) 
  weights 
No. Arcs in spanning trees 1: AF 2: ND 3: IA 4: CC 5: ST 6: PI 
1 a21, a26, a36, a25, a24 0.0644 0.3221 0.1380 0.1074 0.3221 0.0460 
2 a21, a26, a25, a24, a23 0.0683 0.3417 0.0854 0.1139 0.3417 0.0488 
3 a21, a36, a25, a24, a23 0.0698 0.3488 0.0872 0.1163 0.3488 0.0291 
4 a21, a26, a36, a24, a56 0.0644 0.3221 0.1380 0.1074 0.3221 0.0460 
5 a21, a36, a25, a24, a56 0.0644 0.3221 0.1380 0.1074 0.3221 0.0460 
6 a21, a26, a36, a25, a46 0.0574 0.2869 0.1230 0.2049 0.2869 0.0410 
7 a21, a36, a25, a24, a46 0.0714 0.3571 0.0714 0.1190 0.3571 0.0238 
8 a21, a36, a25, a24, a16 0.0732 0.3659 0.0549 0.1220 0.3659 0.0183 
9 a26, a36, a25, a24, a16 0.1644 0.2877 0.1233 0.0959 0.2877 0.0411 
10 a21, a36, a24, a56, a23 0.0816 0.4082 0.1020 0.1361 0.2381 0.0340 
11 a21, a25, a24, a56, a23 0.0683 0.3417 0.0854 0.1139 0.3417 0.0488 
12 a21, a26, a24, a56, a23 0.0683 0.3417 0.0854 0.1139 0.3417 0.0488 
13 a21, a24, a46, a56, a23 0.0863 0.4317 0.1079 0.1439 0.2014 0.0288 
14 a21, a25, a46, a56, a23 0.0605 0.3024 0.0756 0.2160 0.3024 0.0432 
15 a21, a36, a46, a56, a23 0.0789 0.3947 0.0987 0.1645 0.2303 0.0329 
16 a21, a26, a46, a56, a23 0.0605 0.3024 0.0756 0.2160 0.3024 0.0432 
17 a24, a16, a46, a56, a23 0.1119 0.4196 0.1049 0.1399 0.1958 0.0280 
18 a25, a16, a46, a56, a23 0.1553 0.2718 0.0680 0.1942 0.2718 0.0388 
19 a36, a16, a46, a56, a23 0.1250 0.3750 0.0938 0.1563 0.2188 0.0313 
20 a26, a16, a46, a56, a23 0.1553 0.2718 0.0680 0.1942 0.2718 0.0388 
21 a21, a16, a46, a56, a23 0.0952 0.4762 0.1190 0.1190 0.1667 0.0238 
22 a21, a36, a25, a46, a23 0.0678 0.3390 0.0847 0.1412 0.3390 0.0282 
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23 a21, a25, a24, a46, a23 0.0702 0.3509 0.0877 0.1170 0.3509 0.0234 
24 a21, a26, a25, a46, a23 0.0605 0.3024 0.0756 0.2160 0.3024 0.0432 
25 a26, a25, a24, a16, a23 0.1733 0.3032 0.0758 0.1011 0.3032 0.0433 
26 a36, a25, a24, a16, a23 0.1111 0.3333 0.0833 0.1111 0.3333 0.0278 
27 a21, a25, a24, a16, a23 0.0706 0.3529 0.0882 0.1176 0.3529 0.0176 
28 a21, a36, a25, a46, a56 0.0574 0.2869 0.1230 0.2049 0.2869 0.0410 
29 a21, a36, a24, a46, a56 0.0882 0.4412 0.0882 0.1471 0.2059 0.0294 
30 a21, a26, a36, a46, a56 0.0574 0.2869 0.1230 0.2049 0.2869 0.0410 
31 a26, a36, a24, a16, a56 0.1644 0.2877 0.1233 0.0959 0.2877 0.0411 
32 a36, a25, a24, a16, a56 0.1644 0.2877 0.1233 0.0959 0.2877 0.0411 
33 a21, a36, a24, a16, a56 0.0960 0.4800 0.0720 0.1600 0.1680 0.0240 
34 a26, a36, a25, a16, a46 0.1481 0.2593 0.1111 0.1852 0.2593 0.0370 
35 a36, a25, a24, a16, a46 0.0930 0.3488 0.0698 0.1163 0.3488 0.0233 
36 a21, a36, a25, a16, a46 0.0755 0.3774 0.0566 0.0943 0.3774 0.0189 
37 a25, a24, a16, a56, a23 0.1733 0.3032 0.0758 0.1011 0.3032 0.0433 
38 a36, a24, a16, a56, a23 0.1290 0.3871 0.0968 0.1290 0.2258 0.0323 
39 a26, a24, a16, a56, a23 0.1733 0.3032 0.0758 0.1011 0.3032 0.0433 
40 a21, a24, a16, a56, a23 0.0916 0.4580 0.1145 0.1527 0.1603 0.0229 
41 a25, a24, a16, a46, a23 0.0914 0.3429 0.0857 0.1143 0.3429 0.0229 
42 a36, a25, a16, a46, a23 0.1081 0.3243 0.0811 0.1351 0.3243 0.0270 
43 a26, a25, a16, a46, a23 0.1553 0.2718 0.0680 0.1942 0.2718 0.0388 
44 a21, a25, a16, a46, a23 0.0727 0.3636 0.0909 0.0909 0.3636 0.0182 
45 a36, a24, a16, a46, a56 0.1143 0.4286 0.0857 0.1429 0.2000 0.0286 
46 a36, a25, a16, a46, a56 0.1481 0.2593 0.1111 0.1852 0.2593 0.0370 
47 a26, a36, a16, a46, a56 0.1481 0.2593 0.1111 0.1852 0.2593 0.0370 
48 a21, a36, a16, a46, a56 0.1000 0.5000 0.0750 0.1250 0.1750 0.0250 
 
Step 6: Finally, by getting the arithmetic average of all weights for each risk 
dimension (i.e. EAST) based on Equation (H.51) in Appendix H or geometric average 
(i.e. GMAST) based on Equation (H.52) in Appendix H, the final weight of each risk 
dimension can be obtained as shown in Table 6.15.  
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Table 6.15 Average weights of all spanning trees and rankings of risks (ND and PI) 
 AF ND IA CC ST PI 
EAST 0.1010 0.3444 0.0938 0.1410 0.2858 0.0341 
Ranking 4 1 5 3 2 6 
GMAST 0.0943 0.3392 0.0913 0.1360 0.2788 0.0327 
Ranking 4 1 5 3 2 6 
 
6.5.1.2 The EAST analysis for ST and PI 
The EAST as explained in Appendix H is applied here, similar to previous Section 
6.5.1.1.  
Step 1: The identified set of risk dimensions are 𝐶 = {𝐴𝐹, 𝑁𝐷, 𝐼𝐴, 𝐶𝐶, 𝑆𝑇, 𝑃𝐼}  
Step 2: The incomplete pair-wise comparison matrix 𝐴 can be obtained as shown in 
Table 6.16. It is constructed based on provided pair-wise comparison vectors by expert 
4 for ST (i.e. the best risk dimension), and PI (i.e. the worst risk dimension) as shown 
in Table 6.10, and Table 6.11.  
Table 6.16 The incomplete pair-wise comparison matrix A by expert 4 (ST and PI) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
  AF ND IA CC ST PI 
1 AF 1    0.20 𝟒 
2 ND  1   1.00 𝟕 
3 IA   1  0.25 𝟑 
4 CC    1 0.33 𝟓 
5 ST 𝟓 𝟏 𝟒 𝟑 1 𝟕 
6 PI 0.25 0.14 0.33 0.20 0.14 1 
 
Step 3: The corresponding graph 𝐺 of the pair-wise comparison matrix 𝐴 (Table 6.16) 
is produced as shown in Figure 6.9.  
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Figure 6.9 The undirected (a) and directed (b) graph G of the matrix A (ST and PI) 
Step 4: The Kirchhoff’s matrix-tree theorem (Theorem B.3 in Appendix B) is used to 
obtain the total number of spanning trees as 𝜂 = 48 (see Table K.1 in Appendix K).  
According to the Kirchhoff’s matrix-tree theorem (Theorem B.3 in Appendix 
B), the degree matrix and adjacency matrix of graph 𝐺 are shown in Equations (6.4) 
and Equation (6.5), respectively. 
         𝐷(𝐺) =
[
 
 
 
 
 
2 0 0 0 0 0
0 2 0 0 0 0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2 0 0 0
0 2 0 0
0 0 5 0
0 0 0 5]
 
 
 
 
 
 (6.4) 
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         𝐴(𝐺) =
[
 
 
 
 
 
0 0 0 0 1 1
0 0 0 0 1 1
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
1
0 0 1 1
0 0 1 1
1 1 0 1
1 1 1 0]
 
 
 
 
 
 (6.5) 
 
Then, the Laplacian matrix of graph 𝐺 is obtained as represented in Equation (6.6) 
 
 
𝐿(𝐺) = 
2 0 0 0 -1 -1 
0 2 0 0 -1 -1 
0 0 2 0 -1 -1 
0 0 0 2 -1 -1 
-1 -1 -1 -1 5 -1 
-1 -1 -1 -1 -1 5 
 
(6.6) 
 
𝐿∗(𝐺) can be obtained by omitting any row and the corresponding column of the 
Laplacian matrix. As a result, |𝐿∗(𝐺)| = 48 which is the total number of spanning 
trees for the graph 𝐺 (Figure 6.9) of the incomplete pairwise comparison matrix 𝐴 
(Table 6.16). Finally, a Gray code algorithm can be used to generate all the 48 
spanning trees as shown in Table K.1 in Appendix K. 
Step 5: The weights of six risk dimensions in each of the 48 spanning trees are 
calculated. The weight of 𝑖𝑡ℎ risk dimension (𝑖 = 1,… , 6) in 𝑘𝑡ℎ spanning tree (𝑘 =
1,… ,48) is denoted as 𝑤𝑖
(𝑘)
 and computed based on Equation (H.49) in Appendix H, 
and Equation (H.50) in Appendix H. All weights are shown in Table 6.17. 
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Table 6.17 Weights of risk dimensions in all spanning trees (ST and PI) 
  weights 
No. Arcs in spanning trees 1: AF 2: ND 3: IA 4: CC 5: ST 6: PI 
1 a16, a26, a36, a46, a56 0.1481 0.2593 0.1111 0.1852 0.2593 0.0370 
2 a16, a26, a36, a46, a54 0.1143 0.2000 0.0857 0.1429 0.4286 0.0286 
3 a16, a26, a36, a56, a54 0.1644 0.2877 0.1233 0.0959 0.2877 0.0411 
4 a16, a26, a36, a46, a53 0.1250 0.2188 0.0938 0.1563 0.3750 0.0313 
5 a16, a26, a46, a56, a53 0.1553 0.2718 0.0680 0.1942 0.2718 0.0388 
6 a16, a26, a36, a46, a52 0.1481 0.2593 0.1111 0.1852 0.2593 0.0370 
7 a16, a36, a46, a56, a52 0.1481 0.2593 0.1111 0.1852 0.2593 0.0370 
8 a16, a26, a36, a46, a51 0.1000 0.1750 0.0750 0.1250 0.5000 0.0250 
9 a26, a36, a46, a56, a51 0.0574 0.2869 0.1230 0.2049 0.2869 0.0410 
10 a16, a26, a56, a53, a54 0.1733 0.3032 0.0758 0.1011 0.3032 0.0433 
11 a16, a26, a46, a53, a54 0.1119 0.1958 0.1049 0.1399 0.4196 0.0280 
12 a16, a26, a36, a53, a54 0.1290 0.2258 0.0968 0.1290 0.3871 0.0323 
13 a16, a56, a52, a53, a54 0.1733 0.3032 0.0758 0.1011 0.3032 0.0433 
14 a16, a46, a52, a53, a54 0.0914 0.3429 0.0857 0.1143 0.3429 0.0229 
15 a16, a36, a52, a53, a54 0.1111 0.3333 0.0833 0.1111 0.3333 0.0278 
16 a16, a26, a52, a53, a54 0.1733 0.3032 0.0758 0.1011 0.3032 0.0433 
17 a56, a51, a52, a53, a54 0.0683 0.3417 0.0854 0.1139 0.3417 0.0488 
18 a46, a51, a52, a53, a54 0.0702 0.3509 0.0877 0.1170 0.3509 0.0234 
19 a36, a51, a52, a53, a54 0.0698 0.3488 0.0872 0.1163 0.3488 0.0291 
20 a26, a51, a52, a53, a54 0.0683 0.3417 0.0854 0.1139 0.3417 0.0488 
21 a16, a51, a52, a53, a54 0.0706 0.3529 0.0882 0.1176 0.3529 0.0176 
22 a16, a36, a46, a52, a54 0.0930 0.3488 0.0698 0.1163 0.3488 0.0233 
23 a16, a36, a56, a52, a54 0.1644 0.2877 0.1233 0.0959 0.2877 0.0411 
24 a16, a26, a36, a52, a54 0.1644 0.2877 0.1233 0.0959 0.2877 0.0411 
25 a26, a36, a46, a51, a54 0.0882 0.2059 0.0882 0.1471 0.4411 0.0294 
26 a26, a36, a56, a51, a54 0.0644 0.3221 0.1380 0.1074 0.3221 0.0460 
27 a16, a26, a36, a51, a54 0.0960 0.1680 0.0720 0.1600 0.4800 0.0240 
28 a16, a36, a46, a52, a53 0.1081 0.3243 0.0811 0.1351 0.3243 0.0270 
29 a16, a46, a56, a52, a53 0.1553 0.2718 0.0680 0.1942 0.2718 0.0388 
30 a16, a26, a46, a52, a53 0.1553 0.2718 0.0680 0.1942 0.2718 0.0388 
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31 a26, a36, a46, a51, a53 0.0789 0.2303 0.0987 0.1645 0.3947 0.0329 
32 a26, a46, a56, a51, a53 0.0605 0.3024 0.0756 0.2160 0.3024 0.0432 
33 a16, a26, a46, a51, a53 0.0952 0.1667 0.1190 0.1190 0.4762 0.0238 
34 a26, a36, a46, a51, a52 0.0574 0.2869 0.1230 0.2049 0.2869 0.0410 
35 a36, a46, a56, a51, a52 0.0574 0.2869 0.1230 0.2049 0.2869 0.0410 
36 a16, a36, a46, a51, a52 0.0755 0.3774 0.0566 0.0943 0.3774 0.0189 
37 a26, a56, a51, a53, a54 0.0683 0.3417 0.0854 0.1139 0.3417 0.0488 
38 a26, a46, a51, a53, a54 0.0863 0.2014 0.1079 0.1439 0.4317 0.0288 
39 a26, a36, a51, a53, a54 0.0816 0.2381 0.1020 0.1361 0.4082 0.0340 
40 a16, a26, a51, a53, a54 0.0916 0.1603 0.1145 0.1527 0.4580 0.0229 
41 a36, a56, a51, a52, a54 0.0644 0.3221 0.1380 0.1074 0.3221 0.0460 
42 a36, a46, a51, a52, a54 0.0714 0.3571 0.0714 0.1190 0.3571 0.0238 
43 a26, a36, a51, a52, a54 0.0644 0.3221 0.1380 0.1074 0.3221 0.0460 
44 a16, a36, a51, a52, a54 0.0732 0.3659 0.0549 0.1220 0.3659 0.0183 
45 a46, a56, a51, a52, a53 0.0605 0.3024 0.0756 0.2160 0.3024 0.0432 
46 a36, a46, a51, a52, a53 0.0678 0.3390 0.0847 0.1412 0.3390 0.0282 
47 a26, a46, a51, a52, a53 0.0605 0.3024 0.0756 0.2160 0.3024 0.0432 
48 a16, a46, a51, a52, a53 0.0727 0.3636 0.0909 0.0909 0.3636 0.0182 
 
Step 6: Eventually, by getting the arithmetic average of all weights for each risk 
dimension (i.e. EAST) based on Equation (H.51) in Appendix H or geometric average 
(i.e. GMAST) based on Equation (H.52) in Appendix H, the final weight of each risk 
dimension can be obtained as shown in Table 6.18.  
Table 6.18 Average weights of all spanning trees and rankings of risks (ST and PI) 
 AF ND IA CC ST PI 
EAST 0.1010 0.2858 0.0938 0.1410 0.3444 0.0341 
Ranking 4 2 5 3 1 6 
GMAST 0.0943 0.2788 0.0913 0.1360 0.3392 0.0327 
Ranking 4 2 5 3 1 6 
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6.5.1.3 Results 
In this section, the obtained results and rankings from the EAST analysis for Natural 
Disasters (ND) and Political Instability (PI) (Table 6.15), and for Sabotage and 
Terrorism (ST) and Political Instability (PI) (Table 6.18), are incorporated to reach a 
conclusion that which one of Natural Disasters (ND) or Sabotage and Terrorism (ST) 
should be the best risk dimension based on the data obtained from expert 4. The 
aggregated weights and final rankings obtained from EAST and GMAST methods are 
represented in Table 6.19.  
Table 6.19 Aggregated weights and final rankings from EAST and GMAST 
  EAST   
  ND and PI ST and PI Average Ranking 
AF 𝑤1 0.1010065335 0.1010065335 0.1010065335 4 
ND 𝑤2 0.3443855204 0.2857569085 0.3150712145 1 
IA 𝑤3 0.0937656585 0.0937656585 0.0937656585 5 
CC 𝑤4 0.1409772290 0.1409772290 0.1409772290 3 
ST 𝑤5 0.2857569085 0.3443848954 0.3150709020 2 
PI 𝑤6 0.0341081492 0.0341081492 0.0341081492 6 
  GMAST   
  ND and PI ST and PI Average Ranking 
AF 𝑤1 0.0942570944 0.0942570944 0.0942570944 4 
ND 𝑤2 0.3391580310 0.2788162447 0.3089871379 1 
IA 𝑤3 0.0912640382 0.0912640382 0.0912640382 5 
CC 𝑤4 0.1360483960 0.1360483960 0.1360483960 3 
ST 𝑤5 0.2788162447 0.3391575505 0.3089868976 2 
PI 𝑤6 0.0327443216 0.0327443216 0.0327443216 6 
 
As it is shown in Table 6.19, Natural Disasters (ND) has a bit higher weight compared 
to the weight of Sabotage and Terrorism (ST) in both EAST and GMAST methods. 
Thus, in the BWM analysis the Natural Disasters (ND) has been chosen as the best 
risk dimension suggested by expert 4.  
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6.5.2 The BWM and NE-BWM applications 
In this section, using the data provided in Table 6.10 and Table 6.11 and the outcome 
of the STE-BWM using EAST and GMAST methods (Section 6.5.1), the original 
linear and non-linear BWM (L-BWM and NL-BWM) and the proposed NE-BWM are 
applied to prioritise the six energy risk dimensions. Note that, it is assumed in this 
analysis that all participated experts acquire relatively equal knowledge and expertise. 
Therefore, all experts are treated with equal level of importance weights in this study. 
The obtained weights from the applied methods as well as the final ranks of the risk 
dimensions are provided in Table 6.20 and Figure 6.10. The findings reveal that CC is 
the most critical energy risk dimension followed by ND, AF, ST, IA and PI.    
Table 6.20 Weights and rankings of risks and aggregated final ranking  
Risks L-BWM NL-BWM NE-BWM Average 
Final 
ranks 
AF 0.1447 (4) 0.1794 (2) 0.1824 (2) 0.1688 3 
ND 0.1810 (2) 0.1752 (3) 0.1726 (3) 0.1763 2 
IA 0.1189 (5) 0.1319 (5) 0.0843 (6) 0.1117 5 
CC 0.3023 (1) 0.2455 (1) 0.2889 (1) 0.2789 1 
ST 0.1467 (3) 0.1570 (4) 0.1586 (4) 0.1541 4 
PI 0.1064 (6) 0.1110 (6) 0.1131 (5) 0.1102 6 
 
 
Figure 6.10 Weights and order of risk dimensions 
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6.6 Discussion 
The applications of two proposed extended BWM under uncertain decision-making 
(i.e. NE-BWM and STE-BWM) were presented. The aim was the prioritisation of the 
six most important energy risk dimensions which have been obtained from the 
previous phase of thesis (Chapter 5). The results were compared to two original BWM 
including L-BWM and NL-BWM. As shown in Table 6.20, and Figure 6.10, the 
average weights have been used to introduce the final order of energy risk dimensions. 
The aggregated weights revealed that Climate Change (CC) is the most critical one 
followed by Natural Disasters (ND), Affordability (AF), Sabotage and Terrorism 
(ST), Industrial Action (IA), and Political Instability (PI), respectively. The Climate 
Change (CC) and Natural Disasters (ND) stood at the top of the list. Thus, it is of 
critical importance that policy makers focus on the Climate Change (CC), and Natural 
Disasters (ND) and identify the most critical Climate Change (CC), and Natural 
Disasters (ND) risk elements to the UK energy system.    
The subjective uncertainty of the involved experts has been considered in two 
major ways as shown in STE-BWM for expert 4, and in NE-BWM for all experts. In 
the data collection survey, experts were provided with the opportunity to offer their 
opinions of the best (i.e. the most critical) and the worst (i.e. the least critical) risk 
dimension in terms of a set of criteria instead of only considering one single criterion. 
It was aimed at capturing uncertainty of experts in situations when there is a hesitancy 
or indeterminacy to choose one single risk dimension. Thus, as can be seen in Table 
6.9 and Table 6.10, expert 4 had the hesitancy to choose only one best risk dimension 
(i.e. the most critical) over Natural Disasters (ND), and Sabotage and Terrorism (ST) 
and selected both of them as the best ones. The analysis results of the STE (i.e. EAST 
and GMAST) were shown in Section 6.5.1 and revealed that ND was marginally 
preferred over ST by expert 4, although they were not able to choose with absolute 
certainty only one risk dimension but with the aid of the STE method (i.e. 
EAST/GMAST) this issue has been overcome and the best risk dimension has been 
realised. Therefore, in the rest of the calculation steps in the BWM, and NE-BWM, 
Natural Disasters (ND) risk dimension was considered as the most important one 
recommended by expert 4.   
Regarding the proposed NE-BWM, in order to capture the experts’ uncertainty 
in selecting the best and worst risk dimension and subsequently the resulted 
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comparisons in the original BWM, two parameters were proposed which are defined 
as 0 1 +   and 0 1 −  . In other words, in the original BWM, obtaining the 
weights of risks was irrespective of how certain an expert was about the two 
separations ( I and II ). The reason was that the two separations ( I and II ) were 
treated with equal importance while in real-world decision-making problems it would 
not be the case, mainly due to experts’ indeterminacy in selecting the best and worst 
risks and consequently in the provided comparisons. As shown in Section 6.3, the 
performance of the proposed NE-BWM was also verified in two real-world case 
studies before its actual implementation in the energy risk dimensions analysis (See 
the Discussion in Section 6.3.4). In general, this lack of confidence could result from 
two interdependent causes: (1) hesitancy in opting the best and worst criteria, and/or 
(2) uncertainty or lack of confidence in the provided preferences (separations I and 
II ). The  +  and 
−
 are subjective values which can be dealt with by capturing the 
experts’ opinions. Based on the NST (Table 4.2),  +  and 
−
represent the experts’ 
degree of confidence on separations I and II . In the original BWM, either L-BWM 
or NL-BWM, experts are supposed to have the highest possible confidence on the two 
separations (i.e. 1 + =  and 1 − = ), in fact it is assuming experts have no uncertainty 
which is not realistic. 
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6.7 Conclusions 
In this chapter, the application of the two proposed methods STE-BWM and NE-
BWM in obtaining the final ranking of the six significant UK energy risk dimensions 
resulted from the previous phase of the thesis (Chapter 5) was shown. The objective 
was to develop and apply two extensions of the BWM (i.e. STE-BWM and NE-BWM) 
so as to prioritise important energy risks obtained from the interrelationship analysis 
in previous chapter. Thus, objectives in this chapter were twofold:  
(1) to theoretically enhance the BWM method  
(2) to practically apply it in the UK energy supply chain risks prioritisation in order 
to show the applicability of methodological extensions of the BWM as well as 
confirming the most critical risk dimensions which were identified in the previous 
chapter. 
The findings revealed that Climate Change (CC) is the most critical energy risk 
dimension followed by Natural Disasters (ND), Affordability (AF), Sabotage and 
Terrorism (ST), Industrial Action (IA), and Political Instability (PI).  
This study focused on representing the applicability of the methodological 
development of the original BWM in terms of capturing uncertainty. It revealed a need 
to improve the original BWM and proposed an extension of the method based on the 
NST called NE-BWM as well as STE-BWM which is based on spanning trees 
enumeration methods (EAST and GMAST).  
The degree of the experts’ confidence on the best-to-others preferences 
(Separation 𝐼), and others-to-worst preferences (Separation 𝐼𝐼) have been overlooked 
in the original BWM. The NE-BWM was proposed to overcome the explained 
shortcomings of the original BWM in the real-world under uncertainty applications. 
The validity of the proposed NE-BWM was analysed in two real-world cases in supply 
chain management.  In each case, 20 test problems were analysed and compared with 
one test problem of the original NL-BWM. The CR calculation in the NE-BWM was 
also elaborated in detail. Furthermore, a new measurement index named CD  was 
proposed which takes into consideration the extent of the discrepancy between the 
DMs’ evaluations on the separations 𝐼 and 𝐼𝐼. The NE-BWM can assist decision 
makers achieve more reliable rankings in real-world decision-making problems.  
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The STE-BWM would strengthen the capability of the original BWM (either L-BWM 
or NL-BWM) in capturing experts’ uncertainty by offering them the opportunity to 
choose the best set and the worst set of criteria (i.e. risk dimensions) compared to 
choosing only one criterion as the best and one as the worst as is common in the 
original BWM.  
6.7.1 Limitations and future research directions 
Regarding the verification of the proposed NE-BWM, there is a limitation about the 
small number of application cases which might make it rather hard to generalise the 
findings from the proposed NE-BWM. The other limitation is about the complexity 
of implementation of the proposed STE-BWM which makes it costly and time 
consuming and not handy for all researchers in spite of its promising merits. An 
additional limitation is a common one among MCDM methods which is about limited 
number of involved experts. The reason might partly be due to the difficulty of 
recruiting higher number of experts from multidisciplinary fields such as risks in 
energy supply chain management. 
In future studies, a Monte Carlo simulation can be a suitable choice to overcome 
the issue of a limited number of application cases which can improve the 
generalisability of results. For instance, by a larger sample or numerical simulations 
the generalisability of the obtained relationship between CD and CR in our case 
studies can be confirmed. Secondly, given that uncertainty leads to higher 
inconsistency (i.e., it has been confirmed that a higher CD value would result in a 
higher CR value), thus, there would be a necessity for processes that mitigate 
inconsistency to be further investigated. Thirdly, the proposed model can also be 
compared to the other uncertainty extensions of the original BWM integrated with 
uncertainty theories like FST. Using the idea of Interval Valued Neutrosophic Sets 
(IVNS) as another future research direction can be a suitable alternative to SVNS. It 
can be applied in conjunction with the enhanced BWM, in order to structure the 
confidence rating scale more properly by shifting from a single point to an interval. 
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Chapter 7 Risk Mitigation Analysis  
7.1 Introduction and Background 
In the previous chapter, it was found that Climate Change (CC), and Natural Disasters 
(ND) are the most critical energy risk dimensions in the UK energy supply chain. As 
a result, the next step of this thesis focuses on an innovative risk mitigation modelling 
based on the Concept of Stratification (CST) (see Section 3.6), game theory (see 
Section 3.7) and Shared Socio-economic Pathway (SSP) (see Section 7.2). The aim is 
to deal with the most significant natural disaster risk to the UK infrastructure (i.e. 
flooding) for the long-term policy making (between 5 to 20 years) with reference to 
the UK socio-economic status. In Figure 7.1, the details of the study in Chapter 7 are 
highlighted.  
 
Figure 7.1 Final phase of the research carried out in this chapter 
The UK has been a pioneer in developing a national evaluation of climate change risks 
(Warren et al., 2018), and has been ranked 8th least vulnerable, and 14th most ready 
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for climate change in 2016, based on Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative (ND-
GAIN) (Chen et al., 2015). In the UK, within the 2008 Climate Change Act there has 
been an obligation for the UK Government to evaluate the risks of current and 
estimated impacts of climate change through Climate Change Risk Assessment 
(CCRA) reports (Warren et al., 2018). The aim is to inform priorities for the UK 
Government’s National Adaptation Programme (NAP). Two rounds of CCRA have 
been done so far, implementing different methodologies which are CCRA1 in 2012, 
and CCRA2 in 2017. The CCRA2 was carried out in partnership with the Adaptation 
Sub-Committee (ASC) (Warren et al., 2016). Warren et al. (2016) explains that in 
CCRA2, the goal was to determine where immediate actions are required over the 
five-year period of NAP (2018-2022) by recognising adaptation choices.  
The CCRA2 recognised flooding and coastal change as one of the six risks with 
high priority in need of urgent action in the UK. Flooding is also recognised as a 
critical risk to infrastructure by CCRA2 (Committee on Climate Change, 2019; Sayers 
et al., 2015). Flooding in the UK is expected to increase while flood damage costs the 
UK around £1.3 billion yearly (Committee on Climate Change, 2012). By the 2080s, 
flooding can cost the UK approximately £27 billion yearly under a high global 
emission scenario (Foresight Future Flooding, 2004). In Figure 7.2, with reference to 
CCRA2, top six areas of inter-connected climate change risks for the UK is provided. 
The definition of urgency categories are presented as follows (Committee on Climate 
Change, 2016): 
1. More action needed: It indicates that new, and stronger government policies or 
implementation activities are required so as to decrease long-term vulnerability to 
climate change. 
2. Research priority: It emphasises the need for research in order to fill the gap and 
eliminate the uncertainty and evaluate further required actions. 
3. Sustain current action: It states that the current or planned activities are good 
enough and should be continued. 
4. Watching brief: It indicates that evidence should be kept under review considering 
long-term risk levels monitoring so as to ensure proper action can be taken if needed. 
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The categories more action needed, and research priority are more urgent compared 
to sustain current action, and watching brief. 
 
 
Figure 7.2 The top six UK climate change risks (Committee on Climate Change, 2016) 
 
The CCRA2 estimates that there is a large increase in both the number of people at 
risk from flooding and related costs in the future, if no extra adaptation above current 
levels is put in place (Committee on Climate Change, 2019). Additionally, Dawson et 
al. (2018) indicated that flooding can result in severe disruptions and damage to power 
stations compared to other infrastructure assets (see Table 7.1 adapted from Dawson 
et al. (2018)).  
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Table 7.1 Various infrastructure assets at risk from flooding in the UK (%) 
 Source of flooding 
 
River or coastal 
Surface 
water 
Groundwater 
Power stations 41 6 18 
Railway track 17 9 17 
Railway stations 14 3 16 
Motorways and A-roads 9 6 9 
Clean water and wastewater treatment 
plants 
33 12 24 
 
The way that climate change risks can affect the UK energy supply chain can be 
realised better by taking a systemic approach (Figure 7.3) with reference to Dawson 
et al. (2018). As it is shown in Figure 7.3, energy supply chain risks can be recognised 
as the systemic risks which are located at the bottom of the provided framework.  
179 
 
 
Figure 7.3 A systemic approach to climate change risk assessment framework for 
infrastructures (Dawson et al., 2018) 
Knowing that, the literature strongly indicates that flooding is a crucial natural disaster 
threatening infrastructure and life in the UK. In this study, it is tried to introduce a 
useful decision analysis model from the realm of decision making in order to enhance 
long-term policy making in a flooding risk mitigation strategy selection. The focus of 
this research is on flooding in the Highland and Argyll district in Scotland. The reason 
is that the expected annual flood damage in Scotland is £252 million (56% river 
flooding, 23% surface water flooding, and 21% coastal flooding) within 2016-2021. 
This amount can be increased considering the climate change effects as well as 
challenges to mitigation and adaptation that the country might face in its long-term 
planning (Kenyon, 2007; SEPA, 2016). This considerable cost of flooding has sparked 
interest in flood risk assessment by policy makers necessitating sophisticated 
techniques to deal with long-term strategy selection via informed decisions. The 
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Scottish Environment Protection Agency (SEPA) is the Scotland’s strategic flood risk 
management authority and has provided strategies for 14 local plan districts in 
Scotland. Among them, Highland and Argyll district has 4600 residential and 2700 
non-residential properties which are at risk of flooding in the region with estimated 
annual damage across the region accrued to £26.5 million (SEPA, 2015) indicating 
the critical risk of flooding in the region.  
The effects of flooding as a serious natural disaster in the UK can threaten the 
energy generation and distribution efficiency in the UK energy supply chain as the 
relationship between floods and energy infrastructure including generation and 
distribution is strong (Figure 7.4) (Dawson et al., 2018). It has been also indicated in 
the literature that taking into account uncertainty is critical for properly incorporating 
resilience into flood risk management programs. Additionally, a flood management 
program shall be assessed against a more comprehensive set of criteria such as those 
related to climate change adaptation (Associated Programme on Flood Management, 
2015).   
 
Figure 7.4 Relationships between climate hazards and infrastructure sectors [adapted 
from (Dawson et al., 2018)] 
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The contributions of this study are listed as follows: 
(I) A novel stratified decision-making model is introduced on the basis of the Concept 
of Stratification (CST), game theory, and Shared Socio-economic Pathway (SSP). 
(II) Managing impacts of flooding risk in the Highland and Argyll region in Scotland 
by identifying the most suitable strategies and proposing the priorities for action based 
on a novel stratified decision-making model. It is important to know that 4600 
residential and 2700 non-residential properties are at risk of flooding in the region 
with estimated annual damage across the region accrued to £26.5 million (SEPA, 
2015). This amount can increase in the next years due to climate change and UK socio-
economic status. This would necessitate the need for such a decision model for long-
term decision making due to importance of the issue in the region.       
7.2 Methodology  
The applied model is named stratified decision-making model which is based on the 
stratified model of game of chance involving risk that was explained in detail in 
Section 4.6. The main contribution of this model is proposing a stratified decision-
making modelling for long-term decision making. It considers system’s dynamics on 
the basis of the CST, game theory and SSP. The most suitable flooding risk mitigation 
strategies have been selected by taking into account the dynamic of the UK challenges 
to adaptation and mitigation based on SSP and flooding risk impacts based on MI, 
MO, and SV levels. The theories which are utilised in the applied model are CST and 
game theory which are explained in Section 3.6 and Section 3.7, respectively. Here, 
the SSP is explained. The SSP as discussed in Kriegler et al., (2012) defines two 
dimensions of Challenges to Adaptation and Challenges to Mitigation explained in 
the following parts: 
Challenges to Adaptation:  
Socio-economic conditions that, in the absence of climate-related policies, 
would result in higher vulnerability, and less adaptation capacity for a given level of 
climate change (Kriegler et al., 2012). 
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Challenges to Mitigation: 
Socio-economic conditions that in the absence of climate-related policies, 
would result in higher emissions, and poorly suited technological, or institutional 
conditions to reduce emissions (Kriegler et al., 2012). 
The nine possible SSPs based on the three-point scale on each dimension are presented 
in Figure 7.5. In this study, the three SSPs (i.e. SSP1, SSP5, and SSP9) are considered 
for simplicity. The SSP1, SSP5, and SSP9 correspond to low, moderate, and high 
challenges to adaptation and mitigation, respectively.  
 
Figure 7.5 Nine SSPs on two dimensions of challenges to mitigation and adaptation 
The obtained solutions in game theory are generally acquired via considering the 
interaction between the involved players. This process can be recognised in a form of 
“interactive decision theory” (Zhao et al., 2012). In decision making, not only the 
outcome from a particular strategy is seldom fully predictable but also the strategy-
performance relationships would not remain unchanged. This indicates the importance 
of adaptive decision making depending on the observed performances of previous 
choices. This can be more crucial when other decision circumstances change 
simultaneously (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Lee, 2008). Game theory has been 
called the science of strategic decision making (Kelly, 2003). However, in some 
games like games of chance (i.e. one-player game against nature), the dynamic change 
of various states of the system in a long-term decision-making time frame has been 
overlooked. In games of chance, the current state of the system has been considered 
unchanged during the decision-making timescale. This fixed state of the game makes 
the obtained decision useful in a longer time frame if only the current state at the time 
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of arriving to a decision persists, which in reality occurs rarely. The reason for this 
shortcoming might be due to lack of a proper theory to formulate dynamic change of 
states throughout a longer decision-making period.    
This study benefited from integration of CST and game of chance involving risk 
to overcome the explained gap in the long-term decision analysis. The model 
introduces a novel decision-making framework for long-term decision-making 
planning. The proposed model is a stratified decision-making model under risk or a 
stratified decision-making model of game of chance involving risk. In this study, it is 
named as a stratified decision-making model. Colman (1982) explained that games of 
chance are called “individual decision making under risk or uncertainty”. The 
stratified model is surmised to be cogently an effective methodology for interpreting 
the interplay between socio-economic situations and natural disasters in this study to 
make an optimum decision in the longer timescale. The outcomes of a game of chance 
depend partly on the player's choices and partly on nature, who is a second player. A 
number of DMs, experts or players can get involved to provide the parameters' values. 
Although the player does not know with certainty what moves will be made by nature, 
they know the meaningful probability of each of nature's responses and therefore the 
approximate probability of success for each of their strategies or actions. In this study, 
to show the applicability of the proposed decision model (Section 4.6), the model is 
utilised to evaluate flooding risk mitigation strategies in the Highland and Argyll 
district in Scotland, considering the dynamic nature of socio-economic situations and 
climate hazards severity impact levels in the long-term. 
The CST, as explained in Section 3.6 is a computational system where the 
elements of computation are strata of data. An example of a system with a stratified 
structure can be a multi-layer perception (Zadeh, 2016). The stratified approach has 
gained attention in the academic literature. However, there are only a handful of 
studies exploring the capability of CST to date. For instance, Asadabadi (2018) 
developed a Stratified MCDM (S-MCDM). Asadabadi and Zwikael (2019) proposed 
an extended version of stratified MCDM in order to address an important challenge 
of time and cost estimations in project management. Asadabadi et al. (2017) showed 
the practicality of CST in the field of logistic informatics modelling and revealed how 
the user would benefit from hybrid utilisation of Fuzzy Inference System (FIS) and 
CST. Asadabadi et al. (2018) discussed and proposed Bi-Objective CST (BO-CST) 
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and Fuzzy Bi-Objective CST (FBO-CST) models for the unequal importance 
objective weights in the original CST.  
7.3 Data Collection 
The data collection has been carried out in two stages: (1) screening; and (2) actual 
data collection.  
1) Screening stage 
In screening stage, 57 potential experts with sufficient knowledge and expertise in 
flood management have been chosen based on search of relevant websites and 
databases. Then, they were sent a short survey to self evaluate their level of knowledge 
and expertise in flood risk management in Scotland using a scale 1 to 100. Those who 
gave themselves a value greater than 70 have been considered for the actual data 
collection. Regarding the defined criteria, 13 experts have been chosen for the next 
actual stage of data collection.   
2) Actual stage 
In actual data collection, 13 surveys have been sent to experts and 10 responses have 
been received which have been considered for analysis. Thus, the data is collected 
from 10 flooding experts in the region of Scotland who participated in the online 
survey to answer the provided questions. In Appendix L, the questions used in the 
survey are explained in detail. The survey questions are constructed based on the 
rating scales provided in Table 7.2, and Table 7.3. In Table 7.2, the linguistic scale 
utilised by experts for estimating the utility values of each flooding risk mitigation 
strategy is provided.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
185 
 
Table 7.2 The verbal scale for obtaining utility values 
Linguistic Phrase Score SVTNN 
Expected 
Utility 
No Effectiveness (NE) 0 <(0,0,0,0);0,0,0> 0 
Low Effectiveness (LE) 1 <(0.2,0.3,0.4,0.5);0.6,0.2,0.2> 0.26 
Fairly Low Effectiveness 
(FLE) 
2 <(0.3,0.4,0.5,0.6);0.7,0.1,0.1> 0.38 
Medium Effectiveness 
(ME) 
3 <(0.4,0.5,0.6,0.7);0.8,0,0.1> 0.50 
Fairly High Effectiveness 
(FHE) 
4 <(0.7,0.8,0.9,1);0.8,0.2,0.2> 0.68 
High Effectiveness (HE) 5 <(1,1,1,1);0.9,0.1,0.1> 0.90 
Absolutely High 
Effectiveness (AHE) 
6 <(1,1,1,1);1,0,0> 1 
 
The following rating scale (Table 7.3) is introduced based on Haase et al. (2013) and 
Govindan et al. (2015) to obtain the estimated status transition and outcome transition 
probabilities. The Trapezoidal Intuitionistic Fuzzy Number (TrIFN) is a type of 
intuitionistic number which is explained in Appendix A that is applied here to capture 
subjective uncertainty of experts in the probability estimations.  
Table 7.3 The rating scale used for acquiring probability estimations  
Linguistic Phrase Score TrIFNs 
Expected 
probability 
Almost Zero (AZ) 0 (0,0,0,0) , (0,0,0,0)
 
0 
Very Small (VS) 1 ,0.3)(0,0.1,0.2 , ,0.3)(0,0.1,0.2
 
0.15 
Small (S) 2 ,0.5)(0,0.2,0.3 , .3,0.4)(0.1,0.2,0
 
0.25 
Moderate (M) 3 .5,0.7)(0.2,0.4,0 , .5,0.6)(0.3,0.4,0
 
0.45 
Large (L) 4 .7,0.9)(0.4,0.6,0 , .7,0.8)(0.5,0.6,0
 
0.65 
Very Large (VL) 5 .9,1)(0.7,0.8,0 , .9,1)(0.7,0.8,0
 
0.85 
Almost Certain (AC) 6 (1,1,1,1) , (1,1,1,1)
 
1 
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7.4 Analysis 
As explained previously, the region Highland and Argyll in Scotland has been 
considered in this study. The recommended strategies can manage flood risk (i.e. a 
major climate hazard in the UK) to energy infrastructure as shown in Table 7.5 (SEPA, 
2015). 
The proposed model considers both the socio-economic status of the UK 
influencing the adaptation options utilising the concept of SSP (i.e. low challenges to 
mitigation and adaptation, moderate challenges to mitigation and adaptation, high 
challenges to mitigation and adaptation) (Kriegler et al., 2012), and impact level of 
the flooding risk (i.e. mild, moderate and severe) to the energy infrastructure. The 
model also considers the transitions between various possible states in a longer 
timeframe (5 to 20 years) by taking into account the transition probabilities between 
socio-economic status, and flooding risks. This helps provide a model that can be 
more reliable in identifying the most effective strategies for long-term planning.  
The benefits obtained from strategies in each state (payoff or utility values) 
would not be always easy to assess precisely in quantitative values. Especially when 
the strategies include policy, regulatory, and community responses in addition to 
engineering responses. It is indicated that much of the evidence of adaption activity 
for UK infrastructures concentrates on engineering responses rather than policy, 
regulatory or community responses and the reason is that for engineering responses 
quantitatively assessing the benefits is typically easier (Dawson et al., 2018).  
To categorise climate hazards based on impact severity, three levels of Mild 
(MI), Moderate (MO), and Severe (SV) are chosen regarding the flood risk matrix of 
Scottish Flood Forecasting Service (SFFS) (Figure 7.6). As shown in Figure 7.6, the 
potential impacts of flooding (river, tidal/coastal, and surface water) can be 
categorised in four levels of minimal, minor, significant, and severe based on the SFFS 
(2014). However, knowing minimal and minor levels are very close, thus for the sake 
of simplicity in later computational steps and considering other international 
definitions like Malaysian National Security Council (2003), just a level mild (MI) 
has been defined along with moderate (MO) and severe (SV). The provided three 
levels of MI, MO, and SV are well representative of the impact severity of floods. The 
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three levels 𝐼, 𝐼𝐼 and III or MI, MO, and SV have been defined respectively as follows 
(Rahman, 2012):  
Level 𝐼, or MI 
Climate hazards are controllable and with no possibility of spreading out. They are 
not complicated and may cause a small damage to life and property. 
Level 𝐼𝐼, or MO 
Climate hazards cover a wide range area and have potential to spread out while 
affecting public daily activities. They would possibly cause damage to a large number 
of properties and could cause loss of life. Their complexity level is higher than level 
𝐼 and in terms of search and rescue are very challenging but could be controlled by 
the government.  
Level 𝐼𝐼𝐼, or SV 
Any disaster caused at this level is more complex in nature compared to other levels 
and affects a wide area (more than two provinces) while causing the highest damage 
possible to life and property. 
The risk assessment can be carried out on the basis of impact and likelihood of 
flooding to give a combined risk as shown in Figure 7.6. In this study, just the potential 
impact of flooding is considered in three levels of MI, MO, and SV in the introduced 
model, and likelihood of flooding risk is not considered as this would need to be based 
on climate modelling which is not the focus of this thesis. 
 
Figure 7.6 Flood risk matrix and overall flood risk (SFFS, 2014) 
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Floods can have direct or indirect damages. Direct flood damages are related to 
immediate effects of flood water with built, natural or human environments. Indirect 
damages cover disruptions of transportation and economy which influence people’s 
income (Associated Programme on Flood Management, 2015).  
It is assumed that the socio-economic situation can cause Low (L), Moderate 
(M), or High (H) challenges to mitigation and adaptation based on the SSP (Figure 
7.5). Furthermore, the impact of flooding can be MI, MO, or SV. Thus, the stratified 
game table with three statuses (𝑁 = 3) and three outcomes (𝑀 = 3) can be 
constructed as shown in Table 7.4.  
Table 7.4 The stratified game table of flood risk management for N=3 and M=3 
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Table 7.5 Flooding risk management strategies (SEPA, 2015)   
No. Strategy Characteristics 
1 Awareness raising Raising public awareness of flood risk is a duty of responsible authorities. Enhanced awareness of 
individuals, homes, and businesses regarding flood risk and related measures can lessen the total 
impact. 
2 Emergency plans/response Many organisations have responsibility to provide an emergency response to flooding, including local 
authorities and emergency services. This response may be supported by the work of voluntary 
organisations. 
3 Flood forecasting Issuing flood warnings by the Scottish Flood Forecasting Service (SFFS) via offering daily flood 
guidance statements can provide the public with information to lower the impacts of flooding on their 
business.  
4 Self help Property and business owners can make sure they are protected against flood damage by taking simple, 
yet effective steps such as arranging a flood plan or property level protection via registering at Floodline 
and the Resilient Communities Initiative. 
5 Maintenance It is of local authorities’ duty to evaluate watercourses and do clearance and repair works where such 
actions would significantly minimise flood risk. 
6 Planning policies The Scottish Planning Policy supports a catchment scale approach for sustainable flood risk 
management. It suggests that new development in areas with medium to high likelihood of flooding 
should be avoided. 
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7.4.1 Scenario settings for inputs in CST 
The performance of the considered strategies is evaluated in 5 to 20-year planning 
horizon via the proposed model. The influence of inputs on the state change should 
be evaluated in the understanding that state 1 is the target state and cannot be 
improved. Incremental enlargement in CST as a tool to identify possible paths towards 
the target state is considered in various ways in each Scenario (Section 3.6).   
7.4.1.1 Scenario 1: optimistic improvement  
In this scenario, all possible improvements are considered even those which can make 
an enormous difference. That is transition by incremental enlargement from the worst 
state to the best state is possible. 
7.4.1.2 Scenario 2: cautious improvement  
In this scenario, the state transitions are occurring towards the improvement of the 
system or not becoming worse. The incremental enlargement takes place at one step 
towards the target state which means inputs of the system cannot make the transition 
possible from a very poor situation to the very best situation in one move, indicating 
cautious or more realistic improvement. 
Table 7.6 Tabular CST for the flood risk management example 
tSE  
Socio-economic 
situation 
Flooding hazard 
t+1SE  
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 
𝟏 L MI 1 1 
𝟐 L MO 1,2 1,2 
𝟑 L SV 1,2,3 2,3 
𝟒 M MI 1,4 1,4 
𝟓 M MO 1,2,4,5 1,2,4,5 
𝟔 M SV 1,2,3,4,5,6 2,3,5,6 
𝟕 H MI 1,4,7 4,7 
𝟖 H MO 1,2,4,5,7,8 4,5,7,8 
𝟗 H SV 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9 5,6,8,9 
State 1 is the target state. Inputs can be categorised into variables partly in control or 
out of control like climate change and natural disasters; and in control of the system 
analysts and associated authorities such as economic policies. In this study, only the 
outcomes and resulted states under various scenarios are considered.  
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7.4.2 Parameters settings 
In this section, parameters setting for the status and outcome transition probabilities 
and utility function values are explained.  
7.4.2.1 Status and outcome transition probability values 
In scenario 1, the values of 𝑝11 = 1, 𝑝12 = 𝑝13 = 𝑝23 = 0 , and 𝑞11 = 1, 𝑞12 = 𝑞13 =
𝑞23 = 0 are fixed. In scenario 2, the values of 𝑝11 = 1, 𝑝12 = 𝑝13 = 𝑝23 = 𝑝31 = 0 , 
and 𝑞11 = 1, 𝑞12 = 𝑞13 = 𝑞23 = 𝑞31 = 0  are fixed as shown in Table 7.7 and 
Appendix L. Status and outcome transitions are explained in Section 4.6.2 and Section 
4.6.3. Other probabilities can change based on the experts’ opinions and collected data 
(Table 7.7). The average of obtained values from experts are taken into consideration 
and all experts’ opinions are treated with the same level of importance. Details about 
the utilised surveys and how probability values are acquired can be seen in Appendix 
L. 
Table 7.7 Status and outcome transition probabilities setting for different scenarios based on 
average experts’ opinions 
Scenario 𝟏: optimistic 
Status transition probability matrix Outcome transition probability matrix 
P  
11
p = 1
 12
p = 0
 13
p = 0
 
Q  
11
q = 1
 12
q = 0
 13
q = 0
 
21
p = 0.37
 22
p = 0.63
 23
p = 0
 21
q = 0.43
 22
q = 0.57
 23
q = 0
 
31
p = 0.35
 32
p = 0.40
 33
p = 0.25
 31
q = 0.32
 32
q = 0.34
 33
q = 0.34
 
Scenario 2: cautious 
Status transition probability matrix Outcome transition probability matrix 
P  
11
p = 1
 12
p = 0
 13
p = 0
 
Q  
11
q = 1
 12
q = 0
 13
q = 0
 
21
p = 0.46
 22
p = 0.54
 23
p = 0
 21
q = 0.44
 22
q = 0.56
 23
q = 0
 
31
p = 0
 32
p = 0.39
 33
p = 0.61
 31
q = 0
 32
q = 0.44
 33
q = 0.56
 
 
In Figure 7.7, the graphical CST with transition probabilities based on optimistic 
scenario (scenario 1) is depicted. The values are calculated based on the provided 
probabilities in Table 7.7  and Equation (4.30). The pseudo code for the calculation of 
the state transition probability matrix presented in Table 4.7 can be helpful in the 
calculation process. 
192 
 
 
Figure 7.7 Graphical CST with transition probabilities for the flood risk planning (scenario 
1) 
In Figure 7.8, the graphical CST with transition probabilities based on cautious 
scenario (scenario 2) is provided. 
 
Figure 7.8 Graphical CST with transition probabilities for the flood risk planning (scenario 
2) 
 
193 
 
7.4.2.2 Utility values 
Based on the rating scale provided in Table 7.2, and the survey explained in Appendix 
L, the utility values of strategies are obtained on the basis of the average values offered 
by all experts (Table 7.8).  
Table 7.8 Utility values  
   outcome 
status strategy MI MO SV 
L 
1 Awareness raising 0.5960 0.5140 0.5400 
2 
Emergency 
plans/response 
0.5450 0.5110 0.5050 
3 Flood forecasting 0.5110 0.5100 0.5320 
4 Self help 0.4620 0.4720 0.4460 
5 Maintenance 0.4820 0.4880 0.4800 
6 Planning policies 0.4670 0.4770 0.4650 
M 
1 Awareness raising 0.4720 0.5250 0.5480 
2 
Emergency 
plans/response 
0.5520 0.5120 0.5143 
3 Flood forecasting 0.5730 0.5860 0.6080 
4 Self help 0.4940 0.5160 0.5180 
5 Maintenance 0.4960 0.4850 0.5700 
6 Planning policies 0.5350 0.5680 0.5970 
H 
1 Awareness raising 0.5613 0.6220 0.5310 
2 
Emergency 
plans/response 
0.5220 0.5680 0.5460 
3 Flood forecasting 0.6547 0.6310 0.6450 
4 Self help 0.5140 0.5620 0.5600 
5 Maintenance 0.6430 0.6200 0.6830 
6 Planning policies 0.6180 0.6240 0.6000 
 
In Figure 7.9, the trend of utility values for each strategy under various flooding risk 
impact levels, and socio-economic status are depicted.  
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Figure 7.9 Utility values for each strategy under various flooding risk impact levels, and socio-economic status determined by experts  
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7.4.3 Results 
The after-transition utility decision matrices for scenario 1 (Table 7.9), and scenario 2 
(Table 7.11) are calculated based on Equation (4.34), and Table 4.8. The EMVs are 
also calculated based on Equation (4.35). The calculations are carried out under the 
assumption of equal current state probabilities (i.e. 0.11). The current state is the state 
at the present time of planning with current or very near future that the socio-economic 
status and flooding risk impact can be framed.  If we are 100% sure about the current 
state, then this will get the probability 1 and other states will get probabilities of zero 
and automatically will be removed from the EMV calculation. In Section 7.5, the 
sensitivity analysis of the current state probabilities under various schemes are 
provided. Table 7.10, and Table 7.12 provide rankings of strategies under equal current 
state probabilities in scenarios 1 and 2, respectively. 
The analysis findings suggest that in the area of Highland and Argyll in Scotland 
the best long-term flood mitigating strategy is flood forecasting (i.e. Strategy 3) 
followed by awareness raising (i.e. Strategy 1), emergency plans/response (i.e. 
Strategy 2), planning policies (i.e. Strategy 6), maintenance (i.e. Strategy 5), and self 
help (i.e. Strategy 4), respectively.  
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Table 7.9 The after-transition utility decision matrix (scenario 1) 
Current state 
probability 
𝟎. 𝟏𝟏 𝟎. 𝟏𝟏 𝟎. 𝟏𝟏 𝟎. 𝟏𝟏 𝟎. 𝟏𝟏 𝟎. 𝟏𝟏 𝟎. 𝟏𝟏 𝟎. 𝟏𝟏 𝟎. 𝟏𝟏  
Strategies 1SE  2SE  3SE  4SE  5SE  6SE  7SE  8SE  9SE  EMV 
Strategy 𝟏 0.5960 0.5493 0.5491 0.5179 0.5196 0.5282 0.5377 0.5421 0.5414 𝟎. 𝟓𝟑𝟔𝟗 
Strategy 𝟐 0.5450 0.5256 0.5198 0.5494 0.5279 0.5235 0.5421 0.5327 0.5286 𝟎. 𝟓𝟐𝟕𝟒 
Strategy 𝟑 0.5110 0.5104 0.5178 0.5501 0.5545 0.5629 0.5717 0.5711 0.5778 𝟎. 𝟓𝟒𝟐𝟎 
Strategy 𝟒 0.4620 0.4677 0.4600 0.4822 0.4922 0.4913 0.4878 0.5017 0.5013 𝟎. 𝟒𝟕𝟖𝟏 
Strategy 𝟓 0.4820 0.4854 0.4834 0.4908 0.4881 0.5048 0.5279 0.5233 0.5383 𝟎. 𝟒𝟗𝟕𝟔 
Strategy 𝟔 0.4670 0.4727 0.4697 0.5098 0.5238 0.5312 0.5320 0.5423 0.5448 𝟎. 𝟓𝟎𝟓𝟑 
 
Table 7.10 Rankings of strategies under equal current state probabilities (scenario 1) 
 
1SE  2SE  3SE  4SE  5SE  6SE  7SE  8SE  9SE  EMV 
Strategy 𝟏 1 1 1 3 4 3 3 3 3 𝟐 
Strategy 𝟐 2 2 2 2 2 4 2 4 5 𝟑 
Strategy 𝟑 3 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 𝟏 
Strategy 𝟒 6 6 6 6 5 6 6 6 6 𝟔 
Strategy 𝟓 4 4 4 5 6 5 5 5 4 𝟓 
Strategy 𝟔 5 5 5 4 3 2 4 2 2 𝟒 
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Table 7.11 The after-transition utility decision matrix (scenario 2) 
Current state 
probability 
𝟎. 𝟏𝟏 𝟎. 𝟏𝟏 𝟎. 𝟏𝟏 𝟎. 𝟏𝟏 𝟎. 𝟏𝟏 𝟎. 𝟏𝟏 𝟎. 𝟏𝟏 𝟎. 𝟏𝟏 𝟎. 𝟏𝟏 
 
Strategies 
1SE  2SE  3SE  4SE  5SE  6SE  7SE  8SE  9SE  EMV 
Strategy 𝟏 0.5960 0.5501 0.5286 0.5290 0.5239 0.5336 0.5265 0.5588 0.5581 𝟎. 𝟓𝟑𝟗𝟓 
Strategy 𝟐 0.5450 0.5260 0.5076 0.5488 0.5279 0.5107 0.5337 0.5407 0.5391 𝟎. 𝟓𝟐𝟓𝟕 
Strategy 𝟑 0.5110 0.5104 0.5223 0.5445 0.5482 0.5634 0.6228 0.6176 0.6230 𝟎. 𝟓𝟓𝟕𝟎 
Strategy 𝟒 0.4620 0.4676 0.4574 0.4793 0.4885 0.4897 0.5062 0.5274 0.5438 𝟎. 𝟒𝟖𝟔𝟒 
Strategy 𝟓 0.4820 0.4854 0.4835 0.4896 0.4878 0.5100 0.5857 0.5754 0.6074 𝟎. 𝟓𝟏𝟕𝟕 
Strategy 𝟔 0.4670 0.4726 0.4703 0.5037 0.5163 0.5318 0.5856 0.5949 0.6003 𝟎. 𝟓𝟐𝟏𝟕 
 
Table 7.12 Rankings of strategies under equal current state probabilities (scenario 2) 
 
1SE  2SE  3SE  4SE  5SE  6SE  7SE  8SE  9SE  EMV 
Strategy 𝟏 1 1 1 3 3 2 5 4 4 𝟐 
Strategy 𝟐 2 2 3 1 2 4 4 5 6 𝟑 
Strategy 𝟑 3 3 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 𝟏 
Strategy 𝟒 6 6 6 6 5 6 6 6 5 𝟔 
Strategy 𝟓 4 4 4 5 6 5 2 3 2 𝟓 
Strategy 𝟔 5 5 5 4 4 3 3 2 3 𝟒 
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7.5 Sensitivity Analysis 
In this section, the sensitivity of the rankings based on the probability of current state 
is analysed under two scenarios 1 and 2 to see how sensitive the final ranking is to 
changes of current state’s probability. As can be seen in Table 7.13, five schemes of 
various probabilities are suggested while the sum of probabilities shall be equal to 1 
in all of them. In the default scheme, equal probabilities for all states are considered 
which was also used as the main analysis in the previous section. Scheme 1, 
emphasises the occurrence of High socio-economic situations (high challenges to 
mitigation and adaptation) by assigning the highest probability to them. Scheme 2, 
contrary to the scheme 1, considers the probability of Low socio-economic situations 
(low challenges to mitigation and adaptation) higher than others. In scheme 3, the SV 
flooding risk has the highest probability, and finally in scheme 4, the MI flooding risk 
has the highest probability.  
Table 7.13 Test schemes for sensitivity analysis of current state probability  
tSE  
Socio-
economic 
situation 
Flooding 
risk 
Default 
scheme 
Scheme 
𝟏 
Scheme 
𝟐 
Scheme 
𝟑 
Scheme 
𝟒 
𝟏 L MI 0.11 0.03 𝟎. 𝟐𝟎 0.03 𝟎. 𝟐𝟎 
𝟐 L MO 0.11 0.03 𝟎. 𝟐𝟎 0.10 0.10 
𝟑 L SV 0.11 0.03 𝟎. 𝟐𝟎 𝟎. 𝟐𝟎 0.03 
𝟒 M MI 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.03 𝟎. 𝟐𝟎 
𝟓 M MO 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 
𝟔 M SV 0.11 0.10 0.10 𝟎. 𝟐𝟎 0.03 
𝟕 H MI 0.11 𝟎. 𝟐𝟎 0.03 0.03 𝟎. 𝟐𝟎 
𝟖 H MO 0.11 𝟎. 𝟐𝟎 0.03 0.10 0.10 
𝟗 H SV 0.11 𝟎. 𝟐𝟎 0.03 𝟎. 𝟐𝟎 0.03 
 
The obtained EMVs from the sensitivity analysis under scenario 1 are shown in Table 
7.14. Trends and rankings of EMVs for strategies under various schemes in scenario 
1 is depicted in Figure 7.10. It is resulted that the three lowest ranking strategies 
(Strategies 4 to 6) in the default scheme are not sensitive to the changes in current 
state probability while the first three strategies (Strategies 1 to 3) are more sensitive 
in Schemes 2 and 4. It shows when the current socio-economic situation is facing low 
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challenges to adaptation and mitigation (Scheme 2), the most prioritised strategy 
would be awareness raising (Strategy 1) followed by emergency plans/response 
(Strategy 2) and flood forecasting (Strategy 3). It is also resulted that in scheme 4 
(under mild flooding risk), the awareness raising (Strategy 1) is the most useful 
strategy followed by flood forecasting (Strategy 3) and emergency plans/response 
(Strategy 2).     
Table 7.14 EMVs and rankings of strategies under various schemes (scenario 1) 
 Default 
Scheme 
Scheme 1 Scheme 2 Scheme 3 Scheme 4 
Strategy 1 0.5369 (2) 0.5316 (2) 0.5441 (1) 0.5344 (2) 0.5400 (1) 
Strategy 2 0.5274 (3) 0.5285 (3) 0.5263 (2) 0.5221 (3) 0.5331 (3) 
Strategy 3 0.5420 (1) 0.5570 (1) 0.5262 (3) 0.5443 (1) 0.5399 (2) 
Strategy 4 0.4781 (6) 0.4864 (6) 0.4692 (6) 0.4796 (6) 0.4761 (6) 
Strategy 5 0.4976 (5) 0.5098 (5) 0.4862 (5) 0.5000 (5) 0.4956 (5) 
Strategy 6 0.5053 (4) 0.5226 (4) 0.4869 (4) 0.5083 (4) 0.5020 (4) 
 
 
Figure 7.10 Trends and rankings of EMVs for strategies under various schemes (scenario 1) 
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The sensitivity analysis findings in scenario 2 (Table 7.15), indicate that the last 
prioritised strategy which is self help (Strategy 4) is not sensitive to changes in current 
state probability. Furthermore, the most significant strategy in scenario 2 (flood 
forecasing), which is ranked first in almost all Schemes, (except Scheme 2) is not 
sensitive to the changes either. In Figure 7.11, trends and rankings of EMVs for 
strategies under various schemes (scenario 2) are shown. 
Table 7.15 EMVs and rankings of strategies under various schemes (scenario 2) 
 Default 
Scheme 
Scheme 1 Scheme 2 Scheme 3 Scheme 4 
Strategy 1 0.5395 (2) 0.5376 (4) 0.5429 (1) 0.5369 (2) 0.5422 (2) 
Strategy 2 0.5257 (3) 0.5288 (5) 0.5229 (3) 0.5198 (5) 0.5317 (3) 
Strategy 3 0.5570 (1) 0.5846 (1) 0.5303 (2) 0.5597 (1) 0.5545 (1) 
Strategy 4 0.4864 (6) 0.5028 (6) 0.4705 (6) 0.4900 (6) 0.4826 (6) 
Strategy 5 0.5177 (5) 0.5460 (3) 0.4920 (4) 0.5218 (4) 0.5143 (5) 
Strategy 6 0.5217 (4) 0.5536 (2) 0.4906 (5) 0.5255 (3) 0.5177 (4) 
 
 
Figure 7.11 Trends and rankings of EMVs for strategies under various schemes (scenario 2) 
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7.6 Discussion 
Without any doubt, flooding is a major threat for the UK and can affect lives, 
infrastructures, and businesses. This impact is not diminishing and is predicted to 
grow in the future due to climate change and severe weather conditions (Few, 2003; 
Ntontis et al., 2019). As mentioned before, it was predicted that flooding could cost 
the UK approximately £27 billion under a high global emission scenario yearly by the 
2080s which is approximately 21 times higher than the £1.3 billion based on CCRA1 
report in 2012 (Committee on Climate Change, 2012; Foresight Future Flooding, 
2004).  
In this study, suggested uncertainty and climate change adaptation criteria have 
been used together with flood risk impacts in one single decision-making model. The 
main contribution of this study is proposing a stratified decision-making model for 
long-term decision making. It considers system’s dynamics on the basis of the CST, 
game theory and SSP. The most suitable flooding risk mitigation strategies have been 
selected by taking into account the dynamic of UK challenges to adaptation and 
mitigation based on SSP and flooding risk impacts based on MI, MO, and SV levels. 
The model applicability has been verified in the case of flooding risk mitigation 
strategy in an area selected to be at Highland and Argyll in Scotland. After primary 
data collected from the involved experts in the region of Scotland, the proposed model 
as described in Section 4.6, and Section 7.2 was applied and analysed (Section 7.4). 
The sensitivity analysis of the probabilities of current state was provided in Section 
7.5 in order to verify the obtained results. The final order of strategies is provided in 
Figure 7.12.  
The literature also supports the importance of Flood Forecasting as many 
studies explored it by developing various techniques such as neural network model 
(Campolo et al., 1999), and MCDM  (Levy, 2005). Neal et al. (2018) supported the 
finding in this study that Flood Forcasting should be prioritised to effectively deal 
with flood impacts proactively. They indicated that a medium to long-term forecast of 
coastal flooding can be useful for the UK government and response agencies. Nye et 
al. (2011) emphasised on the criticality of Awareness Raising strategy in the literature 
which confirms the identification of this strategy as the second most suitable flooding 
risk mitigation strategy in this chapter. They indicated that social aspects of flooding, 
particularly flood warning and awareness raising can lead to a more balanced 
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sociotechnical risk management portfolio (Johnson et al. 2005). Carter et al. (2009) 
also emphasised on the awareness raising of the flood risk threat among stakeholders 
and indicated that it can be enhanced by sustainability appraisal. Coles et al. (2017) 
highlighted the significance of the third important strategy in this study which is 
Emergency Plans/Response. They proposed an integrated model of numerical 
modelling and geographical analysis of service areas for ambulance, fire and rescue 
services by demonstrating two floods in York, UK in order to assess vulnerability of 
sheltered and care homes. Finally, one way to handle the impacts of flooding that the 
UK policy guidelines suggest is the community resilience concept by designing 
interventions which is close to the concept of Self Help strategy in the obtained result 
which ranks at the sixth place (Ntontis et al., 2019).  
 
 
 
Figure 7.12 Final order of strategies 
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7.7 Conclusions 
In this Chapter 7, a hybrid risk mitigation modelling based on CST (Section 3.6), game 
theory (Section 3.7), and SSP (Section 7.2) was proposed in order to obtain a reliable 
and applicable model for flooding risk mitigation strategy selection in the long-term. 
The model was applied in the region of Highland and Argyll in Scotland based on 
primary data obtained from experts to prioritise flooding risk mitigation strategies 
which were recommended by SEPA.  
In the literature, various decision analysis methods such as MCDM have been 
used for flood risk management, however it is believed the proposed stratified 
decision-making model is unique and innovative as it can offer predictive insights by 
incorporating advantages of CST, game theory, and SSP in one model. Game theory 
represents an abstract model of decision making, not the social reality of decision 
making itself. Thus, while game theory ensures that a result follows a model logically, 
it cannot ensure that the result itself represents reality, unless the model is an accurate 
one (Kelly, 2003). The integration of CST and game theory provide with a stratified 
model to overcome this static issue of game theory which enables the proposed model 
more dynamic. Then, for applying the proposed model in the context of disaster 
management (i.e. flooding) the SSP was taken into account to understand UK socio-
economic conditions in three levels of low (L), moderate (M), and high (H). As the 
proposed model has two dimensions, impact of flooding was considered, based on 
SFFS (2014), by providing three impact levels of mild (MI), moderate (MO) and 
severe (SV).  
Thus, the resulted model aims to take into account both UK socio-economic 
situations and flooding risk impacts for the long-term decision making (5 to 20-year 
time frame). The socio-economic situation is categorised into 3 status namely L, M, 
and H challenges to adaptation and mitigation based on SSP and flooding risk impacts 
with regard to MI, MO, and SV levels. These two dimensions generated nine states as 
shown in Table 7.4. The findings indicated that the most important strategies which 
can provide long-term benefit in mitigating flooding risk impact in the area of 
Highland and Argyll in Scotland are flood forecasting (i.e. Strategy 3), awareness 
raising (i.e. Strategy 1), emergency plans/response (i.e. Strategy 2), planning policies 
(i.e. Strategy 6), maintenance (i.e. Strategy 5), and self help (i.e. Strategy 4), 
respectively (Figure 7.12). 
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7.7.1 Limitations and future research directions  
In spite of the proposed model’s merits it suffers from a few downsides. Firstly, for 
the sake of simplicity, two dimensions of challenges to adaptation and mitigation 
based on SSP have been used to conceptualise the socio-economic conditions in only 
three levels (low, moderate, and high). However, in future studies in order to take into 
account the full picture, researchers may apply a model with all 9 possible levels. This 
may pose another obstacle of acquiring data from experts which would make it 
extremely hard for experts to offer their assessments due to high number of 
evaluations. As a result, it leads to the second limitation of this study that is utilising 
primary data acquired from subject experts. To overcome this issue, in future research, 
researchers can take advantage of mixed primary and secondary data and decrease the 
dependence of the results on subjective judgements. It can help strengthen the model’s 
reliability and robustness. The other concern may arise regarding the quantitative 
validation which might be difficult for this type of models. However, face validation 
or validation through expert elicitation should be relied upon for this aim. Thirdly, 
adding a third dimension of sustainable development goals or agenda to the model can 
be another interesting future research topic. It is also important to understand the 
potential synergic or dysergic behaviour of strategies apart from the adaptation and 
mitigation challenges and impact level dimensions, particularly in the longer time 
frame. However, it might add an extra level of complexity to the model which requires 
researchers to add more innovative features into the proposed stratified model. In 
other words, it would be beneficial to realise if strategies can potentially offer more 
helpful merits in terms of social justice or community well-being at the time following 
a flood. Fourthly, the proposed model can be utilised in similar strategic decision-
making settings such as natural disasters or energy systems in other countries or 
regions. In this way, the applicability and versatility of the model can be confirmed. 
The proposed model can deal with types of problems which are comprised of two 
dimensions such as socio-economic situations and climate hazards (as in the current 
study) for strategic, long-term, or even medium-term decision making. One 
application can be the evaluation of strategies for dealing with the impact of 
pandemics under various readiness of governments or local authorities for choosing 
the best strategies to respond in medium-term decision-making timeframes such as 
within 1.5-3 years.  Finally, it is also interesting to propose theories to more efficiently 
capture the utility values and transition probabilities in the stratified model. 
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Chapter 8 Conclusions  
In this chapter, conclusions, contributions, implications, limitations, and future 
research directions are presented in subsequent sections. 
8.1 Conclusions 
Large infrastructures like electricity supply networks are widely presumed to be 
crucial for the functioning of societies as they create conditions for essential economic 
activities. Electric power outages have been recognised as a national security issue by 
many governments like the US and more than 20 other countries including the UK 
(Brunner and Suter, 2008; Silvast, 2017). This thesis aimed at answering the following 
questions: 
1. What are the critical risks in the UK power supply chain?  
2. What are the causal relationships among the critical risks? 
3. How are these risks ranked and prioritised? 
4. How can policy makers deal with mitigating the most critical risks in the longer 
timeframe by taking into account socio-economic situations? 
5. What are the most appropriate risk mitigation strategies in response to the most 
critical risks?  
An overview on the energy security literature led this study to a comprehensive 
framework for identifying risks in energy supply chain and then to their 
interrelationship analysis. The reason is that, risks usually act in close interconnection 
to each other and barely act independently that means there would be causal relations 
among them in that occurrence of one risk would cause the other one. The following 
two research questions were answered in Chapter 5: 
1. What are the critical risks in the UK power supply chain?  
2. What are the causal relationships among the critical risks? 
In Chapter 5, an energy supply chain risk assessment model was proposed to 
address the identified UK energy supply chain risks. The study provided an insight on 
the energy supply chain risk management both practically and theoretically. It is 
aimed to be helpful and practical for practitioners as well as scholars in the energy 
supply chain to use an explicable risk identification framework while analysing an 
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energy system such as UK power supply chain. First, a risk identification and 
classification framework was proposed based on scrutinising energy supply chain 
risks. Then, causal relationships between identified risks were analysed by applying 
the NR-DEMATEL method. The proposed model considered experts’ subjective 
judgement applying the NR-DEMATEL. A novel HESM to systematically assist DMs 
with the expert selection and importance weight determination was also introduced. 
The proposed method was utilised in the energy supply chain in the UK to demonstrate 
its applicability and efficacy. It identified twelve risk dimensions each one can 
potentially include a myriad of consolidated micro-level risks (i.e. risk elements).  
This provided an opportunity to make a more comprehensive framework by 
presenting detailed risks namely risk elements as a sub-group of risk dimensions. The 
results suggest that the UK energy supply chain should focus on the following six 
risks out of the 12 identified risks when formulating the risk mitigation strategies: 
Natural Disasters (ND), Climate Change (CC), Industrial Action (IA), Affordability 
(AF), Political Instability (PI), and Sabotage and Terrorism (ST). They were chosen 
in a way that the majority of potential risk elements would be covered under their 
definitions and can easily be categorised under one of the dimensions. Considering all 
the analysis, the final suggestion would be to focus on the six risk dimensions of 
Natural Disasters (ND), Climate Change (CC), Industrial Action (IA), Affordability 
(AF), Political Instability (PI), and Sabotage and Terrorism (ST) and offering 
mitigation strategies based on them can be quite beneficial for the UK energy supply 
chain being sustainable. This finding would allow managers to allocate their resources 
efficiently by focusing on the dominant risks and the interdependencies among them. 
Additionally, it would open up avenues for further suggestions on risk mitigation 
strategies, which can improve the performance of the entire UK energy supply chain.   
Although this study focused on the UK energy supply chain, it is believed the 
results are relevant and the findings can be applicable to the power sectors of other 
countries. This is because the UK power sector fuel mix is similar to the fuel mix in 
other countries (Chalvatzis et al., 2019). For example, characteristics such as 
elimination of coal, ambitious offshore wind capacity, other renewables expansion 
plans are gaining momentum across Europe and the US (Hills et al., 2018; Ioannidis 
et al., 2019; Ioannidis and Chalvatzis, 2017; Li et al., 2018). Therefore, several aspects 
of the UK’s power supply system are similar to the current or forthcoming systems in 
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other countries as they all face strict decarbonisation agendas all while the nuclear 
power stocks are not replaced at the end of their lifespan (Chalvatzis and Ioannidis, 
2017b). As a result, risks such as Affordability (AF) gained popularity in the past 
when countries rushed to subsidise the emergence of renewable energy sources. 
Similarly, countries with thermal power stations face Operational Safety (OS) 
challenges to cool those power stations while Climate Change (CC) increases the 
frequency and intensity of heatwaves, and ultimately reducing access to cooling water. 
This is a core issue for nuclear power stations but one that expands to all thermal 
power stations as one of the prevailing risks. At the same time, risks deriving from 
exposure to Political Instability (PI), Sabotage and Terrorism (ST), and Industrial 
Action (IA) are highly dependent on country-specific circumstances relevant to the 
power industry structure, the economic and geopolitical balances, and 
industrialisation trends (Pappas et al., 2018; Pappas and Chalvatzis, 2017).   
Therefore, it is argued that this study is generalisable to other countries firstly 
by methodological virtue, as it can be applied to other countries to reveal their own 
power sector’s detailed risk analysis; and secondly, by highlighting the prioritisation 
of risks specific to certain power supply technologies (which are similar among 
countries). Currently, a sweeping transformation is taking place across the power 
sector of most countries, which requires decisions over electricity planning with risk 
vulnerability being one of the most important issues to be considered. Technologies 
subject to significant risks are being left behind as uninvestable.  To this end, results 
are useful for context setting for countries other than the UK, but it is maintained that 
more research would be required for any specific country’s electricity planning.   
The answer to the third research question “How are these risks ranked and 
prioritised?” was discussed in Chapter 6. That was focused on representing the 
applicability of the methodological development of the original BWM in terms of 
capturing uncertainty. A need to improve the original BWM and propose an uncertain 
extension of the method based on the NST called NE-BWM as well as STE-BWM 
was revealed and discussed in detail. The STE-BWM method by applying spanning 
trees enumeration offers an opportunity for experts to suggest more than one best or 
worst criteria. The reason is that in some cases experts are unable to choose only one 
risk dimension as either the best or worst one due to uncertainty, hesitancy, or lack of 
information. Thus, the proposed STE-BWM can obtain which ones are actually the 
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best and worst criteria based on already provided pair-wise comparison values by 
experts. Furthermore, original BWM considers two vectors of pairwise comparisons 
as equally important which is unrealistic. Thus, the proposed NE-BWM dealt with 
this issue. The first vector (i.e. best-to-others) was named as Separation 𝐼 and the 
second vector (i.e. others-to-worst) was named as Separation 𝐼𝐼. Then, the NST was 
utilised in structuring the value assignment process in terms of 𝜌+  and 𝜌−  values 
while dealing with an expert’s uncertainty in the NE-BWM. In fact, the NST provides 
a rating scale for DMs to express their level of confidence in terms of 𝜌+ and 𝜌− 
values.   
The applications of two proposed extended BWM under uncertain decision-
making (i.e. NE-BWM and STE-BWM) in prioritising the six most critical risk 
dimensions in energy supply chain were presented. For obtaining final ranking of 
risks, weights obtained from both the original BWM (L-BWM and NL-BWM), and 
NE-BWM were integrated. The aggregated weights revealed that Climate Change 
(CC) is the most critical one followed by Natural Disasters (ND), Affordability (AF), 
Sabotage and Terrorism (ST), Industrial Action (IA), and Political Instability (PI), 
respectively. 
Ultimately, Chapter 7, discussed the answers to the 4th and 5th research 
questions: 
4. How can policy makers deal with mitigating the most critical risks in the longer 
timeframe by taking into account socio-economic situations? 
5. What are the most appropriate risk mitigation strategies in response to the most 
critical risks? 
In a standard decision-making model of game of chance, the best strategy is 
chosen on the basis of the current state of the system under various outcomes of the 
nature. However, there is a shortcoming about this standard model that may be 
applicable only to short-term decision-making period. This drawback is mainly due to 
not evaluating the dynamic characteristics and changes in the states of system and 
outcomes of the nature which might occur in the longer timescale. In Chapter 6, it was 
obtained that Climate Change (CC), and Natural Disasters (ND) are the most critical 
energy risk dimensions in the UK power supply chain. In Chapter 7, an innovative 
risk mitigation model based on the CST (see Section 3.6), game theory (see Section 
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3.7), and SSP (see Section 7.2) was introduced to deal with these two most critical 
risk dimensions. The aim was to deal with the most significant climate change risk to 
UK infrastructure (i.e. flooding) for the long-term policy making (between 5 to 20 
years) with reference to the UK socio-economic status. In the study, the game of 
chance involving risk and CST were integrated to incorporate the dynamic nature of 
the decision environment for the long-term disaster risk planning taking into account 
various states of the system. It was demonstrated how this methodology can suitably 
be applied to obtain ad-hoc models, solutions, and analysis in the strategic decision-
making process of flooding risk strategy evaluation. The model applicability was 
shown in an uncertain decision-making context while taking into account the dynamic 
nature of socio-economic situations, and flooding hazards. The proposed model has 
been applied to a flooding risk mitigation strategy planning in the Highland and Argyll 
district in Scotland. The findings indicated that the most important strategies which 
can provide long-term benefit in mitigating flooding risk impact in the area of 
Highland and Argyll in Scotland are flood forecasting (i.e. Strategy 3), awareness 
raising (i.e. Strategy 1), emergency plans/response (i.e. Strategy 2), planning policies 
(i.e. Strategy 6), maintenance (i.e. Strategy 5) and self help (i.e. Strategy 4), 
respectively. 
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8.2 Contributions 
This thesis benefited from both theoretical and applied contributions that can yield 
insightful recommendations to both academics and practitioners. The research 
contributions are highlighted in Table 8.1. Novelty, scientific soundness, and value of 
each research objective are presented in Table 8.2. 
Table 8.1 Contributions 
No. Description Chapter RQ Type 
1 
A framework for risk analysis which can be 
used in strategic risk mitigation analysis 
resulted from systematic literature review 
and experts’ feedback 
5 1 Theoretical 
2 
A NR-DEMATEL method to analyse risk 
dimensions based on the causal relationships 
between them 
5 2 Applied 
3 
Introducing an expert selection model based 
on HFS theory (i.e HESM) to systematically 
assist researchers with the expert selection 
process. It has provided a reliable model that 
help decide who can be an expert based on 
their credentials and experience as well as 
assigning each expert a relative importance 
weight 
5 2 Theoretical 
4 
Aiding policy makers in the UK energy 
supply chain to recognise most critical risks  
5 2 Applied 
5 
The proposed STE-BWM which is a hybrid 
method of spanning trees enumeration and 
BWM. It can help identification of the best 
and the worst energy risk dimensions if the 
involved experts are not able to choose only 
one best and one worst risk dimension with 
full confidence 
6 3 Theoretical 
6 
The proposed NE-BWM by introducing two 
new parameters as the DMs’ confidence on 
the best-to-others preferences and the DMs’ 
confidence on the others-to-worst 
6 3 Theoretical 
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preferences. The NE-BWM  considers the 
NST to structure uncertainty of experts in 
terms of 𝜌+ and  𝜌− values which can 
prioritise the six energy risk dimensions 
7 
Two real-world cases to illustrate the 
applicability of the proposed NE-BWM by 
considering partial factorial experiment for 
confidence rating levels selection of the 
experts are explored. The results are 
analysed in 21 test problems under various 
𝜌+ and 𝜌− values 
6 3 Applied 
8 
A new output measurement index, namely 
confidence difference (CD ) for the NE-
BWM is proposed and discussed.  
6 3 Applied 
9 
A novel stratified decision-making model is 
introduced on the basis of the Concept of 
Stratification (CST), game theory, and 
Shared Socio-economic Pathway (SSP) 
7 4 Theoretical 
10 
Managing impacts of flooding risk in the 
Highland and Argyll region in Scotland by 
identifying the most suitable strategies and 
proposing the priorities for action based on a 
novel stratified decision-making model.  
7 5 Applied 
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Table 8.2 Novelty, scientific soundness, and value for each research objective 
Research 
Objectives 
Novelty Scientific Soundness Value 
RO #1: Proposing a 
risk classification 
and identification 
framework in the 
UK energy supply 
chain 
Novel 
comprehensive 
risk identification 
framework to help 
categorise energy 
supply chain risks 
in the UK 
Verified by systematic literature 
review and experts’ feedback 
It offers a structure for 
researchers in the energy risk 
management field to classify 
and organise the risk 
identification process in 
future studies 
RO #2: Analysing 
causal 
interrelationships 
between identified 
risks 
The proposed NR-
DEMATEL has a 
theoretical 
contribution as it 
uses the revised 
DEMATEL and 
NST 
The DEMATEL is a well-
established MCDM method for 
evaluating the causal 
interrelationships between 
factors. Additionally, the result 
is supported by the primary data 
from  31 experts, making the 
result reliable as it is a LSGDM 
problem (more than 20 
participants)  
It offers value for policy 
makers in the UK energy 
supply chain to understand 
the causal interrelationships 
between risks at macro-level 
RO #3: Prioritising 
identified UK 
energy supply chain 
risks 
Two novel 
extensions of the 
original BWM are 
proposed (i.e. 
STE-BWM and 
NE-BWM)  
The original BWM is a recently 
developed MCDM method 
which has various merits. In 
addition to application in 
energy risk management in this 
thesis, two real case studies 
from supply chain management 
verified the applicability of NE-
BWM.  
It provides (1) two extensions 
of BWM which can be used 
by researchers in any other 
MCDM problems, (2) a 
ranking for energy risks 
which can assist policy 
makers to recognise most 
critical risks  
RO #4: Long-term 
risk mitigation 
planning   
A novel stratified 
decision-making 
model is proposed 
for long-term 
decision making 
considering two 
dimensions of 
socio-economic 
situations and 
climate hazards 
The model has been verified by 
showing its application in the 
region Highland and Argyll in 
Scotland for managing flood 
risks (i.e. a major climate 
hazard in the UK) to energy 
infrastructure by providing an 
order for risk mitigation 
strategies. The data for the 
analysis were gathered from 10 
experts with suitable level of 
practical knowledge  
It provides researchers with 
(1) a decision-making model 
that can be used for strategic 
or medium-term decision 
making by taking into 
account at least two 
dimensions in the model  (2) 
an insight for flood risk 
managers and policy makers 
in the region by knowing 
priorities for action in the 
longer timescale  
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8.3 Implications  
The implications of the results for academics and policy makers are listed in Table 8.3 
Table 8.3 Implications  
No. Description For 
1 
The proposed energy risk identification framework would provide a 
guideline to further explore the detailed analysis of risk elements in 
a specific sector in energy supply chain 
Academics 
2 
The identified most important risk dimensions including Natural 
Disasters (ND), Climate Change (CC), Industrial Action (IA), 
Affordability (AF), Political Instability (PI), and Sabotage/Terrorism 
(ST) can inform decision-making in the energy supply chain  
Policy 
makers 
3 
The proposed Expert Selection Model (ESM) would be a valuable 
tool for researchers in MCDM field to identify experts and their 
importance weights in a more systematic way 
Academics 
4 
The proposed STE-BWM and NE-BWM both can be used by 
researchers in future studies in the MCDM field in various decision-
making problems 
Academics 
5 
The stratified decision-making model would be a helpful model for 
long-term decision-making process by considering system’s 
dynamics. It can be utilised in project management, or other fields 
where two dimensions with various levels would construct a number 
of states 
Academics 
6 
The identified prioritised list of flooding risk mitigation strategies 
including flood forecasting, awareness raising, emergency 
plans/response, planning policies, maintenance, and self help can be 
useful for policy makers in Highland and Argyll region in Scotland 
Policy 
makers 
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8.4 Limitations  
In this section, limitations are provided separately regarding each study presented in 
Chapter 5, Chapter 6, and Chapter 7.  
In Chapter 5, the first limitation is the static, snapshot approach to risk 
interrelations, meaning the dynamics of the risk dimensions over time has not been 
considered. Secondly, the identified risk dimensions are macro-level risks in the UK 
energy supply chain and not dealing with risk elements (i.e. micro-level risks). In other 
words, risks can be studied in more detail in a specific part of the supply chain such 
as supply or demand or even can be studied in a specific power generation sector such 
as offshore wind industry, just as an example. Thirdly, due to the nature of MCDM 
methods the primary data has to be collected from experts in the field which can be 
regarded as a limitation. Fourthly, the DEMATEL method has a quantitative approach 
to explore the cause-effect and interrelationships between risks which might make it 
hard to elicit knowledge quantitatively from experts by using a Likert scale in some 
decision-making problems. That is why in this study, the revised DEMATEL was 
integrated with NST to facilitate this knowledge elicitation process from experts. The 
fourth limitation is related to the generic nature of the risk dimensions which was due 
to the broad extent of energy supply chain. This limitation has made recruiting subject 
experts for covering all interdisciplinary subject areas extremely lengthy and costly. 
In Chapter 6, the first limitation is the small number of application cases which 
makes it difficult to generalise the findings from the proposed NE-BWM. The second 
limitation is about the complexity of implementation of the proposed STE-BWM 
which makes it costly and time consuming and not handy for all researchers in spite 
of its promising merits. The third limitation is a common one within MCDM field 
which is about limited number of experts involved that is partly due to the difficulty 
of recruiting higher number of experts from a transdisciplinary field like risks in 
energy supply chain management. 
In Chapter 7, for the sake of simplicity, two dimensions of challenges to 
adaptation and mitigation based on SSP have been used to conceptualise the socio-
economic conditions in only three levels (low, moderate, and high). It was a limitation 
of the model because considering all 9 SSPs would make it too complicated for both 
experts and researcher. The second limitation of this study was utilising primary data 
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for acquiring parameters’ values which are based on subject experts. Primary data are 
prone to be biased due to the nature of subjective judgements when humans are 
involved in the decision-making process. 
8.5 Future Research Directions 
In Chapter 5, as directions for future study, firstly, a more detailed analysis of six 
identified critical risks in order to lead to a more reliable outcome by expanding the 
number of experts who are participating in the data collection process can be 
beneficial because it would provide more insight for policy makers. Secondly, 
proposing a predictive dynamic model that can estimate the influence and 
interrelationships among risks over the longer period can provide insights into how 
risks act under various socio-political and economic conditions over time. System 
Dynamics (SD) can be an attractive approach in pursuing this research direction. 
Thirdly, a more detailed analysis at the lower level called risk elements (i.e., micro-
level risks) based on the proposed framework would be interesting. Fourthly, the 
occurrence probability estimation of each risk elements with a reliable method and 
using the probability scores along with experts’ opinions to prioritise risk elements 
can be regarded as another future research direction. Fifthly, results from the 
DEMATEL can be compared with qualitative approaches such as Know-Why method 
or even with other dynamic quantitative methods such as SD to verify the outcome. 
Finally, proposing risk mitigation strategies that links to the outcome of vital risk 
elements identification to provide more detailed and efficient response to identified 
risk elements. 
In Chapter 6 in future research directions, firstly, a simulation approach can be 
a reasonable solution to overcome the issue of a limited number of application cases 
in order to provide findings that are more generalisable. Secondly, given that 
uncertainty leads to higher inconsistency (i.e., it has been confirmed that a higher 𝐶𝐷 
value would result in a higher 𝐶𝑅 value), thus, there would be a necessity for processes 
that mitigate inconsistency to be further investigated. Thirdly, the proposed model 
might also be compared to the other uncertainty extensions of the original BWM 
integrated with uncertainty theories like FST.  
In Chapter 7, in order to take into account the full potential of the proposed 
stratified decision-making model, researchers may revise the model in order to make 
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it capable of encompassing all 9 possible levels within SSPs. In this way the result can 
be more comprehensive by recognising all possible socio-economic conditions in the 
UK. Secondly, to overcome the limitation of primary data, in future research, 
researchers can take advantage of a mixed primary and secondary data and decrease 
the dependence of the results on subjective judgements. It can help strengthen the 
model’s reliability and robustness. Thirdly, adding a third dimension of sustainable 
development goals or agenda to the model can be another interesting future research 
topic. However, it might add an extra level of complexity to the model which requires 
researchers to add more innovative features into the proposed stratified model. In 
other words, it would be beneficial to realise if strategies can potentially offer more 
helpful merits in terms of social justice or community well-being at the time following 
a flood. Fourthly, the proposed model can be utilised in similar strategic decision-
making settings such as natural disasters or energy systems in other countries or 
regions. In this way, the applicability and versatility of the model can be confirmed. 
Finally, it is also interesting to propose theories to more efficiently capture the utility 
values and transition probabilities in the stratified model.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
217 
 
Glossary of Terms 
Terms Acronyms 
Analytic Hierarchy Process AHP 
Asia Pacific Energy Research Centre APERC 
Adaptation Sub-Committee ASC 
Bayesian Network BN 
Best Non-fuzzy Performance BNP 
Best-to-Others vector BO 
Bi-Objective CST BO-CST 
Best-Worst Method BWM 
Climate Change Risk Assessment CCRA 
Circular Economy CE 
Carbon Dioxide CO2 
COmplex PRoportional ASsessment COPRAS 
Clean Power Plan CPP 
Consistency Ratio CR 
Corporate Social Responsibility CSR 
Concept of Stratification CST 
Decision-Making Trial and Evaluation Laboratory DEMATEL 
Decision Maker DM 
Dynamic Programming DP 
Enumerating All Spanning Trees EAST 
Evaluation based on Distance from Average Solution EDAS 
Expert Eligibility Value EEV 
ELimination Et Choix Traduisant la REalit (in French) or 
elimination and choice expressing reality 
ELECTRE 
Expected Monetary Value EMV 
Expert Selection Model ESM 
Fuzzy Bayesian Network FBN 
Fuzzy Bi-Objective CST FBO-CST 
Fuzzy-Delphi Method FDM 
Fuzzy Filtering Method FFM 
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Terms Acronyms 
Fuzzy Inference System FIS 
Fuzzy Sets FS 
Finite-State Machine FSM 
Fuzzy Set Theory FST 
Grams of CO2 equivalent per kilowatt-hour of electricity 
generated 
gCO2eq/kWh 
Green-House Gas GHG 
Geometric Mean of All Spanning Trees GMAST 
Grey Relational Analysis GRA 
Human Development Indicator HDI 
Hesitant Expert Selection Model HESM 
Hesitant Fuzzy Element HFE 
Hesitant Fuzzy Sets HFS 
International Energy Agency IEA 
Intuitionistic Fuzzy Best-Worst Method IF-BWM 
Intuitionistic Fuzzy Sets IFS 
Intuitionistic Fuzzy Multiplicative Best-Worst Method IFM-BWM 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change IPCC 
Impact-Relations Map IRM 
Interval Rough Number IRN 
Interpretive Structural Modelling ISM 
Interval Valued Neutrosophic Sets IVNS 
Linear Best-Worst Method L-BWM 
Linguistic Neutrosophic Geometric Heronian Mean LNGHM 
Linguistic Neutrosophic Prioritised Geometric Heronian Mean LNPGHM 
Large-Scale Group Decision-Making LSGDM 
Multiple Attribute Decision Making MADM 
Multi Attribute Group Decision Making MAGDM 
Multi Criteria Decision Analysis MCDA 
Multiple Criteria Decision Making MCDM 
Multiple Criteria Group Decision-Making MCGDM 
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Terms Acronyms 
Matrice d’Impacts Croisés Multiplication Appliquée à un 
Classement meaning “Cross Impact Matrix Multiplication 
Applied to Classification” 
MICMAC 
Mixed Integer Linear Model MILM 
Maximum Mean De-Entropy algorithm MMDE 
Model of Short-term Energy Security MOSES 
Maclaurin Symmetric Mean MSM 
Multi-Objective Optimisation by Ratio Analysis plus the full 
MULTIplicative form 
MULTIMOORA 
National Adaptation Programme NAP 
Normal Accident Theory NAT 
Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative ND-GAIN 
Neutrosophic Enhanced Best-Worst Method NE-BWM 
New Energy Power System NEPS 
Neutrosophic Hesitant Fuzzy Set NHFS 
Non-Linear Model NLM 
Non-Linear Best-Worst Method NL-BWM 
Normal Neutrosophic Sets NNS 
Neutrosophic Revised-DEMATEL NR-DEMATEL 
Neutrosophic Sets NS 
Normalised Score Function Value NSFV 
Neutrosophic Set Theory NST 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development OECD 
Others-to-Worst vector OW 
Probabilistic Hesitant Fuzzy Elements PHFE 
Preference Ranking Organisation Method for Enrichment 
Evaluations 
PROMETHEE 
Power Transmission System PTS 
Photovoltaics PV 
Renewable Energy RE 
Renewable Energy Sources RES-E 
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Terms Acronyms 
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome SARS 
System Dynamics SD 
The Scottish Environment Protection Agency SEPA 
The Scottish Flood Forecasting Service SFFS 
Score Function Value SFV 
Safety, Health and Environment SHE 
Stratified Multiple Criteria Decision Making S-MCDM 
Security of Supply SOS 
Shared Socio-economic Pathway SSP 
Spanning Trees Enumeration STE 
Spanning Trees Enumeration and BWM STE-BWM 
Single Valued Neutrosophic SVN 
Single-Valued Neutrosophic Dombi Weighted Arithmetic 
Average 
SVNDWAA 
Single-Valued Neutrosophic Dombi Weighted Geometric 
Average 
SVNDWGA 
Single-Valued Neutrosophic Numbers SVNN 
Single-Valued Neutrosophic Sets SVNS 
Single-Valued Trapezoidal Neutrosophic Numbers SVTNN 
Single-Valued Trapezoidal Neutrosophic Normalised Weighted 
Bonferroni Mean 
SVTNNWBM 
Triangular Fuzzy Number TFN 
Trapezoidal Neutrosophic Number TNN 
Trapezoidal Neutrosophic Weighted Arithmetic Averaging TNWAA 
Trapezoidal Neutrosophic Weighted Geometric Averaging TNWGA 
TOmada de Deciso Interativa e Multicritrio (in Portuguese) 
meaning interactive and multicriteria decision-making 
TODIM 
Technique for Order Preference by Similarity to Ideal Solution TOPSIS 
Trapezoidal Intuitionistic Fuzzy Number TrIFN 
United Nations Development Programme UNDP 
Vlsekriterijumska Optimizacija I Kompromisno Resenje (in 
Serbian) 
VIKOR 
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Appendix A: Uncertainty Theories-Definitions 
 
A.1 Fuzzy logic 
A.1.1 Fuzzy set  
In this section the definitions of the FST are provided: 
Definition A.1. A special Fuzzy Set (FS) 𝐹 = {(𝑥, 𝜇𝐹(𝑥)), 𝑥 ∈ 𝑅} would define a 
fuzzy number (Kwong and Bai, 2002). A Triangular Fuzzy Number (TFN) is 
represented as a triplet (𝑙, 𝑚, 𝑟) where 𝑙 ≤ 𝑚 ≤ 𝑟. Equation (A.1) presents the 
membership function of a TFN (Vafadarnikjoo et al., 2018, 2015): 
 
𝑓𝐴(𝑥) =
{
 
 
 
 
0 𝑥 < 𝑙
𝑥 − 𝑙
𝑚 − 𝑙
𝑙 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 𝑚
𝑟 − 𝑥
𝑟 − 𝑚
𝑚 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 𝑟
0 𝑥 > 𝑟
 (A.1) 
 
Definition A.2. Given ?̃? = (𝑎1, 𝑎2, 𝑎3) and ?̃? = (𝑏1, 𝑏2, 𝑏3) are two TFNs. Then 
Equations (A.2)-(A.5) are true (Vafadarnikjoo et al., 2018, 2015):  
?̃? − ?̃? = (𝑎1, 𝑎2, 𝑎3) − (𝑏1, 𝑏2, 𝑏3) = (𝑎1 − 𝑏3, 𝑎2 − 𝑏2, 𝑎3 − 𝑏1)  (A.2) 
 
 ?̃? + ?̃? = (𝑎1, 𝑎2, 𝑎3) + (𝑏1, 𝑏2, 𝑏3) = (𝑎1 + 𝑏1, 𝑎2 + 𝑏2, 𝑎3 + 𝑏3) 
(A.3) 
 
 ?̃? × ?̃? = (𝑎1, 𝑎2, 𝑎3) × (𝑏1, 𝑏2, 𝑏3) ≈ (𝑎1𝑏1, 𝑎2𝑏2, 𝑎3𝑏3) (A.4) 
 
?̃? ÷ ?̃? = (𝑎1, 𝑎2, 𝑎3) ÷ (𝑏1, 𝑏2, 𝑏3) ≈ (𝑎1/𝑏3, 𝑎2/𝑏2, 𝑎3/𝑏1) (A.5) 
 
A.1.2 Hesitant fuzzy set 
The Hesitant Fuzzy Set (HFS) was first introduced by Torra (2010) and is a 
generalisation of IFS. By HFS theory, it is possible to acquire DMs’ or experts’ 
subjective judgements more properly by giving them the opportunity to choose among 
a couple of possible values. The reason is that experts usually encounter a degree of 
hesitance or indeterminacy before expressing their subjective judgements and by 
using HFS theory this issue is addressed (Vafadarnikjoo et al., 2020). In this study, 
222 
 
HFS theory is applied in the proposed Hesitant Expert Selection Model (HESM) to 
obtain experts’ importance weights as explained in Section 5.4.  
Definition A.3. (Farhadinia, 2013; Torra, 2010; Torra and Narukawa, 2009) HFS on 
𝑋 (i.e. a fixed set) is defined in terms of a function when applied to 𝑋 generates a 
subset of [0,1]. Xia and Xu (2011) presented HFS as Equation (A.6): 
 𝐸 = {〈𝑥, ℎ𝐸(𝑥)〉: 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋} 
(A.6) 
 
The ℎ𝐸(𝑥) can take values within [0,1], signifying the possible membership 
degree of the element 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 to the set 𝐸. Additionally, Hesitant Fuzzy Element (HFE) 
was defined by Xia and Xu (2011) as ℎ = ℎ𝐸(𝑥). 
Definition A.4. (Farhadinia, 2013) Let ℎ = 𝑈𝛾𝜖ℎ{𝛾} = {𝛾𝑗}𝑗=1
𝑙(ℎ)
 be a HFE, in which 
𝑙(ℎ) represents the number of values in ℎ. Equation (A.7) shows a score function 𝑆 of 
a HFE ℎ. Where {𝛿(𝑗)}𝑗=1
𝑙(ℎ)
 is a positive-valued monotonic ascending order of index 𝑗. 
 𝑆(ℎ) =
∑ 𝛿(𝑗)𝛾𝑗
𝑙(ℎ)
𝑗=1
∑ 𝛿(𝑗)
𝑙(ℎ)
𝑗=1
 (A.7) 
 
Considering 𝑙(ℎ) = 𝑁 and 𝛿(𝑗) = 𝑗 are given and Equation (A.8) is resulted. 
 𝑆(ℎ) =
∑ 𝑗𝛾𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1
∑ 𝑗𝑁𝑗=1
=
2
𝑁(𝑁 + 1)
∑𝑗𝛾𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1
 (A.8) 
 
A.1.3 Intuitionistic fuzzy set 
Atanassov (1986) introduced the Intuitionistic Fuzzy Set (IFS) theory as the extension 
of the original FST. The IFS theory is characterised by both membership and non-
membership functions unlike FST which only benefits from membership function 
(Govindan et al., 2015; Nikjoo and Saeedpoor, 2014).  
Definition A.5. (Atanassov, 1986): Let 𝑋 be a fixed set. Then an IFS, 𝐴 can be defined 
as Equation (A.9)    
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 𝐴 = {〈𝑥, 𝜇𝐴(𝑥), 𝑣𝐴(𝑥)〉|𝑥 ∈ 𝑋} 
(A.9) 
Where, 𝜇𝐴(𝑥): 𝑋 → [0,1] (i.e. membership degree of  𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 to set 𝐴),  𝑣𝐴(𝑥): 𝑋 →
[0,1]  (i.e. non-membership degree of  𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 to set 𝐴) and 0 ≤ 𝜇𝐴(𝑥) + 𝑣𝐴(𝑥) ≤ 1 , 
 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 . Furthermore, the 𝜋𝐴(𝑥) is defined as the hesitancy level of 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 to set 𝐴 
based on Equation (A.10). 
 𝜋𝐴(𝑥) = 1 − 𝜇𝐴(𝑥) − 𝑣𝐴(𝑥) ,  𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 
(A.10) 
Definition A.6. (Govindan et al., 2015). A Trapezoidal Intuitionistic Fuzzy Number 
(TrIFN) 𝐴, given 𝑏1 ≤ 𝑎1 ≤ 𝑏2 ≤ 𝑎2 ≤ 𝑎3 ≤ 𝑏3 ≤ 𝑎4 ≤ 𝑏4in ℝ is signified as 𝐴 =
〈(𝑎1, 𝑎2, 𝑎3, 𝑎4), (𝑏1, 𝑏2, 𝑏3, 𝑏4)〉 which the membership and non-membership 
functions of 𝐴 are provided in Equation (A.11) and (A.12) 
 












−
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Definition A.7. (Govindan et al., 2015). The expected value (EV) of a TrIFN 𝐴 =
〈(𝑎1, 𝑎2, 𝑎3, 𝑎4), (𝑏1, 𝑏2, 𝑏3, 𝑏4)〉 is presented as Equation (A.13)  
 𝐸𝑉(𝐴) =
1
8
(𝑎1 + 𝑎2 + 𝑎3 + 𝑎4 + 𝑏1 + 𝑏2 + 𝑏3 + 𝑏4) 
(A.13) 
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A.2 Grey systems 
Grey systems theory was first introduced by Deng (1989). Grey theory can be applied 
in various research fields such as grey systems analysis, decision making, modelling 
and forecasting. Successful applications of grey system span a broad range of research 
in agriculture (Tang et al., 2008), energy (Malekpoor et al., 2018), transport (Hsu and 
Wen, 2000), innovation (Chalvatzis et al., 2019), just to name a few. In manufacturing 
sectors, the applications have produced considerable profits. The main merit of grey 
systems theory is its capability to produce satisfactory outcomes by using a relatively 
small amount of data (Govindan et al., 2016; Xia et al., 2015).  
Grey systems theory compared to many mainstream uncertainty theories, such 
as FST has appreciable features, particularly when it is necessary to deal with 
uncertain data and lack of information (Govindan et al., 2016; Yamaguchi et al., 
2007):  
• Grey systems generate satisfactory results utilising a relatively small amount 
of data. 
• Grey systems are robust regarding the noise and lack of modelling 
information. 
• Grey systems theory yields fairly flexible, non-parametric assumptions. 
The basic definitions of grey systems are provided as follows: 
Definition A.8. A grey number ⊗𝑋 is defined as an interval with known upper and 
lower bounds which are shown by 𝑋 and 𝑋 , respectively, but there is no known 
distribution information for 𝑋  (Deng, 1989; Vafadarnikjoo et al., 2018). It is 
represented in Equation (A.14). 
 ⊗𝑋 = [𝑋, 𝑋] = [𝑋′ ∈⊗ 𝑋|𝑋 ≤ 𝑋′ ≤ 𝑋] (A.14) 
  
Definition A.9. Given ⊗𝑋1 = [𝑋1, 𝑋1] and ⊗𝑋2 = [𝑋2, 𝑋2] are two grey numbers 
then the basic operations of grey numbers can be defined as Equation (A.15) to (A.18) 
(Govindan et al., 2016; Liu and Lin, 2006).  
 ⊗𝑋1 +⊗𝑋2 = [𝑋1 + 𝑋2, 𝑋1 + 𝑋2] 
(A.15) 
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 ⊗𝑋1 −⊗𝑋2 = [𝑋1 − 𝑋2, 𝑋1 − 𝑋2] 
(A.16) 
 ⊗𝑋1 ×⊗ 𝑋2 = [𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑋1𝑋2, 𝑋1𝑋2, 𝑋1𝑋2, 𝑋1𝑋2), 𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑋1𝑋2, 𝑋1𝑋2, 𝑋1𝑋2, 𝑋1𝑋2)] 
(A.17) 
 ⊗X1 ÷⊗X2 = [X1, X1] × [
1
X2
,
1
X2
] (A.18) 
 
Definition A.10. The length of a grey number ⊗𝑋 is defined as Equation (A.19). 
 𝐿(⊗ 𝑋 ) = [𝑋 − 𝑋] (A.19) 
 
Definition A.11. Comparison of grey numbers (Li et al., 2007): 
Given ⊗𝑋1 = [𝑋1, 𝑋1] and ⊗𝑋2 = [𝑋2, 𝑋2] are two grey numbers, the possibility 
degree of ⊗𝑋1 ≤⊗𝑋2 can be defined as Equation (A.20). 
 𝑃{⊗ 𝑋1 ≤⊗𝑋2} =
𝑚𝑎𝑥 (0, 𝐿∗ −𝑚𝑎𝑥(0,𝑋1 − 𝑋2))
𝐿∗
 
(A.20) 
Where 𝐿∗ = 𝐿(⊗ 𝑋1) + 𝐿(⊗ 𝑋2) 
There are four possible cases on the real number axis to determine the relationship 
between ⊗𝑋1 and ⊗𝑋2 : 
(1) If 𝑋1 = 𝑋2 , and 𝑋1 = 𝑋2 , then ⊗𝑋1 =⊗ 𝑋2. Hence, 𝑃{⊗ 𝑋1 ≤⊗ 𝑋2} = 0.5 
(2) If 𝑋2 > 𝑋1 , then ⊗𝑋2 >⊗𝑋1 . Hence, 𝑃{⊗ 𝑋1 ≤⊗𝑋2} = 1 
(3) If 𝑋2 < 𝑋1 , then ⊗𝑋2 <⊗𝑋1. Hence, 𝑃{⊗ 𝑋1 ≤⊗𝑋2} = 0 
4-a) If {⊗ 𝑋1 ≤⊗𝑋2} > 0.5 , then ⊗𝑋2 >⊗𝑋1   
4-b) If {⊗ 𝑋1 ≤⊗𝑋2} < 0.5 , then ⊗𝑋2 <⊗𝑋1 
Definition A.12. (Stanujkic et al., 2012). Whitenised (whitened or crisp value) of a 
grey number is a deterministic number with its value between the upper and lower 
bounds of a grey number ⊗𝑋. The whitenised value 𝑥(𝜆) can be defined as Equation 
(A.21) in which 𝜆 is whitening coefficient and 𝜆 ∈ [0,1]. 
 𝑥(𝜆) = (1 − 𝜆)𝑥 + 𝜆𝑥 
(A.21) 
For 𝜆 = 0.5, the Equation (A.22) will be resulted: 
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 𝑥(𝜆=0.5) =
1
2
(𝑥 + 𝑥) (A.22) 
 
Definition A.13. Signed Distance: (Eberly, 2006; Stanujkic et al., 2012). Given ⊗
𝑋1 = [𝑋1, 𝑋1] and ⊗𝑋2 = [𝑋2, 𝑋2] are two grey numbers. Then, the distance between 
⊗𝑋1 and ⊗𝑋2 can be calculated as signed difference between their centres as shown 
in Equation (A.23). 
 𝑑(⊗ 𝑋1,⊗ 𝑋2) =
𝑥1 + 𝑥1
2
−
𝑥2 + 𝑥2
2
=
1
2
[(𝑥1 − 𝑥2) + (𝑥1 − 𝑥2)] 
(A.23) 
 
Definition A.14. (Liu and Lin, 2006). Given ⊗𝑋 = [𝑋, 𝑋] is a grey number and 𝑘 >
0 then Equation (A.24) is obtained. 
 𝒌 × [𝑋, 𝑋] = [𝑘𝑋, 𝑘𝑋] (A.24) 
 
A.3 Neutrosophic logic 
A.3.1 Neutrosophic set theory 
Atanassov (1986) proposed IFS as a development of the FST. The IFS was generalised 
to the Neutrosophic Set (NS), so as to present valuable information on how a DM 
would effectively deal with uncertainty within subjective judgements (Smarandache, 
1999, 1998). However, values of truth, indeterminacy, and falsity functions must be 
within [0,1] in order to be able to apply NS in real-world problems. The issue was 
that, they were within ]0−, 1+[ , where 1+ = 1 +  , and 0− = 0 −   , are non-
standard finite numbers (Ji et al., 2018; Rivieccio, 2008). Wang et al. (2010) solved 
the issue by introducing Single-Valued Neutrosophic Sets (SVNS) where truth, 
indeterminacy, and falsity functions are real values within [0,1] (Ji et al., 2018; Scherz 
and Vafadarnikjoo, 2019). Another generalisation of intuitionistic numbers is a 
Single-Valued Trapezoidal Neutrosophic Number (SVTNN). In Table A.1 a 
comparison between four uncertainty approaches is presented (Govindan et al., 2016; 
Liu and Lin, 2006; Smarandache, 2002). 
 
 
227 
 
Table A.1 A comparison between four uncertainty theories  
 Grey Systems 
Theory 
Probability 
Theory 
FS Theory NS Theory 
Study objects poor 
information 
uncertainty 
stochastic 
uncertainty 
cognitive 
uncertainty 
transcendental 
uncertainty 
Basic Sets grey hazy sets cantor sets fuzzy sets neutrosophic 
sets 
Methods information 
coverage 
probability 
distribution 
function of 
affiliation 
truth, falsity, 
indeterminacy 
membership 
functions 
Requirement any distribution typical 
distribution 
experience 3D 
neutrosophic 
space 
Objective laws of reality laws of 
statistics 
cognitive 
expression 
neutrosophic 
mathematics 
Characteristics small samples large samples experience philosophical 
viewpoint 
 
Recently, a growing number of scholars are working on SVNS from the Multi 
Attribute Group Decision Making (MAGDM) realm (Table A.2). While NST has been 
developed rapidly over the past few years, there are relatively limited studies looking 
into its practical applications, as most of the literature has focused on its theoretical 
advances (Vafadarnikjoo et al., 2018).   
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Table A.2 Decision-making under the NST environment 
Article Characteristics 
Abdel-Basset 
et al. (2019a)  
Proposed a type-2 neutrosophic number integration with the TOPSIS method. 
Wang et al. 
(2018) 
Developed a series of Maclaurin Symmetric Mean (MSM) aggregation techniques 
under single-valued neutrosophic linguistic environments and proposed 
procedures for solving MCDM problems. 
Liang et al. 
(2018) 
Developed a method based on the Single-Valued Trapezoidal Neutrosophic 
Normalised Weighted Bonferroni Mean (SVTNNWBM) operator to deal with 
Multiple Criteria Group Decision-Making (MCGDM) problems. 
Peng and Dai 
(2018) 
Introduced the Single Valued Neutrosophic (SVN) distance and similarity 
measures expressed by SVNN and a novel score function. 
Li et al. (2017) Proposed two aggregation operators based on neutrosophic information namely 
the Linguistic Neutrosophic Geometric Heronian Mean (LNGHM) and the 
Linguistic Neutrosophic Prioritised Geometric Heronian Mean (LNPGHM). Also, 
developed two MCDM methods under linguistic neutrosophic environments. 
Deli and Subas 
(2017) 
Presented a methodology for solving MADM problems with SVNN. 
Chen and Ye 
(2017) 
Proposed the Single-Valued Neutrosophic Dombi Weighted Arithmetic Average 
(SVNDWAA) and the Single-Valued Neutrosophic Dombi Weighted Geometric 
Average (SVNDWGA) operators to aggregate SVNN. 
Peng and Liu 
(2017) 
Proposed three algorithms to solve the single-valued neutrosophic soft decision-
making problem by EDAS, similarity measure, and level soft set. 
Stanujkic et al. 
(2017) 
Extended MULTIMOORA (Multi-Objective Optimisation by Ratio Analysis plus 
Full Multiplicative Form) by integration with SVNS. 
Liu and Zhang 
(2017) 
Integrated the Neutrosophic Hesitant Fuzzy Set (NHFS) with the VIKOR method. 
Ye (2017a) Developed Trapezoidal Neutrosophic Weighted Geometric Averaging (TNWGA) 
and Trapezoidal Neutrosophic Weighted Arithmetic Averaging (TNWAA) 
operators. On the basis of TNWGA, TNWAA, and the score function of the 
Trapezoidal Neutrosophic Number (TNN), a MADM method is established. 
Ye (2017b) Introduced a simplified neutrosophic harmonic averaging projection measure 
between each alternative and the ideal choice in the MADM problems. 
Ye (2017c) Proposed two correlation coefficients between Normal Neutrosophic Sets (NNS) 
and then developed a MADM method with NNS. 
Ye (2017d) Proposed a MAGDM method under an interval neutrosophic uncertain linguistic 
environment. 
Ye (2017e) Proposed a bidirectional projection measure of interval numbers and neutrosophic 
numbers and then developed a bidirectional projection-based MAGDM method. 
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In this section, some basic definitions of the NST are explained. 
Definition A.15. (Smarandache, 1999; Vafadarnikjoo et al., 2018) Given 𝑈 be a finite 
set of objects, and x denotes a generic element in 𝑈. The NS, 𝐴 in 𝑈 is presented by a 
truth-membership function 𝑇𝐴(𝑥), an indeterminacy-membership function 𝐼𝐴(𝑥), and 
a falsity-membership function 𝐹𝐴(𝑥). The 𝑇𝐴(𝑥), 𝐼𝐴(𝑥), and 𝐹𝐴(𝑥) are the elements of 
]0−, 1+[. The NS can be shown as Equation (A.25). 
 𝐴 = {< 𝑥, (𝑇𝐴(𝑥), 𝐼𝐴(𝑥), 𝐹𝐴(𝑥)) >: 𝑥 ∈ 𝑈, 𝑇𝐴(𝑥), 𝐼𝐴(𝑥), 𝐹𝐴(𝑥) ∈ ]0
−, 1+[ } (A.25) 
 
Note that 0− ≤ 𝑇𝐴(𝑥) + 𝐼𝐴(𝑥) + 𝐹𝐴(𝑥) ≤ 3
+ 
Definition A.16. (Vafadarnikjoo et al., 2018; H. Wang et al., 2010) Given 𝑈 be a finite 
set of elements, and x denotes a generic element in 𝑈. A SVNS, 𝐴 in 𝑈 is signified by 
a truth-membership function 𝑇𝐴(𝑥), an indeterminacy-membership function 𝐼𝐴(𝑥), 
and a falsity-membership function 𝐹𝐴(𝑥). The 𝑇𝐴(𝑥), 𝐼𝐴(𝑥), and 𝐹𝐴(𝑥) are the 
elements of [0,1]. The SVNS can be shown as Equation (A.26) 
 𝐴 = {< 𝑥, (𝑇𝐴(𝑥), 𝐼𝐴(𝑥), 𝐹𝐴(𝑥)) >: 𝑥 ∈ 𝑈, 𝑇𝐴(𝑥), 𝐼𝐴(𝑥), 𝐹𝐴(𝑥) ∈  [0,1] } 
(A.26) 
 
Note that 0 ≤ 𝑇𝐴(𝑥) + 𝐼𝐴(𝑥) + 𝐹𝐴(𝑥) ≤ 3 
For convenience, a SVNS 𝐴 = {< 𝑥, (𝑇𝐴(𝑥), 𝐼𝐴(𝑥), 𝐹𝐴(𝑥)) >: 𝑥 ∈ 𝑈} is 
sometimes shown as a 𝐴 = {< 𝑇𝐴(𝑥), 𝐼𝐴(𝑥), 𝐹𝐴(𝑥) >: 𝑥 ∈ 𝑈} called a simplified form. 
Definition A.17. (Deli and Subas, 2014; Vafadarnikjoo et al., 2018) A SVTNN ?̃? =<
(𝑎1, 𝑏1, 𝑐1, 𝑑1);𝑤?̃?, 𝑢?̃?, 𝑦?̃? > , 𝑎1, 𝑏1, 𝑐1, 𝑑1 ∈ ℝ , 𝑎1 ≤ 𝑏1 ≤ 𝑐1 ≤ 𝑑1, and 
𝑤?̃?, 𝑢?̃?, 𝑦?̃? ∈ [0,1] is a particular SVNN that  𝑇?̃?(𝑥), 𝐼?̃?(𝑥), and 𝐹?̃?(𝑥) are presented 
as Equations (A.27)-(A.29) respectively. 
 𝑇?̃?(𝑥) =
{
 
 
(𝑥 − 𝑎1)𝑤?̃? (𝑏1 − 𝑎1)⁄ 𝑎1 ≤ 𝑥 < 𝑏1
𝑤?̃?                                    𝑏1 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 𝑐1
(𝑑1 − 𝑥)𝑤?̃? (𝑑1 − 𝑐1)⁄          𝑐1 < 𝑥 ≤ 𝑑1
0                                         𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 (A.27) 
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 𝐼?̃?(𝑥) =
{
 
 
 
 (𝑏1 − 𝑥 + 𝑢?̃?(𝑥 − 𝑎1)) (𝑏1 − 𝑎1)⁄ 𝑎1 ≤ 𝑥 < 𝑏1
𝑢?̃?                                     𝑏1 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 𝑐1
(𝑥 − 𝑐1 + 𝑢?̃?(𝑑1 − 𝑥)) (𝑑1 − 𝑐1)⁄          𝑐1 < 𝑥 ≤ 𝑑1
1                                         𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 (A.28) 
 
 
 𝐹?̃?(𝑥) =
{
 
 
 
 (𝑏1 − 𝑥 + 𝑦?̃?(𝑥 − 𝑎1)) (𝑏1 − 𝑎1)⁄ 𝑎1 ≤ 𝑥 < 𝑏1
𝑦?̃?                                    𝑏1 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 𝑐1
(𝑥 − 𝑐1 + 𝑦?̃?(𝑑1 − 𝑥)) (𝑑1 − 𝑐1)⁄          𝑐1 < 𝑥 ≤ 𝑑1
1                                         𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 (A.29) 
 
Definition A.18. (Ye, 2017a) Given ?̃? =< (𝑎1, 𝑏1, 𝑐1, 𝑑1);𝑤?̃?, 𝑢?̃?, 𝑦?̃? > and ?̃? =<
(𝑎2, 𝑏2, 𝑐2, 𝑑2); 𝑤?̃?, 𝑢?̃?, 𝑦?̃? > be two SVTNN and 𝜆 > 0  and 𝑤?̃?, 𝑢?̃?, 𝑦?̃?, 𝑤?̃?, 𝑢?̃?, 𝑦?̃?  ∈
[0,1] ,  𝑎1, 𝑏1, 𝑐1, 𝑑1, 𝑎2, 𝑏2, 𝑐2, 𝑑2 ∈ ℝ , 𝑎1 ≤ 𝑏1 ≤ 𝑐1 ≤ 𝑑1, and 𝑎2 ≤ 𝑏2 ≤ 𝑐2 ≤ 𝑑2 
then Equations (A.30)-(A.31) are defined. 
 ?̃? + ?̃? =< (𝑎1 + 𝑎2, 𝑏1 + 𝑏2, 𝑐1 + 𝑐2, 𝑑1 + 𝑑2); 𝑤?̃? + 𝑤?̃? − 𝑤?̃?𝑤?̃?, 𝑢?̃?𝑢?̃? , 𝑦?̃?𝑦?̃? > 
(A.30) 
 𝜆?̃? =< (𝜆𝑎1, 𝜆𝑏1, 𝜆𝑐1, 𝜆𝑑1); 1 − (1 − 𝑤?̃?)
𝜆 , 𝑢?̃?
𝜆 , 𝑦?̃?
𝜆 > (A.31) 
When 𝑎1,𝑏1, 𝑐1,𝑑1,𝑎2,𝑏2, 𝑐2, 𝑑2 > 0 then Equations (A.32)-(A.33)  are correct.  
 ?̃??̃? =< (𝑎1𝑎2, 𝑏1𝑏2, 𝑐1𝑐2 , 𝑑1𝑑2);𝑤?̃?𝑤?̃?, 𝑢?̃? + 𝑢?̃? − 𝑢?̃?𝑢?̃? , 𝑦?̃? + 𝑦?̃? − 𝑦?̃?𝑦?̃? > 
(A.32) 
 ?̃?𝜆 =< (𝑎1
𝜆 , 𝑏1
𝜆 , 𝑐1
𝜆 , 𝑑1
𝜆);𝑤?̃?
𝜆 , 1 − (1 − 𝑢?̃?)
𝜆 , 1 − (1 − 𝑦?̃?)
𝜆 > (A.33) 
 
Definition A.19. (Wang and Zhong, 2009; Ye, 2017a) Let ?̃? =<
(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑑);𝑤?̃?, 𝑢?̃?, 𝑦?̃? > be a SVTNN. The score function of ?̃? is computed based on 
Equation (A.34): 
 𝑆(?̃?) =
1
12
(𝑎 + 𝑏 + 𝑐 + 𝑑)(2 + 𝑤?̃? − 𝑢?̃? − 𝑦?̃?)        𝑆(?̃?) ∈ [0,1] 
(A.34) 
 
Definition A.20. (Ye, 2017a) For comparison of two SVTNNs  ?̃? =<
(𝑎1, 𝑏1, 𝑐1, 𝑑1);𝑤?̃?, 𝑢?̃?, 𝑦?̃? > and ?̃? =< (𝑎2, 𝑏2, 𝑐2, 𝑑2);𝑤?̃?, 𝑢?̃?, 𝑦?̃? > on the basis of 
Equation (A.34), if 𝑆(?̃?) > 𝑆(?̃?) then ?̃? > ?̃?; if 𝑆(?̃?) = 𝑆(?̃?) then ?̃? = ?̃?.  
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Appendix B: Graph Theory-Definitions 
Definition B.1: order and size of a graph (Benjamin et al., 2015). The order of a graph 
𝐺 is the number of vertices (i.e. 𝑛) and the size of a graph 𝐺 is the number of edges 
(i.e. 𝑚) (In Figure 3.1, 𝑛 = 6 and 𝑚 = 7). 
Definition B.2: the degree of a vertex 𝑣 (Benjamin et al., 2015). The degree of a vertex 
𝑣 in a graph 𝐺 is shown as 𝑑𝑒𝑔𝐺𝑣 and is defined as the number of edges incident with 
the vertex 𝑣. Thus, in a graph 𝐺 with 𝑛 vertices, we have 0 ≤ 𝑑𝑒𝑔𝐺𝑣 ≤ 𝑛 − 1.  
For instance, in graph 𝐺, in Figure 3.1, 𝑑𝑒𝑔𝐺𝑓 = 0 (isolated vertex), 𝑑𝑒𝑔𝐺𝑎 = 3, 
𝑑𝑒𝑔𝐺𝑏 = 3, 𝑑𝑒𝑔𝐺𝑐 = 4, 𝑑𝑒𝑔𝐺𝑑 = 1, 𝑑𝑒𝑔𝐺𝑒 = 3 
Definition B.3: undirected graphs (Metcalf and Casey, 2016). In undirected graphs 
relationships between any two vertices are mutual.  
It means for instance if 𝑒 and 𝑐 in Figure 3.1 are connected vertices by an edge in an 
undirected graph, then 𝑒 is related to 𝑐, and 𝑐 is related 𝑒. The graph G in Figure 3.1, 
is an example of undirected graphs which are also named simple graphs. Social 
networks such as a high school class is an example where students in such a network 
can be modelled by undirected graphs. The reason is that the relationships between 
students in a high school class or people in any other social networks are mutual.   
Definition B.4: complete graph (Zhang, 2012). A graph 𝐾 with order 𝑛 (i.e. 𝐾𝑛) is a 
complete graph if between any pair of distinct vertices there exists an edge (Figure 
B.1).  
 
Figure B.1 A complete graph 𝐾4  
Definition B.5. path (Hein, 2001). A path is defined as a sequence of edges that is 
denoted by a sequence of vertices. 
For instance, in Figure B.1, there is a path 𝑝, 𝑞, 𝑟, 𝑜 with the length of 3 
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Definition B.6. cycle (Hein, 2001). A cycle is a path with equal beginning and ending 
vertices where no edge occurs more than once.  
For instance, in Figure B.1, a path 𝑝, 𝑞, 𝑟, 𝑝 is a cycle 
Definition B.7: connected graph (Hein, 2001). If there is a path between every pair of 
vertices, then the graph is named a connected graph.  
Definition B.8: subgraphs (Benjamin et al., 2015). A graph 𝐻 is named a subgraph of 
a graph 𝐺 if every vertex and edge of 𝐻 is a vertex and edge of 𝐺.  
Definition B.9: spanning subgraphs (Benjamin et al., 2015). If the subgraph 𝐻 of a 
graph 𝐺, has the same vertices as 𝐺, then 𝐻 is a spanning subgraph of 𝐺. 
Definition B.10: trees (Benjamin et al., 2015). A tree is a connected graph that 
contains no cycles. It is common to signify a tree by 𝑇.  
Theorem B.1. A graph 𝐺 is a tree if and only if every two vertices of 𝐺 are connected 
by only one path (The proof is provided in Benjamin et al. (2015)). 
Definition B.11: spanning trees (Wu and Chao, 2004). A spanning tree of a graph 𝐺 
is a subgraph of 𝐺 which is a tree and includes all the vertices in 𝐺.  
Definition B.12: a branch and a chord (Chakraborty et al., 2019). Let 𝐺 be a connected 
graph then an edge in a spanning tree 𝑇 of 𝐺 is named a branch and an edge of 𝐺 
which is absent in the given spanning tree 𝑇 is named chord.  
Definition B.13: directed graphs or digraphs (Bang-Jensen and Gutin, 2006). A 
digraph 𝐷 that is often written as 𝐷 = (𝑉, 𝐴) includes a non-empty finite set 𝑉(𝐷) of 
elements (vertices) and a finite set 𝐴(𝐷) of ordered pairs of distinct vertices (arcs). 
𝑉(𝐷) and 𝐴(𝐷) named vertex set and arc set respectively.  
In Figure B.2, a digraph 𝐷 is depicted as an example. The 𝑉(𝐷) and 𝐴(𝐷) in this 
example are as follows: 
𝑉(𝐷) = {𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧, 𝑡, 𝑢, 𝑣, 𝑤} 
𝐴(𝐷) = {(𝑥, 𝑦), (𝑦, 𝑧), (𝑦, 𝑡), (𝑧, 𝑡), (𝑡, 𝑢), (𝑢, 𝑣), (𝑢, 𝑤), (𝑤, 𝑢)} 
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Figure B.2 A digraph 𝐷 
In digraphs, for an arc like (𝑦, 𝑧) the first vertex 𝑦 is called tail and the second vertex 
is named head (i.e. 𝑧). It is also said that 𝑦 dominates 𝑧 or 𝑧 is dominated by 𝑦. An 
arc (𝑦, 𝑧) is often signified as 𝑦𝑧 (Bang-Jensen and Gutin, 2018). In this thesis, the 
arc (𝑦, 𝑧) is shown as 𝑎𝑦𝑧.  
Theorem B.2: Cayley’s tree formula. Cayley (1889) introduced the formula 𝑛𝑛−2 for 
counting the number of spanning trees in a complete graph with order n (𝐾𝑛). The 
proof is provided in Wu and Chao (2004). 
For instance, for a 𝐾4 graph (Figure B.1), 4
4−2 = 16 spanning trees can be 
obtained as shown in Figure B.3. 
 
Figure B.3 All spanning trees of a complete graph 𝐾4 
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Definition B.14: degree matrix (Chartrand et al., 2011). Let 𝐺 be a graph with 𝑉(𝐺) =
{𝑣1, 𝑣2, … , 𝑣𝑛}, then the degree matrix 𝐷(𝐺) = [𝑑𝑖𝑗] is a diagonal 𝑛 × 𝑛 matrix with 
diagonal values as are shown in Equation (B.35) 
 
𝑑𝑖𝑗 = {
𝑑𝑒𝑔𝑣𝑖 , 𝑖𝑓 𝑖 = 𝑗
0, 𝑖𝑓 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗
 
 
(B.35) 
Definition B.15: adjacency matrix (Siraj et al., 2012). Let 𝐺 be a graph with 𝑉(𝐺) =
{𝑣1, 𝑣2, … , 𝑣𝑛}, then the adjacency matrix 𝐴(𝐺) = [𝑐𝑖𝑗] where each element 𝑐𝑖𝑗 
represents the number of edges from vertex 𝑣𝑖 to vertex 𝑣𝑗. 
Theorem B.3. Kirchhoff’s matrix-tree theorem (Chartrand et al., 2011). Let 𝐺 be a 
labelled graph with adjacency matrix 𝐴(𝐺) and degree matrix 𝐷(𝐺), then the absolute 
value of any cofactor of the Laplacian matrix 𝐷(𝐺) − 𝐴(𝐺) results in the number of 
distinct spanning trees of 𝐺. 
The Kirchhoff’s matrix-tree theorem helps determine the number of distinct spanning 
trees of labelled graphs in general and not only in complete graphs.  
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Appendix C: All spanning trees by Gray code algorithm for ND 
and PI 
There are many algorithms in the literature for generating all possible spanning trees 
in undirected graphs as reviewed by Chakraborty et al. (2019). In this research, I have 
used Gray code algorithm developed by Naskar et al. (2009) using Gray codes. First, 
an initial tree 𝑇0 must be generated by any method such as Breadth-First Traversal 
(Hein, 2001). The 𝑇0 is comprised of 𝑛 − 1 branches and 𝑚 − (𝑛 − 1) chords. Then, 
2𝑚−(𝑛−1) binary representations are produced each of length 𝑚 − (𝑛 − 1) namely 
Gray codes. Subsequently, combination of 𝑛 − 1 branches and 𝑚 − (𝑛 − 1) chords 
are calculated for each Gray code in a way that output will contain (𝑛 − 1) edges. 
Finally, each combination should be checked if there is no cycle and it is a spanning 
tree. In this section, generating all spanning trees by the Gray code algorithm is shown.  
The undirected graph 𝐺 of the pairwise comparison matrix 𝐴 provided by expert 
4 in the UK energy risk dimensions analysis in Chapter 6 (Section 6.5.1.1). It indicates 
ND (Natural Disasters) as the most critical risk dimension (i.e. the best) and PI 
(Political Instability) as the least critical risk dimension (i.e. the worst) in the STE-
BWM and is represented in the Figure C.1.  
 
 
Figure C.1 The graph of pairwise-comparisons (ND and PI) 
The initial tree (tree no 1 in Table C.1) is shown in the Figure C.2 which is used as 
the starting tree, in the Gray code algorithm. 
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Figure C.2 The initial tree used in the Gray code algorithm (ND and PI) 
 
In Table C.1, the # means the graph is not a tree 
Table C.1 All-tree matrix (ATM) of the Gray code algorithm (ND and PI) 
Graph 
no. 
Tree 
no. 
𝒆𝟏 𝒆𝟔 𝒆𝟕 𝒆𝟓 𝒆𝟒 𝒆𝟐 𝒆𝟖 𝒆𝟗 𝒆𝟑 
Gray 
code 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0000 
2 # 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0001 
3 # 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0001 
4 2 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0001 
5 3 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0001 
6 # 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0001 
7 # 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0010 
8 4 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0010 
9 # 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0010 
10 5 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0010 
11 # 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0010 
12 6 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0100 
13 # 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0100 
14 # 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0100 
15 7 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0100 
16 # 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0100 
17 # 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1000 
18 # 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1000 
19 # 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1000 
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20 8 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1000 
21 9 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1000 
22 # 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0011 
23 # 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0011 
24 # 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0011 
25 # 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0011 
26 # 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0011 
27 10 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0011 
28 11 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0011 
29 12 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0011 
30 # 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0011 
31 # 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0011 
32 # 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0111 
33 # 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0111 
34 # 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0111 
35 13 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0111 
36 # 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0111 
37 # 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0111 
38 14 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0111 
39 # 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0111 
40 15 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0111 
41 16 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0111 
42 17 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1111 
43 18 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1111 
44 19 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1111 
45 20 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1111 
46 21 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1111 
47 # 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0101 
48 # 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0101 
49 # 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0101 
50 # 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0101 
51 22 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0101 
52 # 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0101 
53 23 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0101 
54 # 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0101 
55 24 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0101 
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56 # 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0101 
57 # 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1001 
58 # 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1001 
59 25 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1001 
60 26 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1001 
61 # 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1001 
62 # 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1001 
63 27 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1001 
64 # 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1001 
65 # 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1001 
66 # 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1001 
67 # 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0110 
68 # 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0110 
69 # 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0110 
70 # 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0110 
71 28 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0110 
72 29 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0110 
73 # 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0110 
74 # 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0110 
75 # 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0110 
76 30 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0110 
77 # 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1010 
78 31 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1010 
79 # 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1010 
80 32 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1010 
81 # 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1010 
82 33 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1010 
83 # 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1010 
84 # 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1010 
85 # 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1010 
86 # 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1010 
87 34 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1100 
88 # 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1100 
89 # 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1100 
90 35 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1100 
91 36 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1100 
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92 # 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1100 
93 # 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1100 
94 # 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1100 
95 # 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1100 
96 # 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1100 
97 37 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1011 
98 38 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1011 
99 39 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1011 
100 40 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1011 
101 # 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1011 
102 # 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1011 
103 # 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1011 
104 # 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1011 
105 # 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1011 
106 # 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1011 
107 41 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1101 
108 # 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1101 
109 # 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1101 
110 # 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1101 
111 42 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1101 
112 43 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1101 
113 44 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1101 
114 # 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1101 
115 # 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1101 
116 # 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1101 
117 # 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1110 
118 45 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1110 
119 # 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1110 
120 # 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1110 
121 46 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1110 
122 # 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1110 
123 # 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1110 
124 47 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1110 
125 48 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1110 
126 # 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1110 
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As an example, the spanning trees (no 2-6 in Table C.1) are depicted as follows: 
(2): 
 
 
(3): 
 
(4): 
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(5): 
 
(6): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
242 
 
Appendix D: Maximum Mean De-Entropy Algorithm 
The concept of entropy is utilised in information theory and is a measure for capturing 
uncertainty. The higher the entropy, the higher the expected uncertainty of single 
events indicating the higher instability level of the system. The Maximum Mean De-
Entropy (MMDE) algorithm utilises the concept of entropy to determine the helpful 
information in the total relation matrix of the DEMATEL method. It is carried out by 
obtaining a threshold to filter the redundant information in total relation matrix (Lee 
and Lin, 2013; Li and Tzeng, 2009).  
Definition D.1. (Lee and Lin, 2013). Given 𝑋 = (𝑥1, 𝑥2, … , 𝑥𝑛) with a corresponding 
probability 𝑃 = (𝑝1, 𝑝2, … , 𝑝𝑛) then the entropy 𝐻(𝑥) is defined as Equation (D.36) 
Where ∑𝑝𝑖 = 1 and 𝑝𝑖 ln 𝑝𝑖 = 0 if 𝑝𝑖 = 0 
 𝐻(𝑝1, 𝑝2, … , 𝑝𝑛) = −∑𝑝𝑖 ln 𝑝𝑖  (D.36) 
By Definition D.1, 𝐻(𝑝1, 𝑝2, … , 𝑝𝑛) is the largest if 𝑝1 = 𝑝2 = ⋯ = 𝑝𝑛 , and the 
largest entropy is represented as 𝐻 (
1
𝑛
,
1
𝑛
, … ,
1
𝑛
).  
Definition D.2. (Lee and Lin, 2013). Given 𝑋 is a finite discrete scheme, the de-
entropy of 𝑋 is defined as  𝐻𝐷  in Equation (D.37). Unlike entropy, which is used as a 
measure of uncertainty, the de-entropy can expound the amount of helpful information 
obtained from a specific dataset which reduces information uncertainty (Li and Tzeng, 
2009).  
 𝐻𝐷 = 𝐻 (
1
𝑛
,
1
𝑛
,… ,
1
𝑛
) − 𝐻(𝑝1, 𝑝2, … , 𝑝𝑛) (D.37) 
Definition D.3. (Lee and Lin, 2013) For each 𝑡𝑖𝑗 element of matrix 𝑇, that refers to a 
directed influence relation from factor 𝑥𝑖 (dispatch-node) to factor 𝑥𝑗 (receive-node), 
it can be shown as a triplet of (𝑡𝑖𝑗 , 𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥𝑗). Hence, the matrix 𝑇 can be regarded as a 
set 𝑇 with 𝑛2 pair ordered elements (in the set 𝑇, ordered dispatch-node set 𝑇𝐷𝑖and 
ordered receive-node set 𝑇𝑅𝑒  exist). Given 𝑚 is the number of variables in 𝑇𝐷𝑖 or 𝑇𝑅𝑒 
and the frequency of variables 𝑥𝑖 or 𝑥𝑗 is 𝑘, then the probability of the variable would 
be 𝑝𝑖 =
𝑘
𝑚
 noting that ∑𝑝𝑖 = 1. 𝐶(𝑇
𝐷𝑖) or 𝐶(𝑇𝑅𝑒) denotes the cardinal number of an 
ordered set 𝑇𝐷𝑖 or 𝑇𝑅𝑒  while 𝑁(𝑇𝐷𝑖) or 𝑁(𝑇𝑅𝑒) represents the cardinal number of 
different elements in set 𝑇𝐷𝑖 or 𝑇𝑅𝑒 . For example, if 𝑇𝐷𝑖 = {1,2,2,3,1} then 𝐶(𝑇𝐷𝑖) =
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5 and 𝑁(𝑇𝐷𝑖) = 3. The steps of the MMDE algorithm for obtaining a threshold value 
based on a matrix 𝑇 are elaborated as follows (Lee and Lin, 2013):  
Step 1: Ordered triplets 𝑇∗ construction 
Converting 𝑇 into an ordered set 𝑇 = {𝑡11, 𝑡12, … , 𝑡21, 𝑡22, … , 𝑡𝑛𝑛} then 
rearranging elements in descending order and converting to respective ordered triplets 
(𝑡𝑖𝑗 , 𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥𝑗) set called 𝑇
∗ 
Step 2: Dispatch-node set (𝑇𝐷𝑖) and receive-node set (𝑇𝑅𝑒) construction 
Taking the second and third elements from 𝑇∗ and then obtaining a new ordered 
dispatch-node set (𝑇𝐷𝑖) and receive-node set (𝑇𝑅𝑒) as shown in Equation (D.38) and 
(D.39) respectively. 
 𝑇
𝐷𝑖 = {𝑥𝑖} (D.38) 
 𝑇
𝑅𝑒 = {𝑥𝑗} (D.39) 
Step 3: 𝑀𝐷𝐸𝑡
𝐷𝑖 and 𝑀𝐷𝐸𝑡
𝑅𝑒  calculation 
Taking the first 𝑡 elements of 𝑇𝐷𝑖 and 𝑇𝑅𝑒 as new sets 𝑇𝑡
𝐷𝑖 and 𝑇𝑡
𝑅𝑒 respectively. 
By Equation (D.40)-(D.43), 𝑀𝐷𝐸𝑡
𝐷𝑖 and 𝑀𝐷𝐸𝑡
𝑅𝑒  can be obtained. 
 𝐻𝑡
𝐷𝑖 = 𝐻 [
1
𝑁(𝑇𝐷𝑖)
,
1
𝑁(𝑇𝐷𝑖)
, … ,
1
𝑁(𝑇𝐷𝑖)
] − 𝐻 [
𝑘1
𝐶(𝑇𝐷𝑖)
,
𝑘2
𝐶(𝑇𝐷𝑖)
, … ,
𝑘𝑡
𝐶(𝑇𝐷𝑖)
] (D.40) 
 𝐻𝑡
𝑅𝑒 = 𝐻 [
1
𝑁(𝑇𝑅𝑒)
,
1
𝑁(𝑇𝑅𝑒)
, … ,
1
𝑁(𝑇𝑅𝑒)
] − 𝐻 [
𝑘1
𝐶(𝑇𝑅𝑒)
,
𝑘2
𝐶(𝑇𝑅𝑒)
, … ,
𝑘𝑡
𝐶(𝑇𝑅𝑒)
] (D.41) 
 𝑀𝐷𝐸𝑡
𝐷𝑖 =
𝐻𝑡
𝐷𝑖
𝑁(𝑇𝑡
𝐷𝑖)
 (D.42) 
 𝑀𝐷𝐸𝑡
𝑅𝑒 =
𝐻𝑡
𝑅𝑒
𝑁(𝑇𝑡
𝑅𝑒)
 (D.43) 
 
Step 4: MMDE, 𝑇𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝐷𝑖  and 𝑇𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑅𝑒  identification 
Finding the maximum value of 𝑀𝐷𝐸𝑡
𝐷𝑖 and 𝑀𝐷𝐸𝑡
𝑅𝑒  and their respective set 𝑇𝑡
𝐷𝑖 and 
𝑇𝑡
𝑅𝑒 represented as 𝑇𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝐷𝑖  and 𝑇𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑅𝑒  
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Step 5: Maximum information set construction and threshold value determination 
Taking the first 𝑢 elements in 𝑇∗ as the subset, 𝑇𝑇ℎ , which comprises all elements of 
𝑇𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝐷𝑖  and 𝑇𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑅𝑒  , then the minimum impact value in 𝑇𝑇ℎ is the threshold value. 
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Appendix E: Best-Worst Method 
The Best-Worst Method (BWM) functions in a similar way to that of the Analytic 
Hierarchy Process (AHP) as both methods use pairwise comparisons. However, the 
BWM benefits from some advantages over the AHP, which has made it more popular 
in recent years. One merit is the BWM’s requirement of fewer comparisons than those 
required in the AHP. Secondly, the BWM consists of a lower complexity of 
comparisons as in the BWM only whole numbers (i.e., 1 − 9 scale) are utilised, while 
in the AHP, fractional numbers are also used (i.e. 1 9⁄ − 9  scale). Using whole 
numbers makes the evaluation process and interpretations much easier since they can 
more easily be measured by human perception and cognition. Thirdly, the BWM 
properly maintains the consistency of pairwise comparisons because the redundant 
comparisons are eliminated. This means that the derived BWM results are more 
reliable than the ones obtained by the AHP (Mi et al., 2019).  
The BWM has been successfully applied in a wide range of studies. Some of the 
recent applications of the BWM include: Circular Economy (CE) in the leather 
industry in Bangladesh (Moktadir et al., 2020); third-party logistics (Pamucar et al., 
2019); renewable energy integration (Vishnupriyan and Manoharan, 2018); power 
plants alternatives selection (Omrani et al., 2018); battery energy storage systems 
(Zhao et al., 2018); financial performance analysis (Alimohammadlou and Bonyani, 
2018); sustainable architecture (Amoozad Mahdiraji et al., 2018); acute leukaemia 
classification (Alsalem et al., 2018) and  sustainable supplier selection in  the plastics 
industry (Cheraghalipour and Farsad, 2018).  
 Huge efforts have been made to develop the BWM theoretically and integrate 
it with other techniques. Mi et al. (2019) recently reviewed the BWM literature 
providing insightful detailed information on the BWM theoretical extensions and 
practical applications. They have indicated that 67% of the BWM publications are 
related to the integration of the BWM. Almost half of this amount focused on the 
singleton integrations of the BWM while the rest integrated more than one method 
with the BWM. The most popular singleton integrations of the BWM include 
uncertainty (i.e. fuzzy information), Technique for Order Preference by Similarity to 
Ideal Solution (TOPSIS), VIKOR, and Fuzzy-Delphi Method (FDM). 
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A recent list of the BWM integrations include the Euclidean BWM (Kocak et al., 
2018); the Probabilistic Hesitant Fuzzy Elements (PHFE) and the BWM (Li et al., 
2019); the Z-number extension of the BWM (Aboutorab et al., 2018); the mixed grey-
based BWM and TODIM (Bai et al., 2019); the hybrid fuzzy BWM, and Complex 
Proportional Assessment (COPRAS) method (Amoozad Mahdiraji et al., 2018); the 
integrated BWM and VIKOR method (Cheraghalipour et al., 2018; Garg and Sharma, 
2018; Gupta, 2018a); the hybrid fuzzy TOPSIS and the BWM (Gupta, 2018b; Gupta 
and Barua, 2018; Lo et al., 2018); the hybrid BWM and ELECTRE method (Yadav et 
al., 2018); the fuzzy BWM and fuzzy MULTIMOORA (A. Liu et al., 2018); rough 
numbers and the BWM (i.e. RBWM) and VIKOR (S. Liu et al., 2018); the integrated 
Interval Rough Number (IRN) and the BWM (IRN-BWM) (Pamucar et al., 2019); the 
Mixed Integer Linear Model (MILM) to provide better approximate solutions to the 
original Non-Linear Model (NLM) in the BWM (Beemsterboer et al., 2018); the fuzzy 
BWM (Guo and Zhao, 2017; Hafezalkotob and Hafezalkotob, 2017; Ijadi Maghsoodi 
et al., 2019); the IF-BWM (Mou et al., 2017), and the hybrid Intuitionistic Fuzzy 
Multiplicative BWM (IFM-BWM) (Mou et al., 2016).  
The original Linear-BWM (L-BWM) procedure is explained below (Badri 
Ahmadi et al., 2017; Rezaei, 2016):  
Step 1: Identifying decision-making criteria (in this thesis, risk dimensions) 
A set of risk dimensions is identified. The identified risks can be signified by 
the notations {𝑟1, 𝑟2, … , 𝑟𝑛}. 
Step 2: Determining the best (i.e., the most critical) and the worst (i.e., the least 
critical) risks 
In this step, decision-makers identify the best (i.e., the most critical) and the 
worst (i.e., the least critical) risk dimensions. To do this, there is no need to construct 
a vector comparison matrix.  
Step 3: Establishing the Best-to-Others (BO) preference vector using a 9-point scale  
In this stage, experts use the linguistic 1 − 9 rating scale (Table E.1) to construct 
a preference vector of the most critical risk (i.e., best) over other risks. A rating scale 
of 1 means equal preference, and 9 means extreme preference. The resulting BO 
vector can be represented as 𝐴𝐵 = (𝑎𝐵1, 𝑎𝐵2, … , 𝑎𝐵𝑛). The notation 𝑎𝐵1 
denotes the 
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preference of the most critical (i.e., the best) risk dimension 𝐵 compared to risk 
dimension 1 , and obviously, the value of 𝑎𝐵𝐵 will be 1. 
Step 4: Establishing the Others-to-Worst (OW) preference vector using a 9-point scale 
In this stage, experts use the linguistic 1 − 9 rating scale (Table E.1) to construct 
a preference vector of others to the worst (i.e., the least critical) risk dimension. The 
OW vector can be represented as 𝐴𝑊 = (𝑎1𝑊, 𝑎2𝑊, … , 𝑎𝑛𝑊)
𝑇. In the OW vector, the 
notation 𝑎1𝑊 denotes the value of a verbal scale for a risk dimension 1 over the worst 
(i.e., the least critical) risk dimension 𝑊, and, naturally, the value of 𝑎𝑊𝑊  would be 
equal to 1. 
Table E.1 The importance rating scale 
Numerical scale Verbal scale 
𝟏 Equally important 
𝟐 Weakly more important 
𝟑 Moderately more important 
𝟒 Moderately Plus more important 
𝟓 Strongly more important 
𝟔 Strongly Plus more important 
𝟕 Very Strongly Plus more important 
𝟖 Very Very Strongly more important 
𝟗 Extremely more important 
 
Step 5: Finding the optimal weights of identified risks (𝑤1
∗ , 𝑤2
∗ , … ,𝑤𝑛
∗ )  
In this step, the optimised weight of each risk dimension is calculated by 
minimising the maximum absolute differences, as shown in the objective function of 
Model (E.44). 
 min 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑗 {|𝑤𝐵 − 𝑎𝐵𝑗𝑤𝑗|, |𝑤𝑗 − 𝑎𝑗𝑊𝑤𝑊|} (E.44) 
 subject to  
 
∑𝑤𝑗
𝑗
= 1  
 𝑤𝑗 ≥ 0 for all 𝑗  
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Model (E.44) is converted to a linear programming problem, which can be 
represented as Model (E.45): 
 Min 𝜉
𝐿
 (E.45) 
 subject to  
 |𝑤𝐵 − 𝑎𝐵𝑗𝑤𝑗| ≤ 𝜉
𝐿 for all j  
 |𝑤𝑗 − 𝑎𝑗𝑊𝑤𝑊| ≤ 𝜉
𝐿
 for all j  
 
∑𝑤𝑗
𝑗
= 1  
 𝑤𝑗 ≥ 0 for all 𝑗  
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Appendix F: Acquiring DMs’ confidence levels 
Table F.1 Acquiring DMs’ confidence on the best-to-others and the others-to-worst preferences 
Q1. Reflecting on your chosen best criterion and your provided preferences, to what degree do you 
have confidence on your provided best-to-others preferences? Please choose one of the following 
choices: 
󠅊 No  
Confidence 
󠅊 Low  
Confidence 
󠅊 Fairly Low  
Confidence 
󠅊Moderate  
Confidence 
󠅊Fairly High 
Confidence 
󠅊High 
Confidence 
󠅊Absolute 
Confidence 
Q2. Reflecting on your chosen worst criterion and your provided preferences, to what degree do you 
have confidence on your provided others-to-worst preferences? Please choose one of the following 
choices: 
󠅊 No  
Confidence 
󠅊 Low  
Confidence 
󠅊 Fairly Low  
Confidence 
󠅊Moderate  
Confidence 
󠅊Fairly High 
Confidence 
󠅊High 
Confidence 
󠅊Absolute 
Confidence 
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Appendix G: The CI values in NE-BWM 
In this appendix, CI values corresponding to various BWa , 
+ and 
−
 values have 
been shown (Table G.1). Note that by swapping values for  + and 
−
 the CI values 
will not change (The reason for that is clear in Equation (4.25) as interchanging  +
and 
−
 would not produce a new solution. For instance, for 2BWa =  and 0.68
−
=
and 0.90 + =  the CI  would be  0.274CI =  which is the same CI value for  2BWa =  
and 0.90 − =  and 0.68 + = ). Thus, for convenience those 
−
 and  + values are 
shown which produce unique CI values. The CI values for  1BWa =   are not shown 
because it is not possible that the best and worst criteria are equally important.  
 
Table G.1 The CI values in NE-BWM 

+
  −  2BWa =  3BWa =  4BWa =  5BWa =  6BWa =  7BWa =  8BWa =  9BWa =  
0.26 0.26 0.092 0.218 0.363 0.520 0.687 0.860 1.040 1.224 
0.26 0.38 0.109 0.257 0.428 0.612 0.807 1.010 1.218 1.432 
0.26 0.50 0.120 0.283 0.468 0.668 0.878 1.095 1.318 1.546 
0.26 0.68 0.132 0.307 0.506 0.718 0.941 1.169 1.403 1.641 
0.26 0.90 0.140 0.325 0.533 0.754 0.984 1.219 1.459 1.702 
0.26 1.00 0.143 0.331 0.542 0.765 0.997 1.235 1.476 1.721 
0.38 0.38 0.135 0.318 0.530 0.760 1.004 1.258 1.520 1.789 
0.38 0.50 0.153 0.361 0.600 0.860 1.134 1.420 1.715 2.017 
0.38 0.68 0.172 0.404 0.670 0.956 1.258 1.571 1.892 2.220 
0.38 0.90 0.187 0.438 0.723 1.028 1.348 1.678 2.015 2.358 
0.38 1.00 0.193 0.450 0.740 1.051 1.376 1.711 2.053 2.400 
0.50 0.50 0.177 0.419 0.697 1.000 1.321 1.655 2.000 2.354 
0.50 0.68 0.204 0.481 0.800 1.146 1.511 1.892 2.284 2.686 
0.50 0.90 0.227 0.533 0.883 1.261 1.658 2.070 2.493 2.926 
0.50 1.00 0.234 0.551 0.911 1.298 1.706 2.127 2.559 3.000 
0.68 0.68 0.241 0.570 0.948 1.360 1.796 2.251 2.720 3.202 
0.68 0.90 0.274 0.647 1.076 1.542 2.034 2.547 3.075 3.617 
0.68 1.00 0.286 0.675 1.121 1.605 2.115 2.646 3.193 3.752 
0.90 0.90 0.319 0.754 1.255 1.800 2.377 2.979 3.600 4.238 
0.90 1.00 0.336 0.793 1.320 1.893 2.500 3.132 3.785 4.455 
1.00 1.00 0.354 0.838 1.394 2.000 2.641 3.310 4.000 4.708 
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Appendix H: Spanning Trees Enumeration 
H.1 Enumerating All Spanning Trees 
Siraj et al. (2012) introduced the Enumerating All Spanning Trees (EAST) method to 
obtain prioritisation weights of criteria in pair-wise comparisons. The procedure of 
EAST is explained in the following steps (In this thesis, criteria are risk dimensions): 
Step 1: Obtain the criteria set 
 𝐶 = {𝐹1,𝐹2,… , 𝐹𝑛} (H.46) 
 
Step 2: Acquire the pair-wise comparison matrix of criteria 
The obtained pair-wise comparisons can be either complete (without missing values) 
or incomplete (with missing values).   
 𝐴 = [𝑎𝑖𝑗]    𝑖, 𝑗 = 1,… , 𝑛 (H.47) 
 
Step 3: Produce the corresponding graph of the pair-wise comparison matrix 
The graph can be produced by taking each criterion as a vertex then each non-empty, 
non-diagonal element of the pair-wise comparison matrix reveals that there is an edge 
between the two related vertices as in Equation (H.48), (𝑖, 𝑗) represents an edge 
between vertex 𝑖 and 𝑗.  
 (𝑖, 𝑗) = {
𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑠, 𝑎𝑖𝑗 ∉ ∅
𝑑𝑜𝑒𝑠 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑠𝑡, 𝑎𝑖𝑗 ∈ ∅
        𝑖 ≠ 𝑗 (H.48) 
 
Step 4: Generate all spanning trees 
The total number of possible spanning trees (𝜂) can be calculated using Kirchhoff’s 
matrix-tree theorem (Theorem B.3 in Appendix B). Then, a Gray code algorithm 
(Appendix C) can be used to generate all spanning trees. 
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Step 5: Compute the weights of criteria from each spanning tree 
Knowing that each obtained spanning tree has (𝑛 − 1) edges. The weight of 𝑖𝑡ℎ 
criterion in 𝑘𝑡ℎ spanning tree (𝑤𝑖
(𝑘)
) can be computed by solving a system of 𝑛 linear 
equations. For any spanning tree, the (𝑛 − 1) equations out of 𝑛 are constructed based 
on Equation (H.49), and the last one indicates the sum of weights must be equal to 1 
as shown in Equation (H.50).  
 𝑤𝑖
(𝑘) = 𝑎𝑖𝑗𝑤𝑗
(𝑘)
   ∀𝑘 = 1,… , 𝜂    𝑖, 𝑗 = 1,… , 𝑛   𝑖 ≠ 𝑗 (H.49) 
 
 ∑ 𝑤𝑖
(𝑘)𝑛
𝑖=1 = 1       ∀𝑘 = 1,… , 𝜂 (H.50) 
 
Step 6: Calculate the average of all weights and prioritise criteria 
Assuming 𝜂 is the total number of generated spanning trees then the final weights of 
criteria (𝑤𝑖) can be obtained based on the Equation (H.51) 
 𝑤𝑖 =
∑ 𝑤𝑖
(𝑘)𝜂
𝑘=1
𝜂
     ∀𝑖 = 1,… , 𝑛      (H.51) 
 
H.2 Geometric Mean of All Spanning Trees 
Lundy et al. (2017) explored the quality of the Geometric Mean of All Spanning Trees 
(GMAST) method and indicated that as EAST fails to adhere to geometric properties, 
GMAST can outperform EAST in obtaining final weights. The steps 1 to 5 in the 
GMAST is the same as EAST as explained in Section H.1 and the step 6 is as follows: 
Step 6: Calculate the geometric mean of all weights and prioritise criteria as shown in 
Equation (H.52).  
 𝑤𝑖 = √∏ 𝑤𝑖
(𝑘)𝜂
𝑘=1
𝜂
     ∀𝑖 = 1,… , 𝑛      (H.52) 
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Appendix I: Twelve states in a stratified game table 
Table I.1 Twelve states in a stratified game table for N=3 and M=4 
 
1SE  2SE  3SE  4SE  5SE  6SE  7SE  8SE  9SE  10SE  11SE  12SE  
1SE  𝑝11 × 𝑞11 𝑝11 × 𝑞12 𝑝11 × 𝑞13 𝑝11 × 𝑞14 𝑝12 × 𝑞11 𝑝12 × 𝑞12 𝑝12 × 𝑞13 𝑝12 × 𝑞14 𝑝13 × 𝑞11 𝑝13 × 𝑞12 𝑝13 × 𝑞13 𝑝13 × 𝑞14 
2SE  𝑝11 × 𝑞21 𝑝11 × 𝑞22 𝑝11 × 𝑞23 𝑝11 × 𝑞24 𝑝12 × 𝑞21 𝑝12 × 𝑞22 𝑝12 × 𝑞23 𝑝12 × 𝑞24 𝑝13 × 𝑞21 𝑝13 × 𝑞22 𝑝13 × 𝑞23 𝑝13 × 𝑞24 
3SE  𝑝11 × 𝑞31 𝑝11 × 𝑞32 𝑝11 × 𝑞33 𝑝11 × 𝑞34 𝑝12 × 𝑞31 𝑝12 × 𝑞32 𝑝12 × 𝑞33 𝑝12 × 𝑞34 𝑝13 × 𝑞31 𝑝13 × 𝑞32 𝑝13 × 𝑞33 𝑝13 × 𝑞34 
4SE  𝑝11 × 𝑞41 𝑝11 × 𝑞42 𝑝11 × 𝑞43 𝑝11 × 𝑞44 𝑝12 × 𝑞41 𝑝12 × 𝑞42 𝑝12 × 𝑞43 𝑝12 × 𝑞44 𝑝13 × 𝑞41 𝑝13 × 𝑞42 𝑝13 × 𝑞43 𝑝13 × 𝑞44 
5SE  𝑝21 × 𝑞11 𝑝21 × 𝑞12 𝑝21 × 𝑞13 𝑝21 × 𝑞14 𝑝22 × 𝑞11 𝑝22 × 𝑞12 𝑝22 × 𝑞13 𝑝22 × 𝑞14 𝑝23 × 𝑞11 𝑝23 × 𝑞12 𝑝23 × 𝑞13 𝑝23 × 𝑞14 
6SE  𝑝21 × 𝑞21 𝑝21 × 𝑞22 𝑝21 × 𝑞23 𝑝21 × 𝑞24 𝑝22 × 𝑞21 𝑝22 × 𝑞22 𝑝22 × 𝑞23 𝑝22 × 𝑞24 𝑝23 × 𝑞21 𝑝23 × 𝑞22 𝑝23 × 𝑞23 𝑝23 × 𝑞24 
7SE  𝑝21 × 𝑞31 𝑝21 × 𝑞32 𝑝21 × 𝑞33 𝑝21 × 𝑞34 𝑝22 × 𝑞31 𝑝22 × 𝑞32 𝑝22 × 𝑞33 𝑝22 × 𝑞34 𝑝23 × 𝑞31 𝑝23 × 𝑞32 𝑝23 × 𝑞33 𝑝23 × 𝑞34 
8SE  𝑝21 × 𝑞41 𝑝21 × 𝑞42 𝑝21 × 𝑞43 𝑝21 × 𝑞44 𝑝22 × 𝑞41 𝑝22 × 𝑞42 𝑝22 × 𝑞43 𝑝22 × 𝑞44 𝑝23 × 𝑞41 𝑝23 × 𝑞42 𝑝23 × 𝑞43 𝑝23 × 𝑞44 
9SE  𝑝31 × 𝑞11 𝑝31 × 𝑞12 𝑝31 × 𝑞13 𝑝31 × 𝑞14 𝑝32 × 𝑞11 𝑝32 × 𝑞12 𝑝32 × 𝑞13 𝑝32 × 𝑞14 𝑝33 × 𝑞11 𝑝33 × 𝑞12 𝑝33 × 𝑞13 𝑝33 × 𝑞14 
10SE  𝑝31 × 𝑞21 𝑝31 × 𝑞22 𝑝31 × 𝑞23 𝑝31 × 𝑞24 𝑝32 × 𝑞21 𝑝32 × 𝑞22 𝑝32 × 𝑞23 𝑝32 × 𝑞24 𝑝33 × 𝑞21 𝑝33 × 𝑞22 𝑝33 × 𝑞23 𝑝33 × 𝑞24 
11SE  𝑝31 × 𝑞31 𝑝31 × 𝑞32 𝑝31 × 𝑞33 𝑝31 × 𝑞34 𝑝32 × 𝑞31 𝑝32 × 𝑞32 𝑝32 × 𝑞33 𝑝32 × 𝑞34 𝑝33 × 𝑞31 𝑝33 × 𝑞32 𝑝33 × 𝑞33 𝑝33 × 𝑞34 
12SE  𝑝31 × 𝑞41 𝑝31 × 𝑞42 𝑝31 × 𝑞43 𝑝31 × 𝑞44 𝑝32 × 𝑞41 𝑝32 × 𝑞42 𝑝32 × 𝑞43 𝑝32 × 𝑞44 𝑝33 × 𝑞41 𝑝33 × 𝑞42 𝑝33 × 𝑞43 𝑝33 × 𝑞44 
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Appendix J: Survey for NR-DEMATEL 
Q1. On which of the following risk dimension(s) in the UK power supply chain can 
you provide assessments?  (Please choose as many as you can. Based on your selection 
you will rate the influence of each selected items to others.) 
  
 Climate Change (CC) 
 Natural Disasters (ND) 
 Environmental and Health Safety (EHS) 
 Technical Reliability (TR) 
 Operational Safety (OS) 
 Disease Outbreak (DO) 
 Political Instability (PI) 
 Industrial Action (IA) 
 Sabotage and Terrorism (ST) 
 Resource Availability (RA) 
 Market Failure (MF) 
 Affordability (AF) 
 
Based on the chosen risk dimension(s) in the Q1, the expert will answer to a number 
of questions, in the Q2 it is assumed that the expert selected Climate Change (CC) so 
he/she is only asked to answer one question with 11 evaluations (The influence scale 
is explained in Table 4.1). 
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Q2. To what extent do you think Climate Change (CC) can impact the following risks 
in the UK power supply chain? (NI=No Influence, LI=Low Influence, FLI=Fairly 
Low Influence, MI= Medium Influence, FHI=Fairly High Influence, HI=High 
Influence, AHI=Absolutely High Influence). 
 Influence Scale 
Climate Change influence on: NI LI FLI MI FHI HI AHI 
Natural Disasters (ND)        
Environmental and Health 
Safety (EHS) 
       
Technical Reliability (TR)        
Operational Safety (OS)        
Disease Outbreak (DO)        
Political Instability (PI)        
Industrial Action (IA)        
Sabotage and Terrorism (ST)        
Resource Availability (RA)        
Market Failure (MF)        
Affordability (AF)        
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Appendix K: All spanning trees by Gray code algorithm for ST 
and PI 
The undirected graph 𝐺 of the pairwise comparison matrix 𝐴 provided by expert 4 in 
the UK energy risk dimensions analysis in Chapter 6 (Section 6.5.1.2). It indicates ST 
(Sabotage and Terrorism) as the most critical risk dimension (i.e. the best), and PI 
(Political Instability) as the least critical risk dimension (i.e. the worst) in the STE-
BWM and is represented in the Figure K.1.  
 
 
Figure K.1 The graph of pairwise-comparisons (ST and PI) 
The initial tree (tree no 1 in Table K.1) is shown in the Figure K.2 which is used as 
the starting tree, in the Gray code algorithm. 
 
 
Figure K.2 The initial tree used in the Gray code algorithm (ST and PI) 
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In Table K.1, the # means the graph is not a tree 
Table K.1 All-tree matrix (ATM) of the Gray code algorithm (ST and PI) 
Graph 
no. 
Tree 
no. 
𝒆𝟐 𝒆𝟑 𝒆𝟓 𝒆𝟕 𝒆𝟗 𝒆𝟏 𝒆𝟒 𝒆𝟔 𝒆𝟖 
Gray 
code 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0000 
2 2 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0001 
3 3 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0001 
4 # 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0001 
5 # 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0001 
6 # 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0001 
7 4 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0010 
8 # 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0010 
9 5 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0010 
10 # 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0010 
11 # 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0010 
12 6 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0100 
13 # 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0100 
14 # 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0100 
15 7 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0100 
16 # 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0100 
17 8 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1000 
18 # 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1000 
19 # 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1000 
20 # 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1000 
21 9 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1000 
22 # 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0011 
23 # 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0011 
24 # 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0011 
25 # 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0011 
26 # 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0011 
27 # 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0011 
28 # 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0011 
29 10 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0011 
30 11 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0011 
31 12 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0011 
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32 # 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0111 
33 # 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0111 
34 # 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0111 
35 13 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0111 
36 # 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0111 
37 # 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0111 
38 14 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0111 
39 # 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0111 
40 15 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0111 
41 16 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0111 
42 17 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1111 
43 18 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1111 
44 19 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1111 
45 20 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1111 
46 21 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1111 
47 # 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0101 
48 # 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0101 
49 # 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0101 
50 # 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0101 
51 22 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0101 
52 23 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0101 
53 # 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0101 
54 # 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0101 
55 # 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0101 
56 24 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0101 
57 25 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1001 
58 26 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1001 
59 # 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1001 
60 # 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1001 
61 # 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1001 
62 # 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1001 
63 # 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1001 
64 # 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1001 
65 # 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1001 
66 27 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1001 
67 # 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0110 
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68 # 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0110 
69 # 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0110 
70 # 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0110 
71 28 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0110 
72 # 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0110 
73 29 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0110 
74 # 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0110 
75 30 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0110 
76 # 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0110 
77 31 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1010 
78 # 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1010 
79 32 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1010 
80 # 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1010 
81 # 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1010 
82 # 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1010 
83 # 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1010 
84 # 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1010 
85 33 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1010 
86 # 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1010 
87 34 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1100 
88 # 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1100 
89 # 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1100 
90 35 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1100 
91 36 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1100 
92 # 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1100 
93 # 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1100 
94 # 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1100 
95 # 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1100 
96 # 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1100 
97 # 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1011 
98 # 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1011 
99 37 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1011 
100 # 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1011 
101 # 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1011 
102 38 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1011 
103 # 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1011 
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104 39 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1011 
105 # 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1011 
106 40 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1011 
107 # 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1101 
108 41 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1101 
109 # 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1101 
110 # 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1101 
111 42 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1101 
112 # 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1101 
113 # 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1101 
114 43 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1101 
115 44 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1101 
116 # 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1101 
117 45 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1110 
118 # 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1110 
119 # 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1110 
120 # 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1110 
121 46 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1110 
122 47 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1110 
123 48 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1110 
124 # 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1110 
125 # 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1110 
126 # 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1110 
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Appendix L: Survey for stratified decision-making modelling 
In order to acquire the utility values and status transition probabilities, the following 
three sections are designed within the survey. 
Section 1: Utility values estimations for each strategy using the scale provided in the 
Table 7.2.  
Each expert was first asked to read the following definitions for the specific flooding 
risk mitigation strategy and answer Q1. Six questions like Q1 for each strategy are 
required to be answered by each expert. Here, just one of the questions for Awareness 
Raising is provided for the sake of simplicity. The definitions provided for each 
strategy are based on SEPA (2015) and provided in Table 7.5. 
Awareness Raising: 
Raising public awareness of flood risk is a duty of responsible authorities. Enhanced 
awareness of individuals, homes, and businesses regarding flood risk and related measures 
can lessen the total impact. 
Socio-economic scenarios for climate change analysis in the UK: 
L=Low Challenges to Mitigation and Adaptation 
M=Moderate Challenges to Mitigation and Adaptation 
H=High Challenges to Mitigation and Adaptation 
Challenges to Adaptation: Socio-economic conditions that, in the absence of climate-
related policies, would result in higher vulnerability, and less adaptation capacity for a 
given level of climate change.  
Challenges to Mitigation: Socio-economic conditions that in the absence of climate-related 
policies, would result in higher emissions, and poorly suited technological, or institutional 
conditions in order to reduce emissions. 
Impact levels of flooding hazard to the energy infrastructure: 
MI=Mild Impact 
Climate hazards are controllable and with no possibility of spreading out. They are not 
complicated and may cause a small damage to life and property. 
MO=Moderate Impact 
Climate hazards cover a wide range area and have a potential to spread out while affecting 
public daily activities. They would possibly cause damage to a large number of properties 
and cause death. Their complexity level is higher than level MI and in terms of search and 
rescue are very challenging but could be controlled by the government.  
SV=Severe Impact 
Any disaster caused at this level is more complex in nature compared to other levels and 
would affect a wide area (more than two states) and also would cause the highest damage 
possible to life and property 
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Q1: How is the effectiveness of "Awareness Raising" strategy in relation to flood 
prevention/preparedness/recovery in the Highland and Argyll, Scotland region under 
following circumstances? (You can choose more than one phrase in case you are uncertain 
between few choices). NE=No Effectiveness; LE=Low Effectiveness; FLE=Fairly Low 
Effectiveness; ME= Medium Effectiveness; FHE=Fairly High Effectiveness; HE=High 
Effectiveness; AHE=Absolutely High Effectiveness 
 NE LE FLE ME FHE HE AHE 
1.(L) challenges, 
and (MI) 
risk impact 
       
2.(L) challenges, 
and (MO) 
risk impact  
       
3.(L) challenges, 
and (SV) 
risk impact  
       
4.(M) challenges, 
and (MI) 
risk impact  
       
5.(M) challenges, 
and (MO) 
risk impact  
       
6.(M) challenges, 
and (SV) 
risk impact  
       
7.(H) challenges, 
and (MI) 
risk impact  
       
8.(H) challenges, 
and (MO) 
risk impact  
       
9.(H) challenges, 
and (SV) 
risk impact  
       
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Section 2: Obtaining status transition probabilities using scale provided in Table 7.3 
by getting answers of questions Q2-Q4.  
To be more clear, under optimistic scenario (scenario 1) (Table L.1), the aim is to 
identify the values shown as 𝑝21, 𝑝31 , and 𝑝32 by getting the answers of questions 
Q2, Q3 and Q4 respectively. Under cautious scenario (scenario 2) (Table L.2), the aim 
is to identify the values shown as 𝑝21, and 𝑝32 by getting the answers of questions Q2, 
and Q4 respectively. Knowing that sum of probabilities in each row must be equal to 
1. 
Table L.1 Status transition probability matrix under optimistic scenario 
  L M H 
 L 𝑝11 = 1.00 𝑝12 = 0.00 𝑝13 = 0.00 
P M 𝑝21 1 − 𝑝21 𝑝23 = 0.00 
 H 𝑝31 𝑝32 1 − (𝑝31 + 𝑝32) 
 
Table L.2 Status transition probability matrix under cautious scenario 
  L M H 
 L 𝑝11 = 1.00 𝑝12 = 0.00 𝑝13 = 0.00 
P M 𝑝21 1 − 𝑝21 𝑝23 = 0.00 
 H 𝑝31 = 0.00 𝑝32 1 − 𝑝32 
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Q2: What is the probability of status transition from Moderate Challenges to Mitigation 
and Adaptation (M) to Low Challenges to Mitigation and Adaptation (L) in the next 5 to 
20-year timescale in Scotland under following scenarios? AZ=Almost Zero; VS=Very 
Small; S=Small; M= Moderate; L=Large; VL=Very Large; AC=Almost Certain 
 AZ VS S M L VL AC 
1. Optimistic 
Scenario 
       
2. Cautious 
Scenario 
       
 
Q3: What is the probability of status transition from High Challenges to Mitigation and 
Adaptation (H) to Low Challenges to Mitigation and Adaptation (L) in the next 5 to 20-
year timescale in Scotland under following scenario? AZ=Almost Zero; VS=Very Small; 
S=Small; M= Moderate; L=Large; VL=Very Large; AC=Almost Certain 
 AZ VS S M L VL AC 
Optimistic 
Scenario 
       
 
Q4: What is the probability of status transition from High Challenges to Mitigation and 
Adaptation (H) to Moderate Challenges to Mitigation and Adaptation (M) in the next 5 to 
20-year timescale in Scotland under following scenarios? AZ=Almost Zero; VS=Very 
Small; S=Small; M= Moderate; L=Large; VL=Very Large; AC=Almost Certain 
 AZ VS S M L VL AC 
1. Optimistic 
Scenario 
       
2. Cautious 
Scenario 
       
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Section 3: Obtaining outcome transition probabilities using scale provided in Table 
7.3 by getting answers of questions Q5-Q7 
To be more clear, under optimistic scenario (scenario 1) (Table L.3), the aim is to 
identify the values shown as 𝑞21, 𝑞31 , and 𝑞32 by getting the answers of questions 
Q5, Q6 and Q7 respectively. Under cautious scenario (scenario 2) (Table L.4), the aim 
is to identify the values shown as 𝑞21, and 𝑞32 by getting the answers of questions Q5, 
and Q7 respectively. Knowing that sum of probabilities in each row must be equal to 
1. 
Table L.3 Outcome transition probability matrix under optimistic scenario 
  MI MO SV 
 MI 𝑞11 = 1.00 𝑞12 = 0.00 𝑞13 = 0.00 
Q MO 𝑞21 1 − 𝑞21 𝑞23 = 0.00 
 SV 𝑞31 𝑞32 1 − (𝑞31 + 𝑞32) 
 
Table L.4 Outcome transition probability matrix under cautious scenario 
  MI MO SV 
 MI 𝑞11 = 1.00 𝑞12 = 0.00 𝑞13 = 0.00 
Q MO 𝑞21 1 − 𝑞21 𝑞23 = 0.00 
 SV 𝑞31 = 0.00 𝑞32 1 − 𝑞32 
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Q5: What is the transition probability of flooding risk impact from Moderate risk impact 
(MO) to Mild risk impact (MI) in the next 5 to 20-year timescale in the Highland and Argyll 
area in Scotland under following scenarios? AZ=Almost Zero; VS=Very Small; S=Small; 
M= Moderate; L=Large; VL=Very Large; AC=Almost Certain 
 AZ VS S M L VL AC 
1. Optimistic 
Scenario 
       
2. Cautious 
Scenario 
       
 
Q6: What is the transition probability of flooding risk impact from Severe risk impact (SV) 
to Mild risk impact (MI) in the next 5 to 20-year timescale in the Highland and Argyll area 
in Scotland under following scenario? AZ=Almost Zero; VS=Very Small; S=Small; M= 
Moderate; L=Large; VL=Very Large; AC=Almost Certain 
 AZ VS S M L VL AC 
Optimistic 
Scenario 
       
 
Q7: What is the transition probability of flooding risk impact from Severe risk impact (SV) 
to Moderate risk impact (MO) in the next 5 to 20-year timescale in the Highland and Argyll 
area in Scotland under following scenarios? AZ=Almost Zero; VS=Very Small; S=Small; 
M= Moderate; L=Large; VL=Very Large; AC=Almost Certain 
 AZ VS S M L VL AC 
1. Optimistic 
Scenario 
       
2. Cautious 
Scenario 
       
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